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Animalism is the view that each of us, each human person, is identical to a 
human animal—a member of the species Homo sapiens. This project aims to 
formulate a version of animalism that accommodates our best current science, 
especially our current biology. There are three steps that I will make to this 
aim: first, I will argue that current (or ‘traditional’) versions of animalism have 
been unnecessarily relying on problematic metaphysics. Once a more 
scientifically-minded metaphysics has been established, I will argue that such a 
scientific metaphysics is better suited for defending and developing animalism 
in that evidence from biology (as well as other sciences) can be used to ground 
and bolster the position. This leads us to my second step: although animalism 
is more adequately defended and developed by our best current biology, said 
biology could be more easily understood if it was understood in non-substance 
terms. I will argue that a substantavist metaphysics is not as equipped to make 
sense of biological individuality as is certain non-substantavist alternatives. 
Biological individuality understood in terms of biological structures will be 
proposed and defended. A structural metaphysics is a non-substantavist 
metaphysics based on Ontic Structural Realism, a form of realism within the 
philosophy of science. With a structural theory of biological individuality in 
hand, I will make my third and final step: to articulate a scientifically informed 
animalism that is grounded in structure rather than substance. This structural 
animalism is preferable to its substance-based animalist alternatives in that it is 
more accommodating to our best current science. It is also able to better 
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This thesis aims to engage critically with animalism—the view that each of us is 
identical to a human animal—as well as posit and defend a unique version of 
animalism that I believe possesses many of the virtues of its predecessors yet 
evades many of their faults. To this end, I first show that animalism, as 
formulated, does not give adequate consideration to contemporary received 
views in biology and philosophy of biology. I then need to show a way in 
which a naturalised form of animalism can work in tandem with these received 
views in the philosophy of biology and biology.  
The claim that there is a tension between animalism and particular 
received views in biology (and philosophy of biology) should sound strange to 
those familiar with animalism. Apart from “animalism” (a term attributed, in 
the current context, to Snowdon (1991, p. 109)), the view has been referred to 
as “the biological approach” (Olson 1997a; Noonan 2003), and the “biological 
criterion” (D. Shoemaker 2008). These alternative names given to the animalist 
position may give the impression that animalism takes a serious attitude 
towards biology (in fact, as I will show in chapter 1, this relationship is one 
motivation for animalism). Given this, it may surprise one to discover that the 
contemporary biological sciences (or any of the sciences) have played a minimal 
role in debates concerning animalism. Few animalists have utilised biology or 
arguments from biology to motivate their position. Those who have employed 
such scientific evidence to motivate animalism will be discussed in this thesis. 
Still, I will show that even their arguments tend to be based on faulty or 
outdated science.  
 In arguing for my second aim—to provide a view of animalism that 
works alongside contemporary views in biology and philosophy of biology—I 
will attempt to naturalise the animalist position in a way that has not been 
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previously attempted (I will later motivate this attempt, as well as show why I 
believe it is necessary). In doing this, I will suggest that approaching animalism 
from the perspective of biology complicates the animalist position and creates 
possibilities for positions that were previously seen as untenable. I will suggest 
that a version of “new animalism”—a position conceived of, and a version of 
which was found problematic by Olson (2015)—serves as the most defensible 
animalist position.  
The form of “new animalism” I propose in this project I call structuralist 
animalism. The ‘structuralist’ in structuralist animalism refers to the structural 
realism discussed in philosophy of science and to a narrower version (called 
Ontic Structural Realism) that has been formulated in response to problems in 
physics (see, e.g., French and Ladyman 2003; Ladyman and Ross 2007; French 
2014). According to structuralist animalism, human persons are necessarily 
human animals, but this necessity does not spring from animals having some 
intrinsic essence; instead, the necessity comes from specific biological 
structures in the world. These biological structures, I argue, put constraints on 
our ability to understand and talk about the world and ourselves. One job for 
the structuralist animalist is to determine the relevant structure (or structures) in 
deciding the heuristic identity (or identities) that serve our needs as human 
animals. That is to say that I will argue that the animalist will only find as much 
“personal identity” in organisms as they have put in. At the same time, it would 
be unhelpful to debates regarding personal identity if the answer was this easy 
and, indeed, it is not. Although animalists will find only as much personal 
identity in organisms as they put it, certain aspects of biology can better serve 
animalists in this endeavour, whilst others may be unhelpful or cause a 
hindrance. These biological structures can be seen as different tools in a 
toolbox. Finding the best tool for the job at hand (in this case, understanding 
what we want from a theory of personal identity) is an interesting and 
worthwhile endeavour.     
Structuralist animalism, unlike its traditional alternatives, offers a 
compositional eliminativist (perhaps even compositional nihilist) explanation 
of our identity as animals insofar as they deny “animals” are objects (in any 
ontologically compositional sense). Although this may seem to put structuralist 
animalism in a strange position, I will show that there is precedent for this 
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move in debates regarding personal identity (see Hume 1738 [2009]; Unger 
1979c, a), consciousness (see Dennett 1991a), and philosophy of biology (see 
French 2014, ch. 12). I will also show that some animalists have accepted 
similar (although noticeably different) eliminativist ontologies (see van Inwagen 
1990; Olson 2004; Hershenov 2005; Olson 2013), and as such, a move to an 
eliminativist or nihilist form of animalism is not a radical departure from views 
that are already held in other (although related) topics. 
 Before I can get to the core of my project, it would be helpful to clarify 
precisely what animalism is and where it stands in relation to other proposed 
answers to the question of our nature. Section 1 of this introduction will offer 
some basic background clarifications concerning what animalism is, what it is 
not, and the kind of question for which it provides an answer. In section 2, I 
will provide the context for animalism’s role in the debate regarding personal 
identity by laying out the position that animalism has historically been seen as 
rejecting (i.e., the Psychological Criterion of personal identity). I will show how this 
position relates to John Locke’s conception of personal identity and how it has 
affected animalism historically and philosophically. In section 3, I will provide 
a prospectus of what is to come in this project. 
 
1. Animalism’s central claim 
Animalism is the view that we are animals (Blatti 2014; Olson 2015; Thornton 
2016b).  The “we” in “we are animals” refers to human persons, not persons 
simpliciter—animalists do not assert that all persons are animals. The possibility 
is left open as to the existence of non-animal persons (e.g., robot persons, deity 
persons, angelic persons, etc.). Similarly, animalists do not suggest that all 
human animals are human persons, as is seemingly the case with human 
foetuses and patients in persistent vegetative states (Olson 1997a, p. 17; 2007, 
p. 17; Blatti 2014, sect. 1.1).  
Neither is animalism the view that we are “constituted by” animals 
(Olson 1997a, p. 17; Blatti 2014, sect. 1.1; Olson 2015, p. 87) “where 
constitution is defined so that nothing can constitute itself” (Olson 2015, p. 
88). According to the view that we are constituted by animals, a person “is” an 
animal in the sense that they share the same material with one, not in the sense 
4 
 
that they are identical with one (Shoemaker 1984, p. 113). Versions of our 
being materially constituted by animals have been defended by Baker (2000) 
and S. Shoemaker (2008).1 
Animalism, then, states what kind of thing we are, and what we are, 
according to animalists, are human animals. This point is worth stressing as it 
gestures to the sort of question for which animalism provides us with a 
possible answer. The ‘traditional questions’ of personal identity have 
dominated discussions of the issue since Locke might consist of the persistence 
question, the evidence question, and the personhood question (Olson 2007, p. 16). The 
persistence question concerns numerical identity. That is, the persistence question asks 
what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for a person at T1 to be 
numerically identical with a person at T2 (p. 16).  
The evidence question concerns what evidence is used to determine 
whether or not a person or object at any given time is numerically identical 
with a person or object at a different time and how these different forms of 
evidence relate to one another (Olson 2007, p. 16). For instance, one may take 
the fact that many people intuitively believe us to be psychological beings as 
evidence favouring that view (see Nichols and Bruno 2010). Alternatively, one 
may suggest an approach by which we look at how our cognitive capacities 
evolved due to their being advantageous to the survival of Homo sapiens. The 
primacy of organismality over the cognitive faculties of such organisms seen in 
such approaches could count as evidence for our being fundamentally human 
animals rather than psychological beings (see, e.g., Snowdon 2014b, ch. 4.17). 
Although not explicitly stated by Olson, I take it that the evidence 
question can be applied beyond the persistence question to the other questions 
of personal identity. For example, I assume that biological evidence can lend 
itself to the possibility of our being human animals (and persisting has human 
animals) in the same way that psychological evidence can give lend itself to the 
possibility of our persisting in virtue of some psychological property (and 
perhaps to the view that we are something psychological.) Similarly, I take it 
that certain forms of evidence from psychology, neurology, etc., can help us 
 
1 The constitutional views held by Baker and S. Shoemaker will be described in more detail in 
the next chapter.  
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formulate answers to the personhood question by, for instance, telling us what 
psychological characteristics human persons have in common such that we 
deem them ‘persons’ rather than non-persons. 
Questions regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
personhood, i.e., what does it take for a thing to be a person rather than a non-
person, fall under the domain of the personhood question (Olson 2007, p. 16). 
Regarding the personhood question, I believe the question itself can be divided 
into two independent questions on the basis that it can be understood in two 
ways: the first way it can be understood is by asking, “what does it take for 
anything to be a person?” (call this the broad personhood question.)  The second way 
it can be understood is by asking, “what does it for a particular kind of thing to 
be a person?” (call this the narrow personhood question.)  
The difference between the broad and narrow personhood questions is 
important in that what it takes for one kind of thing to be a person (for 
instance, a human) may differ from what it takes for a different kind of thing 
to be a person (for example, a robot). At the same time, having a general idea 
of what we mean by “person” may be important in that it gives us a set of 
properties for which we ought to consider. If, for instance, we know that a 
“person” is any entity that has properties XYZ, then we know that any entity 
that has properties XYZ is a person. However, just because we know what 
properties make something a person doesn’t mean that we know what makes 
different kinds of entities have XYZ properties. Compare this to different 
power sources that are used to generate electricity. We can have a general 
account of what it means to generate electricity, but the way in which solar 
power functions to this end differs from the way that wind power functions to 
this end.  
 Unlike the traditional questions of personal identity described above, 
Olson takes animalism to stand as a response to a different question: “What 
kind of thing are we?” I will follow Olson (2015) in calling this the personal-
ontological question (p. 85). Olson (2007) relates the personal-ontological question to 
the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind. Whereas the mind-body 
problem seeks to understand the essential nature of mental phenomena, the 
animalists aim to understand the nature of the subject of mental phenomena (p. 
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15). Olson notes that the subjects of these enquiries are related, “but we could 
know a good deal about mental phenomena and their relation to the physical 
while knowing little about the basic metaphysical nature of mental subjects” 
(Olson 2007, p. 15). That is, just as we can make a distinction between the 
nature of mental phenomena and the nature of the subject of mental 
phenomena, we can make a distinction between the nature of persons (i.e., 
responses to the personhood question) and the nature of things that can be persons 
(i.e., a response to the personal-ontological question):  
 
The question of what we are is more or less completely unrelated to the 
personhood question. What qualifications a thing needs in order to 
count as a person is one thing; what sort of thing meets those 
qualifications—organisms, immaterial substances, bundles of 
perceptions, or what have you—is another  (Olson 2007, p. 16). 
 
Animalism (broadly speaking) only asks the question “what kind of thing are 
we?”—it is a position that stands only as a response to the personal-ontological 
question. Similarly, a response to the personhood question (e.g., a person is 
anything that is rational and consciously aware of itself) stands only as a 
response to the personhood question. Having an answer to the personhood 
question doesn’t necessitate that we are the kind of thing described by that 
answer, nor does it explain or necessitate the kinds of entities that can be the 
thing described by the answer.  
Similar to the difference between the personal-ontological and 
personhood question, the personal-ontological question also doesn’t directly 
answer the persistence question. That being said, a response to the personal-
ontological question (such as animalism) will imply an answer to the persistence 
question when conjoined with an account of what it takes for a human animal to 
persist through time (Olson 2015, p. 85). For example, suppose we assume that 
animalism is the best response to the personal-ontological question, and we 
take animals to be something that is essentially living. In that case, an answer to 
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the persistence question is implied: we persist (on this view) insofar as we are 
alive.  
Regarding this point, the persistence question may be implied by a 
response to the personal-ontological question—I take it that the reverse may 
also be true: knowing our persistence can imply what kind of thing we are. For 
example, suppose some evidence suggests that we track individuals over time 
in virtue of what memories they have. In that case, I take it that such evidence 
gives credence to an account of our nature that includes memories as a 
necessary component in some way.  Similarly, suppose some evidence suggests 
that we track individuals over time in virtue of some object that persists over 
time. In that case, I take it that such evidence is indicative of a view of our 
nature that includes bodies as a necessary component in some way. Put simply, 
if what we are can imply how we persist (even if some extra information is 
needed), then how we persist can imply what we are.  
The implications formed between answers to the personal-ontological 
and the persistence questions work both ways will become important in 
chapters 1 and 2. As I will show, since proponents of animalism and 
proponents of the Psychological Criterion are focusing on different kinds of 
evidence, it leads them to the opposite conclusion. Proponents of the 
Psychological Criterion tend to emphasise evidence concerning our mental 
capacities, which leads them to answer the persistence question in such a way 
that emphasises these mental capacities. These answers to the persistence 
question then lead them to embrace answers to the personal-ontological 
question implied from their answer to the persistence question. Likewise, 
animalists tend to emphasise our biological aspects and thus answer the 
personal-ontological question in such a way that emphasises our biological 
properties. From this answer to the personal-ontological question (in addition 
to claims about the persistence of organisms,) animalists embrace accounts of 
our persistence implied by their answers to the personal-ontological question.  
 Given that answering the personal-ontological question first leads to an 
implied response to the persistence question (and vice-versa,) I will ultimately 
argue that starting from these questions first is a mistake. It leads to the 
overlooking of some kinds of evidence over others. As such, I will argue that 
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starting with the evidence question is ideal when trying to understand what we 
are and how we persist. 
 
2. Animalism and the Psychological Criterion 
Animalism is typically seen as opposing the Psychological Criterion (or psychological 
approach) of personal identity (Blatti 2014, sect. 2.3). The psychological 
approach to personal identity is a position that offers an answer to the 
persistence question—it offers an answer to the question regarding what it takes 
for one thing to exist over time (Olson 2015, p. 87). According to the 
psychological approach, the necessary and sufficient conditions for survival 
consist only in some psychological relation (Olson 1997a, p. 13). It’s debatable 
precisely what this psychological relation is, and figuring out the relation has 
been a traditional problem in personal identity (p. 13).2 
Neo-Lockeans share a commitment to some version of the 
psychological criterion of personal identity (Blatti 2014, sect. 2.3). Thus it may 
come as no surprise that the chief rival of animalism is typically seen to be neo-
Lockeanism (sect. 2.3). It has been shown by Blatti (2014) that viewing the 
debate in this way (i.e., animalism vs neo-Lockeanism) can be harmless in the 
respect that neo-Lockeans share a commitment to some version of a 
psychological criterion of personal identity (sect. 2.3). However, he also notes 
that framing the debate in this way can be misleading in that this framing 
doesn’t capture the finer-grained differences amongst animalists and neo-
Lockeans. For instance, animalists differ on their reasons for resisting the 
psychological criterion, there are a variety of neo-Lockean positions that differ 
in important ways, and not all positions that oppose animalism are neo-
Lockean (sect. 2.3).  
Given that this project assumes some version of animalism to be 
correct, an in-depth look at anti-animalist positions (neo-Lockean or not) is 
unnecessary. At the same time, it would be difficult to overstate John Locke's 
effect on debates surrounding personal identity. S. Shoemaker (2008, p. 314) 
and Noonan (2003, p. 24) have both claimed that all discussion regarding 
 
2 Snowdon (2014b), I will occasionally refer to views that adhere to the psychological criterion 
as mentalism, and to proponents of such views as mentalists.   
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personal identity is a footnote to Locke, and Blatti (2014) has said that it is 
“undeniable that no single discussion of personal identity has done more to 
shape the current debate than the chapter titled ‘Of Identity and Diversity’” 
(sect. 2). Blatti (2014) also acknowledges that the chapter “Of Identity and 
Diversity”—the chapter in Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 
which Locke walks us through his philosophy of personal identity—has had an 
undeniable effect on animalism as it rose as an alternative to the Lockean 
approach to personal identity (2014, sect. 2) Due to the lasting importance 
Locke has had on the topic of personal identity, and animalism specifically, it 
would be amiss not to spend some time outlining Locke’s views on the topic as 
a way of framing both traditional animalism as well as the positions to which I 
will align myself during the course of this project.   
It has been said that to understand Locke’s position regarding personal 
identity, we must remember that he was concerned with formulating a view 
that was consistent with the problem of resurrection and immortality (Ayers 
1991, p. 205; Noonan 2003, p. 24), which in his time was a “fact” that had to 
be taken into account (Noonan 2003, p. 24). It is also worth bearing in mind 
that Locke was concerned with how we approach and understand concepts in 
our everyday social lives—he was a conceptual pragmatist (Alston and Bennett 
1988, p. 43ff; see also Noonan 2003, ch. 2.6).3  
Given these concerns, Noonan (2003, p. 27) suggests that Locke had 
three main aims in mind when formulating his theory of personal identity: the 
first was to formulate an intelligible theory of personal identity that could make 
sense of the resurrection and immortality whilst remaining independent of a 
dualistic metaphysics. The second was to have a theory of personal identity 
that considered our experiences of our personal identity over time, which we 
could not doubt. Thirdly, Locke wanted to formulate a theory of personal 
identity that took seriously the fact that our personal identity was something 
that matters to each individual in a way that the personal identity of others 
didn’t. That is, Locke held that each individual has a special concern for their 
 
3 Later, in chapters 5-7, I will show that Ontic Structural Realism (and thus structuralist 
animalism) are conducive to some degree of conceptual pragmatism. At the same time, I will 
argue that the Psychological Criterion is unable to accommodate how we approach and use our 
everyday concepts as well as other criterions such as the Biological Criterion (i.e., animalism).  
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own future in a way that they don’t have of the future of others, and 
formulated a theory of personal identity this belief.  
In formulating his theory of personal identity, Locke creates a three-
part ontology that he believes accounts for the identity of three distinct ideas 
we have, which are associated with the words ‘substance,’ ‘man,’ and ‘person’ 
(Noonan 2003, p. 27). In determining what the ideas are behind these words, 
Locke believes we can begin to think about and judge identity correctly, “for 
such is the Idea belonging to that Name, such must be the Identity [. . .]” (Locke 
1690 [1975], II.xxvii.7).  
 ‘Man’ is similar to plants (Locke 1690 [1975], II.xxvii.4) and brutes 
(II.xxvii.5), in that the identity of these things consists in nothing more than a 
material body which is organised in such a way that it is conducive to life (1690 
[1975], II.xxvii.6). “Man”, in particular, Locke argues, is nothing more than an 
animal of a certain form that continues to exist insofar as it partakes in the one 
and the same life (II.xxvii.8). To motivate this idea, Locke suggests that if one 
were to see “a Creature of his own Shape and Make”(Blatti 2014) (1690 [1975], 
II.xxvii.8), they would call this creature a “man”, even if the creature had no 
more reason than a cat or parrot. Likewise, he states that we would call a cat a 
“cat” and a parrot a “parrot” even if the cat or parrot were intelligent and 
rational (1690 [1975], II.xxvii.8).  
Locke argues that the idea behind the word ‘person’ is different from 
that of the word ‘man’, and thus he states we must first figure out the idea 
behind the word ‘person’ if we wish to find out its identity. He takes this idea 
to be “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places” 
(II.xxvii.9). He believes that this thinking can only be done by means of a 
consciousness that is inseparable and essential to it (II.xxvii.9). 
 Since thinking always coincides with consciousness, and since Locke 
believes that it’s this accompaniment that people refer to as their “self” (i.e., 
such that they can make the distinction between themselves and other thinking 
things,) Locke concludes that it is this sameness of rational being in which 




And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past 
Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the 
same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one 
that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Locke 1690 [1975], 
II.xxvii.9) 
 
Furthermore, Locke argues that the identity of substance is entirely 
irrelevant to personal identity (1690 [1975], II.xxvii.10). That is, it is irrelevant 
whether or not the same identical substance thinks in a person or if it is 
different substances that combine in thinking in a person—all that matters is 
that it is the same person that thinks (II.xxvii.10). Locke compares this latter 
possibility (the combination of substances that think in a person) to how 
animals have their identity preserved. This preservation occurs despite its body 
being organised by different particles of matter due to its partaking in the same 
continued life (II.xxvii.10).  
 The ability for personal identity to persist regardless of changing 
substances allows Locke to solve the problem of the resurrection (1690 [1975], 
II.xxvii.15). This was a problem that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
theologians and philosophers had debated in an attempt to account for the 
Bible’s prediction that on judgement day the dead would be resurrected (Blatti 
2014, sect. 2.1). If the prediction was true, then the problem of precisely what 
was to be resurrected had to be solved, as the body of the person seemed 
unlikely due to decomposition, consumption by other organisms, the constant 
change of the associated particles, etc. (sect. 2.1). Given that Locke’s account 
of personal identity is comprised only in terms of the same continued 
consciousness, and given that he is not at all concerned with substance, then a 
person (i.e., a continued consciousness) can “travel” from one substance to a 
different substance and be the same person. Thus, on Locke’s account, a 
person could exist in a soul at one time and a different soul at another time. 
Or, the person could exist in one body at some point in time and a different 
body at another. Through these changes, the person would altogether maintain 
their identity (Locke 1690 [1975], II.xxvii.15).  
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Locke’s human/person distinction also allowed him to formulate a 
thought experiment that has since been regularly used to defend a 
psychological criterion of personal identity (Blatti 2014, sect. 2.1). He provides 
us with the following: 
 
should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the 
Prince’s past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as 
deserted by his own Soul, everyone sees, he would be the same Person 
with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions (1690 [1975], 
II.xxvii.15).  
 
Regarding this thought experiment, Blatti (2014) has noted that it is not “a 
puzzle in need of explanation, but [. . .] a case whose apparent plausibility 
vindicates the human/person distinction (and thereby, his solution to the 
problem of the resurrection)” (sect. 2.1.).  
Locke’s human/person distinction has had a lasting impact on personal 
identity debates, so much so that it may have impacted how animalism has 
been received throughout history. For instance, Blatti and Snowdon (2016) 
note that the notion of our being animals was mostly absent in post-war 
analytic philosophy, despite the problem of personal identity receiving a 
considerable amount of attention during this time period (p. 2). The two 
philosophers’ conjecture that this absence may have been due to Locke’s 
discussion of personal identity and the distinctions he makes between the 
terms ‘animal’ and ‘person’:  
 
Locke’s treatment of these two terms and notions was so effective that 
it generated in people engaging with the problem the conviction that 
the notion of person is the central one fixing the type of thing the 
problem is about, with the consequence that the notion of an animal 




The impact Locke has had on animalism as an emerging alternative to the 
psychological approach was first noted by Blatti (2014), stating, “For whatever 
intuitive appeal animalism may seem to have in our secular, post-Darwinian 
climate, in the wake of Locke’s work, the falsity of animalism was long taken 
for granted” (sect. 2).   
Even if we assume the hindering effect Locke had on the emergence of 
animalism, the latter position doesn’t entirely disagree with many of the 
positions Locke posits. For instance, many animalists accept the 
human/person distinction (Blatti 2014, sect. 2.2). They typically agree with 
Locke’s account of personhood (sect. 2.2). Olson, in particular, notes that: 
 
to say that something is a person is to say that it can think in a certain 
way—that it is rational, that it is ordinarily conscious and aware of itself 
as tracing a path through time and space, that it is morally accountable 
for its action, or the like (Olson 1997, 32).  
 
Animalists, like Locke, believe that there is a difference between a person and 
an animal. Animalists, like Locke, also take certain properties (e.g., rational, 
ordinarily conscious, etc.) to be indicative of persons. To use the questions of 
personal identity described above, animalists agree with Locke on the personhood 
question—what does it take for some entity to be a person rather than a non-
person? 
 The difference between Locke (as well as anyone embracing the 
Psychological Criterion of personal identity) and animalists on this point is that 
animalists disagree that ‘person’ is what Wiggins (1980, p. 24) calls a “substance 
concept” (Olson 1997a, p. 27). To understand what a substance concept is, one 
must first understand what a sortal predicate is: a predicate “whose extension 
consists [. . .] of all the particular things or substances of one particular kind” 
(Wiggins 1980, p. 7). A concept that stands for a sortal predicate is a “sortal 
concept” (p. 8).  A substance concept is a sortal concept that can be applied to an 
individual for the entirety of its existence (p. 24). 
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Snowdon notes that considering ‘person’ a sortal concept is an 
assumption often made in discussions on personal identity. He refers to this 
assumption as ‘PS’ (i.e., Person Sortal), that is, the notion of a person is the 
notion of a kind of things which has built into it, or somehow attached to it, 
conditions for members of its kind to remain in existence (e.g., it’s a sortal 
concept) (Snowdon 2014b, p. 34).  Rather than being a sortal concept, 
animalists typically take ‘person’ to be a “phased-sortal” (see also, Olson 1997a, 
pp. 29-31; Blatti 2014, sect. 2.2). A phased-sortal is a sortal concept that cannot 
be applied to an individual for the entirety of its existence (Wiggins 1980, p. 
24). A substance concept is a concept that typically answers the question “what is 
x?” whereas a phased-sortal can only answer such a question appropriately in the 
appropriate tense (p. 24).   
Take, for example, the concept “philosopher”. A philosopher is a kind 
of thing that something can belong to for a certain duration of time (Olson 
1997a, p. 29), thus making “philosopher” a phased-sortal. “Philosopher” must be 
a phased-sortal because one does not come into existence as a philosopher, and 
likewise, one does not cease to exist if one ceases to be a philosopher (p. 29). 
Similarly, animalists take “person” to be a phased-sortal, allowing for there to be 
potential persons and former persons (p. 30). If “person” were a substance 
concept, then the possibility of potential persons and former persons would be 
incoherent (p. 29), given that substance concepts must be sortal concepts that can 
be applied to an individual throughout its entire existence. Unlike “person”, 
animalists take “animal” to be a substance concept—they take “animal” to be what 
we are fundamentally (p. 30).  
Many animalists also accept Locke’s identity criteria for human animals 
(that they persist insofar as they partake in the same continued life) (Blatti 
2014, sect. 2.2). Whether or not this “same life” criterion is beneficial or 
ultimately contradictory to animalism will be discussed in detail in chapter 7. A 
closely related topic (whether or not an animal continues to exist after death) 
will be discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
Although many animalists typically accept many of Locke’s positions 
regarding identity and personal identity, there is a big difference in how they 
respond to the personal-ontological question (i.e., “what are we?”). As noted above, 
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animalists may endorse Locke’s human/person distinction but, according to 
animalists, a person (at least a human person) is simply a phase that human 
animals typically go through. What we really are (i.e., the correct answer to the 
personal-ontological question) is a human animal, not the phase (i.e., the 
person) that the human animals go through.   
 
3. Prospectus 
As I noted above, this thesis proposes a defence of a new kind of animalism. 
Because of this, the view I defend is in contrast with the Psychological 
Criterion (i.e., views that maintain that there is a psychological aspect that is 
necessary for our existence and/or that we persist in virtue of that mental or 
psychological aspect.) Although animalism has traditionally been seen as the 
view that best comports with our intuitions about biology, I argue that the 
position, at least as it is currently articulated, is misguided by a metaphysics that 
fails to sufficiently take empirical science seriously. This unempirical 
metaphysics hasn’t accommodated biological phenomena (in all of their 
complexities) straightforwardly. Similarly, the current metaphysics used by 
animalists commonly relies on fictional cases in biology rather than real ones—
a reliance that I find problematic (and will argue against later on, in chapter 3.)  
As I mentioned above, I take it that the best question to answer first 
when approaching personal identity is what Olson has referred to as the evidence 
question. The evidence question is that which asks, “what pieces of evidence do we 
consider when formulating a theory of personal identity, and how do these 
pieces of evidence relate to one another?” This question, as it has been noted 
above, is distinct from the personal-ontological question (i.e., “what are we?”) that 
Olson emphasises and the persistence question (i.e., “what does it take for an 
individual at one time to be numerically identical with and individual at another 
time?”) that many proponents of the Psychological Criterion seem to 
emphasise. Chapters 1 and 2 will defend my evidence-first approach to 
personal identity by first considering what evidence we use to defend certain 
conceptions of our nature and persistence. After such evidence is in hand, I 
will then argue that certain pieces of evidence are stronger than others, and 
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thus we ought to accommodate them more in our conceptions of personal 
identity.  
In chapter 1, I will elucidate three arguments that have been made in 
favour of animalism: the Thinking Animals Argument, the Foetus Problem, and the 
Animal Ancestors Argument. As will be shown, all three of these arguments share 
an emphasis on the biological aspects of our nature and identity that, on the 
face of it, seem commonsensical. The Thinking Animals Argument, for instance, 
takes seriously the common tuition that many have that certain animals (such 
as human animals) have the ability to think. The Foetus Problem emphasises the 
common belief that each of us was a foetus for a period of time prior to our 
birth. The Animal Ancestors Argument takes seriously the view that each of us is a 
result of the evolutionary process. 
Apart from showing the similarities between the three arguments in 
support of animalism, I will also analyse some criticisms posed regarding them. 
In doing this, I aim to show which criticisms are problematic (for example, by 
being based on false or undefended premises) and which criticisms should 
cause animalists concern.  
In chapter 2, I turn my attention to some arguments that have been 
made against animalism. As will be shown, these anti-animalist arguments have 
a commonality in that they emphasise certain psychological features that we 
commonly take to be important to our nature. These anti-animalist arguments 
have also been categorised in ways that emphasise the methodologies that 
underpin them (see Snowdon 2014b). For instance, certain arguments are 
derived from real-world cases in which a person ceases to exist, yet a human 
organism continues to exist (such cases occur when an organism is in a 
persisted vegetative state.)  Other anti-animalist arguments rely on the kind of 
cases that, at least at the time of my writing this, can only occur in the realm of 
science fiction and fantasy.  
In response to the different methodologies utilised in anti-animalist 
arguments, I will argue that arguments based on thought experiments, 
common sense and/or language (i.e., cases that can only occur in science 
fiction and fantasy) have only limited use in practice. Specifically, such thought 
experiments may help us consider our intuitions, but they don’t help us 
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understand what we are. These fictional scenarios that we use to generate 
intuitions about our nature and persistence should, at best, be considered as 
weak evidence for what we are. At worst, such fictional accounts shouldn’t be 
considered as evidence at all. The same thing can be said about our linguistic 
uses and common-sense conception of what we are. It will be argued that 
common sense and linguistic practices cannot help us understand our nature or 
identity because it’s not clear what common sense or linguistic practices 
actually tell us about our nature or persistence. What will help us understand 
our nature and persistence is any evidence that has scientific merit (understood 
here in a loose manner): such evidence may be gathered following particular 
scientific methodologies or be used to defend certain scientific theories or 
hypotheses.  
Once the various pieces of evidence for our nature and persistence are 
on the table and the strength of each kind of evidence considered, I can focus 
on the varieties of animalism that have been fleshed out and hypothesised thus 
far in the literature. This is the purview of Chapter 3, in which I will focus on 
clarifying the differences between traditional animalism and new animalism. 
Traditional and new animalism are alike in that both categories propose that 
we are animals; both traditional and new animalism answer the personal-
ontological question the same. However, the two kinds of animalism differ in 
what they take organisms to be—traditional animalists take organisms to be 
individuals of a single kind, whereas ‘new’ animalists reject that a single kind of 
organism is adequate to understanding the complexities of biological 
individuality. This difference will lead me to adopt a naturalised form of 
animalism—a form of animalism motivated by, and that necessarily 
accommodates, scientific evidence and practice.  
A naturalised form of animalism makes new animalism much more 
plausible than has hitherto been acknowledged. Once we focus on a more 
naturalised metaphysics (e.g., a scientifically informed metaphysics as will be 
advanced in the previous chapter), it becomes clearer that what it means to be 
an organism—a biological individual—is much more complex and unintuitive 
than the animalist has traditionally taken it to be. To this effect, I argue that the 
animalist has to decide what to do with this complexity. They can either find a 
way to incorporate the traditional metaphysics used into our understanding of 
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biology (potentially leading to a pluralism of biological individuals) or by taking 
seriously the view that an alternative to the traditional substance views of 
metaphysics is needed.  
Chapter 4 looks at some of the accounts of biological individuality that 
biologists and philosophers of biology have proposed. It has been shown by 
Eric Olson (2021) that all of these solutions to the problem of biological 
individuality are similar in that they are definitional by nature. All of the 
accounts of biological individuality offered by biologists and philosophers of 
biology, Olson claims, suggest a set of properties some entity requires for that 
entity to count as an organism—the solutions complete the formula ‘for any x, 
x is an animal iff x has properties XYZ.’) Olson has criticised such definitional 
solutions because definitional solutions presuppose the existence of the 
individuals that are being defined. Furthermore, he shows that the existence of 
these individuals can only be accommodated in virtue of accepting certain 
controversial metaphysical theses. In replacing definitional accounts, Olson 
offers what can be called an existential solution of biological individuality. Such 
solutions propose the conditions under which a biological organism would 
exist—the solutions follow the formula ‘(ys)(∃x) x is an organism and the ys 
compose x iff…the ys….’) Although I agree with Olson that definitional 
solutions to the problem of individuality are problematic, I argue that 
existential solutions to the problem face their own problems. I provide several 
examples of what a solution to the existential problem could be and show that 
none of them are satisfactory. These unsatisfactory solutions result from the 
claim that biological individuals exist in a substantial way, which I will argue 
leads to either a problem of overlapping substantial kinds or a problem of 
diminishing the importance of certain kinds over others. Because of this, I will 
suggest that there is good reason to prefer a metaphysics that doesn’t rely on 
substances. 
On the issue of whether a substance-based or a non-substance-based 
metaphysics affords us with a better picture of biological entities) the position I 
propose can be compared to Jack Wilson’s position on biological individuality. 
Insofar as “substance” is treated in a narrow sense and refers to “things” or 
“objects” as opposed to “properties” or “events,” Wilson (1999) opts for the 
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more traditional route by grounding natural kinds in patterns in nature. In 
Wilson’s case, a natural kind is a “[. . .] shorthand for a complete description of 
particular properties of a particular object or process” (p. 43, my emphasis). 
Considering that Wilson takes natural kinds to be patterns in nature and also 
descriptions of properties of objects or processes, it must be that he takes 
patterns in nature to describe or “pick out” particular properties of a particular 
object or process. 
In chapter 5, I argue that the former option (i.e., that we articulate the 
complexity of biology in terms of a traditional, substance-based metaphysics) is 
less fruitful. Whilst I agree with Wilson that a “pattern in nature” picks out 
particular properties in nature, as well as that “[a] robust pattern is one that 
identifies a group of phenomena that share important causal or lawlike 
similarities” (p. 43). However, contrary to Wilson, I argue that organisms 
(along with all entities) are pattern-deep. That is, I don’t take patterns, or the 
properties they pick out, to be properties of an object (at least not in any robust 
ontological sense). This is to say that I forward a non-substantivist view of 
biological individuals. In particular, a non-substantavist view of biological 
individuals found in the metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) can, I 
believe, offer an interesting and fruitful direction for work on biological 
individuality. It does this by providing a framework to identify the “important 
causal or lawlike similarities” found in biology and referring to those patterns 
in a coherent way that doesn’t necessitate them being properties of an object.4 
I carry this structuralist approach of biology over to issues regarding 
animalism in chapter 6. Here I take a closer look at some arguments for and 
against animalism and show how a structuralist metaphysics can strengthen 
specific arguments in favour of animalism and offer objections to the 
arguments against animalism. At the same time, a structuralist metaphysics can 
offer certain avenues of criticism against proponents of the Psychological 
Criterion that a substance-based metaphysics cannot. 
 
4 It could be argued that properties are necessarily properties of an object. If this is the case, 
then proponents of OSR are mistaken in referring to properties in this way. This is an 
interesting question that I cannot begin to respond to here. 
20 
 
In chapter 7, I will consider what it means for something to endure and 
persist in a structuralist metaphysics. In particular, I will use forensic and 
medical sciences and necrophilic phenomena in biology and psychology as case 
studies for how we talk about corpses as scientific evidence. In this way, I will 
argue that human organisms are best understood as ceasing to exist at some 
point after death. Thus, I reject the view that human organisms cease to exist at 
death (known as the Termination Thesis). Not only is understanding human 
persistence in this way more straightforward in terms of our scientific 
discourse, but the persistence can be seen as being rooted in specific important 
biological structures that are referred to by forensic scientists, medical doctors, 
and even in the law of most countries.  
Lastly, in the Conclusion of this work, I will provide a brief overview of the 










In the Introduction to this work, I explained that animalism is the view that 
each of us—each human person—is identical to an animal (specifically, a 
human animal—a member of the species Homo sapiens.) I also explained how 
animalism is an answer to the personal-ontological question of personal identity; 
that is, it is an answer to the question “what are we?” This question was shown 
to be distinct from the persistence question—the question concerning numerical 
identity, which seeks to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
an entity at T1 to be numerically identical to an entity at T2. The personal-
ontological question was also shown to be distinct from the personhood question 
(i.e., the question about what it takes for something to be a person rather than 
a non—person) as well as the evidence question (i.e., questions regarding what 
evidence we use to determine numerical identity, and how these types of 
evidence relate to one another.)  
I explained in the introduction that one way of navigating the debate 
between animalists and proponents of mentalism (i.e., proponents of positions 
that regard our identity to be something essentially mental or psychological) is 
to take each position as responding to different questions about personal 
identity. Animalists such as Olson provide an answer to the personal-ontological 
question of personal identity. Animalists such as Snowdon provide an answer to 
the persistence question of personal identity. Mentalists also seem to begin their 
position by answering the persistence question whilst arriving at a different 
position than Snowdon.5 Once these initial questions are answered, the other 
personal identity questions are answered based on what can reasonably be 
implied by the answer to the first (such as how many animalists take our 
 
5 Lynn Rudder Baker may be a proponent of mentalism that doesn’t begin her position by 
responding to the persistence question, but rather the rather personhood question. This could be seen 
as her starting point given that her constitutional view of persons stems from the from persons 
being things that essentially have a first-person perspective (see, e.g., Baker 2000). Her view 
and some implications of it will be discussed below. 
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persistence to be whatever a human animal is—such an answer to the persistence 
question is implied by the animalist’s response to the personal-ontological question.) 
A question of personal identity that I argued receives not enough 
attention is the evidence question—questions concerning what evidence we use to 
determine questions of persistence and how different pieces of evidence used 
in this regard relate to one another. I suggested that the evidence question was the 
best starting point for discussing questions of personal identity, and the 
defence of starting the discussion here is the aim of this and the following two 
chapters. In these chapters, I will highlight some arguments for animalism 
(which is the aim of this chapter), arguments against animalism (the aim of 
chapter 2), and finally (in chapter 3) show that a naturalised metaphysics is best 
equipped to defending animalism.   
As mentioned above, the purpose of this chapter is to show some 
arguments for animalism and evaluate some of the objections to those 
arguments that have been raised by critics. In the process of doing this, I will 
offer some quick responses as to why some of these criticisms are 
unwarranted, miss the point, or are uncharitable and, as such, I won’t be 
discussing these objections further. At the same time, some of the objections 
made against arguments for animalism reveal issues that animalists ought to be 
concerned with. As such, I will highlight these objections and use them to 
foreshadow some larger issues within the conversation around personal 
identity. These objections will be analysed more in-depth in later chapters.  
The Thinking Animals Argument will be the first argument for animalism 
I cover (in section 1). In section 2, I will discuss what can be called the Foetus 
Problem. Lastly (in section 3), I will provide an exposition of the Animal 
Ancestors Argument. As we will see, these arguments all focus on things about 
ourselves that emphasise the ‘human’ aspect of ‘human person.’ That is, all of 
these arguments pick out and highlight beliefs and assumptions that are 
distinctively biological—beliefs and assumptions that most of us seem to share.  
 
1.1. Thinking Animals Argument (TAA) 
The Thinking Animals Argument (TAA) is predicated on the assumption that 
there are biological organisms of the species Homo sapiens that reside on planet 
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earth and that these H. sapiens have the ability to think. The argument can be 
set out as follows:  
 
P1: There is a human animal sitting in this chair 
P2: The human animal sitting in this chair is thinking 
P3: I am the thing sitting in the chair thinking 
Conclusion: I am the human animal sitting in the chair thinking. 
 
The strength of this argument is meant to come from the fact that many 
people intuitively find each premise true, in which case the conclusion must 
follow. It has been observed that it is difficult to deny any of these premises 
unless some “far-reaching” metaphysical work is done to make sense of their 
denial (Blatti 2014, Sect. 3.1). This hasn’t stopped philosophers from putting in 
that strong metaphysical work, of course, and several responses have come of 
it. P1 has been objected to by Zimmerman (2008) on the grounds that the 
truth of P1 is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion of the argument. P2 has 
been shown by Blatti (2014) to be objectionable according to Sydney 
Shoemaker’s functionalist views of mind, which leads Shoemaker to believe 
that animals cannot think. Lastly, P2 and P3 can be rejected out of ambiguity 
according to Baker’s constitution view or Noonan’s revisionist view of 
personal pronoun use. In the rest of this section, I will briefly consider and 
critique these objections.   
One problem that has been shown with the TAA comes from 
Zimmerman (2008), who notes that accepting the schema of the argument 
entails the acceptance of a number of animalism’s rivals (as well as animalism 
itself). He notes that Olson’s schema takes a form akin to:  
 
P1^: There is a human-shaped F sitting in this chair 
P2^: If there is a human-shaped F sitting in the chair, then it is thinking 
P3^: I am the one and only thinking thing sitting in this chair 
Conclusion^: I am an F 
 
A consequence of having such a schema is that F could be plausibly 
substituted with terms other than ‘human animal’ and still be true. Candidate 
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substitutions Zimmerman refers to are ‘mere body,’ ‘psychological person,’ 
((2008, p. 24) and ‘mere hunk of matter’ (2008, p. 25). Insofar as F could be 
replaced by these to make the premises just as plausible as if it were replaced 
by ‘human animal,’ then there needs to be independent justification for why we 
ought to see our identity relation to ‘human animal’ rather than ‘mere hunk of 
matter’ or ‘psychological person.’ Call this the Rival-Candidates Problem. 
Could F be replaced by ‘mere body,’ ‘psychological person,’ or ‘mere 
hunk of matter’? I’m not convinced that it can with ‘psychological person,’ and 
I’m not sure that animalism (broadly understood) is incompatible with our 
being a ‘mere body’ and ‘mere hunk of matter’—especially if an animal turns 
out to be just a particular kind of body or hunk of matter. That an animal is 
just a kind of body or ‘hunk of matter’ will be fleshed out in more detail 
throughout this work. However, even if such an understanding of ‘animal’ isn’t 
plausible—even if animals are more than mere bodies or hunks of matter—
taking ourselves to be anything but an animal doesn’t solve the problem of 
there being too many thinkers. 
Let’s consider what F would look like if it were replaced with 
‘psychological person.’ If F were replaced with ‘psychological person’, then 
there would be a human-shaped ‘psychological person’ sitting in the chair that 
I would have reason to believe that I share an identity relation to. If I am a 
human-shaped psychological person and also the only thinking thing in the 
chair (as P3^ stipulates), then the human animal that is also in the chair doesn’t 
have the ability to think (i.e., P2 is rejected).6 I will show why a rejection of P2 
is problematic momentarily, but first, let’s continue with what substituting F 
with ‘mere body’ would look like.  
By ‘mere body,’ Zimmerman seems to mean whatever possible 
composite object exists prior to, during, and after the animal dies. He asks, 
“[d]oes an animal continue to exist after it dies? Presumably not; but 
something does, a body that was there before death and that has the same 
history as the animal” (p. 24). In chapter 8, I will argue that animals do, in fact, 
survive death (as corpses), but for present purposes, I will assume Zimmerman 
is right that they don’t survive death and that the resulting thing left is ‘mere 
 
6 It seems like Zimmerman acknowledges this as well, as he refers specifically to Sidney 
Shoemaker as an example of how this idea would work out. As I will show shortly, Shoemaker 
does reject P2, although I don’t find his position tenable. 
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body.’ If F were substituted by a mere body understood in this way, and we 
assume that an animal is still sitting in the chair at the same moment that the 
mere body is, then the human animal that is also sitting in the chair must not 
think (a rejection of P2). Alternatively, the animal sitting in the chair at the 
same moment as the body does think, in which case, there are two thinking 
things (the animal and the body) sitting in the chair, and thus the problem of 
there being too many thinkers persists.  
The same problem shown above is true if F is taken to be a ‘mere hunk 
of matter.’ That is, any animal that coincides with a mere hunk of matter in the 
chair will be unable to think insofar as the hunk of matter does. Unless, of 
course, the animal thinks as well, in which case there is still the problem of 
having too many thinkers in the chair.  
All of this is to show that if (a) insofar as we take there to be an animal 
in the chair, and (b) insofar as we assume that animals can think, then (c) it 
doesn’t matter what we substitute F with. Regardless of how we fill that 
variable, it will always lead to a problem of there being too many thinkers. This 
is precisely what the TAA is meant to show: insofar as we believe ourselves to 
be anything but an animal, then there is a problem of there being too many 
thinkers.  
A similar problem to the Rival-Candidates Problem arises when we 
consider that parts of the thinking organisms can, themselves, be considered to 
think. Consider the following:  
 
P1’: There is a human head located near the chair 
P2’: The human head located near the chair is thinking 
P3’: I am the one and only thinking thing sitting in this chair 
Conclusion’: I am the human head 
 
In this argument, ‘human head’ could plausibly be replaced with any 
part of the organism. Thus, it’s not clear that animalists can accept the 
premises of the TAA without accepting that we are also identical to any of the 
thinking parts of the animal—at the very least, animalists need to provide some 
principled explanation for why we are the whole organism and not any of the 
parts. Call this the Thinking Parts Problem. 
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The main issue with the ‘thinking parts problem’ is that it pushes the 
boundaries of what is conceivable. If one adopts some form of panpsychism, 
then stating that a ‘left arm’ or ‘right nostril’ sitting in the chair is thinking may 
carry some weight. Beyond adopting a position of this sort, however, it’s 
difficult to see how such claims can be made in good faith. 
Although it’s unlikely anyone (apart, perhaps, from panpsychists) 
seriously takes any conceivable part (e.g., a left-arm) to think, it is undeniable 
that many take certain parts to have the capacity to think—these parts being 
the head or, more specifically, the brain. It is also undeniable that the brain 
plays an important role in the human animal’s capacity to think. Because of 
this, I take the strongest possible interpretation of the ‘thinking parts problem’ 
to be limited to the brain (or, perhaps, a whole head). Whether or not a brain 
(or head) can think on its own is, of course, open to speculation. 
Baker has also objected to the TAA, arguing that P2 (“the human 
animal sitting in this chair is thinking”) and P3 (“I am the thing sitting in the 
chair thinking”) are unclear as to whether not the thing that is thinking is doing 
so derivatively or nonderivatively. The distinction between the two helps her 
explain and defend her constitution-view of personal identity, whereby persons 
are non-identically constituted by animals. In order to understand Baker’s view, 
it will be helpful to start by articulating the relationship between what she calls 
primary kinds and circumstances. 
A primary kind is a kind of thing to which a particular individual belongs 
(and the only kind thing to which that particular individual fundamentally 
belongs). According to Baker, an individual x’s primary kind is referred to by 
using a substance noun when answering the question “what most 
fundamentally is x?” (Baker 2000, pp. 39-40). In terms of personal identity, for 
example, Baker takes our primary kind to be persons, whereas Olson, 
Snowdon, and myself take our primary kind to be an animal. This is due to 
Baker believing that we are essentially persons and contingently animals, and 
Olson, Snowdon, and I believing that we are essentially animals and only 
contingently persons. 
Circumstances are understood by Baker to be the various variables that 
provide the context that determines why a particular individual is the kind of 
thing that it is (Baker 2000, p. 41). For instance, a particular sheet of paper 
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constitutes a particular marriage license in virtue of certain legal conventions—
the legal conventions are the circumstances that make possible the 
constitutional relation between the sheet of paper and the marriage license.  
With the concepts primary kind and circumstances articulated, Baker goes 
on to informally describe constitution. She writes:  
 
Where being an F and being a G are distinct primary-kind properties, it is 
possible that an F exists without there being any spatially coincident G. 
However, if an F is in G-favorable circumstances, then there is a new 
entity, a G, that is spatially coincident with the F but not identical to it 
(Baker 2000, p. 42, original emphasis). 
 
If we have two different individuals (F and G), and each individual belongs to 
a different primary kind, G is constituted by F in instances where F exists in 
circumstances (i.e. in contexts) that are conducive to the bringing about G. 
Take, for example, a given individual piece of marble (call it ‘Piece’). Piece 
belongs to a primary kind—call this kind ‘Body.’ At any particular time, Piece 
will have the persistence conditions (along with any other properties) of Body 
in virtue of it belonging to that primary kind. At a later time, Piece is relocated 
to the workshop of a sculpture who begins sculpting Piece into a statue—the 
circumstances of which are conducive to the creation of statues (call these 
‘statue-favourable circumstances’). When Piece is in ‘statue-favourable 
circumstances’, a different entity comes into existence (call it ‘David’)—which 
belongs to a different primary kind (call it ‘Statue’). Given that David belongs 
to the primary kind Statue, it will have the persistence conditions (along with 
any other properties) that things of that kind have.  
But, ‘David’ and ‘Piece’ aren’t just two objects that share the same 
spatial boundaries. Baker argues that the relationship is also one of unity, 
claiming:  
 
[W]hen x constitutes y, there is a unitary thing - y, as constituted by x - 
which is a single thing in a sense [. . .] As long as x constitutes y, x has no 
independent existence. If x continues to exist after the demise of y, then 
x comes into its own, existing independently. But during the period that 
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x constitutes y, the identity of “the thing” – y, as constituted by x – is 
determined by the identity of y (Baker 2000, p. 46).  
 
According to Baker, when two coincident objects are in a constitutional 
relation, the identity of the whole unified object is understood by the identity 
of the ontologically superior—or higher-level—object. Thus, although Piece 
and David belong to two distinct primary kinds, the unified object (i.e., David 
constituted by Piece) is identified with the higher-level object (understood here 
as any object that is constituted by another), David. If David were ever to be 
put in a situation where the persistence of the kind Statue ends (for example, if 
it were to be broken into bits), then David would cease to exist, and Piece 
would “come into its own” and persist independently. 
As I mentioned earlier, Baker’s constitution view poses a problem for 
the TAA on the grounds that the ‘thing’ that is thinking in P2 (“the human 
animal sitting in this chair is thinking”) and P3 (“I am the thing sitting in the 
chair thinking”) is doing so derivatively or nonderivatively. According to Baker, “[. . 
.] x has H at t derivatively if and only if x’s having H at t depends wholly on x’s 
being constitutionally related to something that has H at t independently of its 
being constitutionally related to x” (Baker 2000, p. 47). That is, if an object (x) 
has a property in virtue of its constituted relation with a different object (y), 
and y has that property in virtue of it belonging to the primary kind that it does 
(not, in virtue of its constituted relation with x), then x has the property 
derivatively, and y has the property nonderivatively. 
If Baker is right in her belief that persons are constituted by animals, 
then ‘persons’ and ‘animals’ would have derivative properties in virtue of their 
constituted relationship. For example, Baker takes the first-person perspective 
to be a necessary and sufficient property of persons (this ‘first-person 
perspective’ property will be explored in more detail momentarily), and thus 
any person has the ‘first-person perspective’ property non-derivatively (it has it in 
virtue of being of the primary kind ‘person’). A human animal also has the 
‘first-person perspective’ property, although it has the property derivatively, i.e., 
human animals have the ‘first-person perspective’ property in virtue of their 
constituting a person. Baker refers to this derivation of properties from a 
higher-level object to a lower-level object downward derivation, and cases where a 
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higher-level object has properties in virtue of the object that constitutes its 
upward derivation. An example of upward derivation would be a person having high 
blood pressure, a property that the animal has nonderivatively, but the person 
has derivatively (i.e., in virtue of it being constituted by the animal with high 
blood pressure).  
Given the distinction between derivative and nonderivative properties, 
Baker takes P2 (“the animal in the chair is thinking”) of the TAA to be 
ambiguous as to whether the animal in the chair is thinking derivatively or if it 
is thinking nonderivatively. If the animal is thinking derivatively (i.e., if the 
animal is thinking in virtue of the person thinking), then the ‘thinking animal 
argument’ can be sound yet still cause no problem for psychological accounts 
of identity. This is due to the fact that, on Baker’s constitution-view, we can be 
identical to persons who have the ability to think nonderivatively and be non-
identically constituted by animals that have the ability to think derivatively. 
This is a result of Baker’s belief that identity is determined by an entity’s 
nonderivative properties (which must be the case given that entities have 
nonderivative properties fundamentally in virtue of their belonging to the 
primary kind that they do.) 
Similarly, the ‘thing’ in the chair thinking in P3 (“I am the thing sitting 
in the chair thinking”) could either be thinking derivatively or nonderivatively. 
If it’s thinking derivatively, then “I” am only non-identically constituted by the 
thing sitting in the chair thinking. “I” would only be identical to the thing 
sitting in the chair thinking if the “thing” were thinking nonderivatively—
something Baker takes to be characteristic of persons only. 
The problem with Baker’s account of the constitution relation—at least 
as it pertains to the current discussion—is that it hinges on the constituted 
object being ontologically superior to the object that constitutes it. Remember 
that, according to Baker, constituted objects exist in a hierarchy—David was 
described as ontologically superior to—or being an object of a ‘higher-level’—
than Piece. This hierarchy exists because when David comes into existence, a 
new object with new causal powers comes into existence. Thus, Baker states: 
 
If x constitutes y at a certain place and time, then there is a unified 
individual at that place at that time, and the identity of that individual is 
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determined by y. The object (y) that is constituted by something (x) but 
that constitutes nothing else is ontologically more significant than the 
thing (x) that constitutes it. The identity of the constituting thing is 
submerged in the identity of what it constitutes. As long as x 
constitutes y, y encompasses or subsumes x. (Baker 2000, p. 33). 
 
The claim that ‘higher-level’ objects are ontologically more significant is a 
substantial claim in need of substantial justification. Yet, Baker acknowledges 
that her belief that constitution is an asymmetric relation is pretheoretic (Baker 
2000, p. 33). If Baker’s belief is wrong—if constituted objects aren’t 
ontologically more significant than the objects that constitute them—then 
whether or not certain properties (such as the ‘first-person perspective’ 
property) are derivative or nonderivative is put into question because whether 
or not an entirely new entity (y) comes into existence when a different entity 
(x) is in a y-favourable circumstance is put into question.  
Baker does offer a metametaphysical position (i.e., a position 
concerning what metaphysics is, ought to be, and what kind of methods 
metaphysicians out to use) that could be seen as supporting her view that 
constituted entities are more ontologically significant than the entities that 
constituted them (see Baker 2008a)7 The position, which she calls ‘Big-Tent 
Metaphysics’ take there to be a close relationship between metaphysics and 
value such that things that we value have some kind of ontological status (the 
extent of this ontological status, or which things of value have it, are unclear). 
As a result of this close relationship between metaphysics and value, value acts 
as a constraint to the possible conclusions of metaphysics. (Olson 2008) has 
argued against Big-Tent Metaphysics on the grounds that metaphysics 
shouldn’t be constrained by other disciplines, and (Snowdon 2014b) has argued 
against the position on the grounds that some truths don’t have to do with 
value.  
In the following chapter, I will argue that Baker is right (contra Olson) 
in thinking that metaphysics needs to be constrained by other disciplines, but 
that (being sympathetic to Snowdon’s point that some truths have nothing to 
 
7 I more thorough explanation of metametaphysics and its importance to debates around 
personal identity (especially regarding animalism) will be addressed and argued for in chapter 3. 
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do with value) Baker is wrong in thinking that these constraining disciplines 
have to do with value. Given that I take Baker’s value-based metaphysics to be 
untenable (as I will argue for in the following chapter), I likewise take her 
position that the constitution relation is asymmetric to be problematic. Thus, I 
take her objections to P2 and P3 to pose no issue to the TAA. 
 Sydney Shoemaker also defends a constitution-view, although his 
works differently (A complete overview of these differences aren’t needed 
here, such differences, when they occur below, will be addressed.) Blatti (2014) 
has pointed out that Shoemaker’s functionalist theory of mind poses a problem 
for P2 (“the animal in the chair is thinking”) of the TAA because animals don’t 
have the ability to think according to Shoemaker’s theory. A full picture of 
Shoemaker’s functionalist theory of mind isn’t necessary here but, briefly, he 
summarises the view thus: 
 
[. . .] the functionalist view in question says that the psychological 
continuity that Neo-Lockean views take to constitute person identity is 
best viewed as the playing out over time of the functional roles of the 
various sorts of psychological states, and that given that such states are 
individuated by their functional roles, and given that persons are 
subjects of such states, psychological continuity of this sort must 
constitute the persistence of persons over time. (Shoemaker 2004, pp. 
525-526). 
 
Shoemaker’s functionalist view suggests that the right relation to pay attention 
to when formulating a theory of persistence (i.e., when answering the persistence 
question described in the introduction) is the relations between functional roles 
of things. The functional role of psychological states, for example, constitute 
the persistence of persons precisely because it’s persons that are subjects of 
those states (states that play out in a causal succession of mental functions).  
To flesh how functional relations work in more detail, Shoemaker takes 
there two be two sorts of unity relations: synchronic unity occurs between 
various mental states working together at the same time to rationalise a 
particular thing. For example, when a single individual has a belief (a mental 
state) and a desire (a different mental state) together bring about an action. 
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Diachronic unity relations occur when synchronic unity relations bring about 
other synchronic unity relations; the relations between the various synchronic 
unity relations are diachronically united (Shoemaker 2004, p. 526). For 
Shoemaker, these causally connected relations constitute the persistence (and 
thus the identity) of something because each state is causally dependent on the 
state that realised it, thus “[t]here is an internal relation between the properties 
a thing is capable of having and the persistence conditions for things of the 
sort it is” (Shoemaker 2004, p. 527). If the nature of the property is such that 
there is an internal relation, the property is thick (S. Shoemaker 2008, p. 319). 
An example of a thick property is mental properties because each mental state 
(or a synchronic unity of mental states) play a functional role that stands in a 
diachronic relation to other mental states that, themselves, have functional 
roles. Similarly, biological properties are thick because the functional role of, 
e.g., each organ (or, a synchronic unity of organs) stands in a diachronic 
relation to other organs that themselves play a functional role in the 
persistence of the organism.  
  To Shoemaker, animals (i.e., biological things) and persons (i.e., 
thinking things) are coincident entities, which he takes to be entities that have 
different persistence conditions. This, he believes, means that they cannot have 
identical properties. Coincident entities may share certain properties—such as 
micro-structural properties—that can be had by entities with different 
persistence conditions (which he calls thin properties (S. Shoemaker 2008, p. 
319; see also, 2004, p. 528). However, coincident entities don’t share the thick 
properties, which necessarily belong only to things with certain persistence 
conditions (e.g., mental persistence conditions, biological persistence 
conditions, etc.) Thus, Shoemaker denies that persons, bodies, and (assuming 
they are individuated differently than bodies) animals share the same physical 
properties (2004, p. 528).  
The difference in thick properties (e.g., mental properties and biological 
properties) leads Shoemaker to reject P2 of the TAA (i.e., the human animal 
sitting in this chair is thinking) because, on his view, human animals lack this 
capacity—animals don’t have the requisite thick properties (in this case, mental 
properties) to think. 
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The last objection to the TAA that I want to address has been made by 
Noonan, who objects to P2 and P3 on the grounds that only persons are 
capable of referring to themselves in the first person, and thus when animals 
are thinking in the first-person they aren’t referring to themselves (i.e., an 
animal), but to the person with whom they coincide. By revising the first-
person referent in this way, Noonan can accept that there is a multiplicity of 
thinkers (that is, both the animal and the person are thinking) without worrying 
which thinker (i.e., the animal or the person) he is. He states:  
 
[. . .] there is no epistemic worry since the question whether I am a 
person or animal answers itself, and there is no worry that we must say 
that there are two persons present, since there is a difference between 
the person and the animal which justifies denying that the animal is a 
person, namely that it is not an object of first-person reference, a self 
(Noonan 2012, p. 317).   
 
According to first-person revisionism, there is a thinking animal in the chair 
(P2), and I am in the chair thinking (P3), but that doesn’t entail that I am the 
animal in the chair thinking (the conclusion of the TAA) since I must be a 
person to refer to myself as “I”.  
 This conclusion may seem strange given that it creates a mystery as to 
how the animal and the person, sharing in identical thoughts, can differ in the 
cognitive capacities—why can the person think of itself in the first-person, but 
the animal cannot? Noonan acknowledges this concern but denies that there is 
cause for it because, on his view, the animal and the person do, in fact, have 
identical cognitive capacities. He states:  
 
To the question ‘Why is the animal not thinking of itself in the first-
person way given that the coincident person is?’, the answer is that this 
must be so given that there are the same in this respect: namely, that 
each is thinking of the person in the first-person way and neither is 




According to Noonan, the animal the person does share identical cognitive 
capacities: both the animal and person think, both have the same thoughts and, 
importantly, both the animal and the person refer to the person when thinking 
in the first-person.  
 The issue with Noonan’s first-person revisionism is that it’s not clear 
that it totally absolves the critic of the problem of there being too many 
thinkers. It may resolve what the first-person referent is in cases where there is 
more than one thinker (i.e., both the animal and the person refer to the person 
when thinking in the first-person), but it still acknowledges that there are two 
distinct thinking things (which is one more than it seems there should be.) 
“Don’t worry, animalist,” the first-person revisionist insists, “there may be two 
thinkers here, but at least they both refer to me as “I”.  
 An important aspect of the TAA that I want to emphasise is that 
proponents of the TAA highlight a capacity that we commonly take certain 
biological organisms (such as humans) to have: the capacity to think. I take it 
that any adequate objection to the TAA will have to address this assumption. 
Zimmerman’s criticism, it was argued, failed because it only suggested that 
other things (such as bodies or hunks of matter) might be able to think, thus 
not solving the problem. Zimmerman’s criticism merely shows that we could 
be identical to other thinking things; it doesn’t suggest how we are to account 
for more than one thinking thing. Baker’s objections to the TAA relies on 
there being an asymmetric relation between coincident entities. Similarly, 
Shoemaker’s objection to the TAA relies on coinciding entities having different 
properties that are closed off from one another. Lastly, Noonan’s argument 
against the TAA relies on how we account for the first-person perspective. 
This, I’ve shown, is an inadequate response because even if animals and 
persons each refer to the person when thinking the first-person, there are still 
two thinking entities—thus, the problem of there being too many thinkers isn’t 
resolved. 
 
1.2. Foetus Problem 
Another problem that the animalist has posed against mentalist theories of 
identity involves the common-sense view that all human persons were, at one 
stage in their lives, human foetuses. The Foetus Problem is a problem that Olson 
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(1997a; see also, Olson 1997b) claims anyone that embraces a psychological 
criterion of identity must face. As Olson sees it, the problem occurs as a 
consequence of the psychological criterion’s position that some psychological 
relation is necessary and sufficient for our persistence. As a result of this 
psychological necessity, it must be the case, he argues, that no human person 
was ever a foetus because foetuses don’t have the required psychological 
features of human persons (Olson 1997a, p. 73).  Olson writes:  
 
Just as I could not lose all of my mental contents and capacities and still 
survive, I could not have existed at some past time when I had no such 
mental features. Thus, I could not have been a human embryo or fetus 
(or at least a fetus in the earlier stages of its development, before the 
relevant psychological features are in place). According to the 
Psychological Approach, nothing could be a fetus at one time and a 
person later on. No person was ever a fetus, and no fetus ever becomes 
a person (1997a, p. 74) 
 
That no human person was ever a foetus is a conclusion that we should want 
to avoid, not least of all because our once being foetuses is what our biological 
science and folk wisdom tell us to be the case (Olson 1997a, p. 73). An 
advantage of animalism is that the position doesn’t seem to have to deal with 
the Foetus Problem. It is typically thought by the animalist that since we are 
human animals, and since human animals all go through a phase of being a 
foetus, then animalism is compatible with our once being a foetus (see, for 
instance, Olson 1997a, p. 91). It is concluded that animalism must be a more 
satisfactory response to what kind of thing we are since it does not entail a 
rejection of a belief that we usually hold.  
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000) has denied that there is a Foetus Problem 
in personal identity. She offers three arguments that will be discussed later (in 
chapter 6) because, if sound, these arguments would cause serious problems 
for animalism. One of Baker’s arguments against the Foetus Problem is of 




Baker argues that, contra Olson, our having never been foetuses does 
not go against any common sense understanding about our identity, stating 
“[c]ommon sense is not fine-grained enough to distinguish between x’s being 
identical to y and x’s being constituted by y” (p. 205). Furthermore, she argues 
that Olson is wrong to suggest that “[. . .] there does not appear to be a deep 
logical difference between saying, in the ordinary course of life, that I was once 
a toddler or an adolescent and saying, in the ordinary course of life, that I was 
once a fetus, or that I once lived inside my mother’s womb (Olson 1997b, pp. 
99-100). She writes, “[t]his assertion seems plainly false. We do, in the ordinary 
course of life, regard fetuses and adolescents as different kinds of things” 
(Baker 2000, pp. 205-206). She then provides us with an example that she 
believes demonstrates this fact, writing:  
 
[I]n the late seventeenth century, Mary, the Protestant wife of William 
of Orange, daughter of James II of England, a Catholic, and heir to the 
English throne, became pregnant. Many nonCatholics feared that she 
would finally have a son, who would be brought up as a Catholic. The 
birth of a son would have altered the order of succession, and the 
temporary Catholic rule (of James II) might have become permanent. 
Any male person of whom Mary was the mother would be a new heir. 
When Mary was five months pregnant, there was no new heir because 
there was at that time no new person. But if at that time, instead of 
there being a five-month fetus, there had been an adolescent son, there 
would have been a new person and a new heir. So, I think that from 
the perspective of common sense, we do in fact regard a fetus as a 
different sort of entity from an adolescent (Baker 2000, p. 206). 
 
Bakers’ example is meant to highlight what she sees as an obvious reference to 
foetuses and adolescents as different kinds of things in our everyday, common-
sense life. In particular, it shows that foetuses aren’t—but adolescents are—the 
kind of thing that can be heirs to a kingdom. 
I find it odd that Baker used this as an example because it’s not clear 
that it demonstrates the ‘common sense’ relation between a foetus and an 
adolescent that she thinks it clearly does. There are two reasons for this: the 
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first is that there is a seeming inconsistency between Baker’s contention that a 
common-sense understanding of identity is not fine-grained enough to make 
the distinction between identity relations and constitution relations and her 
above contention that common sense tells us there is a substantial difference 
between foetuses and adolescent children. For instance, the non-Catholics in 
Baker’s example could state their worry in two different ways: a worry 
stemming from the identity of the foetus, and the other stemming from the 
possible constitution relation that foetus may have to a human person. Thus, 
the group may state their worry as “any child of Mary (x) would be heir to the 
throne if x were a male. As such, when Mary became pregnant with x, we were 
worried x would be born and that x would be raised catholic. However, x 
ended up never being born.” Or, the group could state their worry as “any 
child of Mary (y) would be heir to the throne if y were male. As such, when 
Mary became pregnant, we were worried that the foetus (x) would come to 
constitute y and that y would be raised Catholic. However, x never came to 
constitute y.” The first example would have the non-Catholics take the foetus 
to be a stage in the life of their potentially Catholic future king. The second 
example would have the non-Catholics take the foetus to be a sign (perhaps a 
very strong and clear sign) of an impending king that may be Catholic. Baker is 
overstating what we can learn about our common sense understanding of the 
relation between foetus and human adolescent from this example because 
there is (at least) an equally plausible alternative interpretation to hers.  
The second reason Baker’s example doesn’t clearly express the 
common sense understanding of the foetus/adolescent relationship isn’t about 
the example itself but is about her interpretation of it. Namely, Baker’s 
interpretation of the phenomena she describes disregards what I take to be 
important aspects of the story—that the non-Catholics in her example became 
afraid only once Mary became pregnant. One may wonder why, in Baker’s view, 
anyone would be worried about a potential heir at that specific point. It seems 
a straightforward interpretation of the events in question would be that the 
common sense of the non-Catholics in question leads them to determine that 
the foetus Mary’s carrying is going to be born and potentially raised Catholic. 
Such an interpretation of the events not only considers the fear of the non-
Catholics but explains that fear in a straightforward way. Thus, it seems that an 
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identity relation between foetus and adolescent child is more plausible than a 
constitution relation between the two.  
Of course, the problems I’m describing aren’t limited to Baker’s 
specific example. As we will see, trying to do metaphysics by way of common 
sense is, at best, a starting point. That something is supported or not supported 
by common sense is not an argument—or, if it is, it’s not a very good one. 
This is partly due to common sense often being a bad indicator of what reality 
is really like. I only analyse Baker’s example to show that common sense can be 
interpreted in different ways (some, perhaps, more straightforward than others) 
and that any metaphysical theory should try to accommodate as much of the 
phenomena in question as it can (e.g., that non-Catholics were afraid Mary’s 
child, and heir to the throne, would be a male and raised Catholic).  
There are more productive methods of objecting to the Foetus 
Problem. For example, if there was reason to believe that human animals don’t 
have a foetus stage (e.g., if there was reason to believe that human animals 
begin their existence at the moment of birth), then the Foetus Problem 
wouldn’t exist because it would deny, on biological and/or metaphysical 
grounds, that any human animal was ever a foetus (regardless whether or not 
we are identical those animals). An objection of this kind, as well as other 
biologically informed criticisms of the Foetus Problem, will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 6. 
  
1.3. Animal Ancestors Argument (AAA) 
Another argument that supports animalism is the Animal Ancestors Argument 
(AAA). The argument was posited by Blatti (2012), and it takes the form of a 
reduction ad absurdum. He explains it thus, 
 
Assume for reductio that animalism is false. If you are not an animal, 
then nor are your parents animals. But then, nor are your parents’ 
parents, nor your parents’ grandparents and so on, as far back as your 
ancestry extends. In this case, the falsity of animalism entails the 
rejection of evolutionary theory (or at least that theory’s applicability to 
us), since it means denying that your distant ancestry includes beings 
who were animals. But, since the rejection of evolutionary theory is too 
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high a price to pay, we should reject the assumption that animalism is 
false (Blatti 2012, p. 686). 
 
According to Blatti’s argument, to reject animalism is to reject 
evolutionary theory because such a rejection would mean that we are no 
biological beings. If we aren’t biological beings, he reasons, then we can’t be 
the product of evolution as we wouldn’t be the kind of things that can evolve 
(i.e., biological beings).8 
Although Blatti acknowledges that the AAA isn’t a knockdown 
argument for animalism, he does believe that it serves us against some 
objections that could be posed. Take, for instance, the objection that he refers 
to as evolving persons. According to the evolving persons objection, we evolved from 
animals, but we are not animals ourselves. The idea here is that at some point 
in our animal ancestry, a thing was produced that shouldn’t be classified as an 
animal but as something else (e.g., a person). Such a view may be held by 
someone that has a constitutional view of persons (i.e., someone that takes us 
to be persons non-identically constituted by human animals). Someone who 
holds such a view could argue that we evolved from animals to persons that 
are non-identically constituted by animals. Contrary to the AAA, then, we 
would not have to reject evolutionary theory (as it pertains to us) by rejecting 
animalism. We did evolve from animals (we just evolved into something else).  
The evolving persons objection is problematic, according to Blatti, because 
it doesn’t seem like biologists take personhood as the most recent speciation 
stage that human animals have undergone (i.e., that we have transitioned from 
H. sapiens to what he calls Homo personae.) He argues: 
 
The reason is that evolution is not a process that begins with one kind 
of thing and results in another kind of thing: natural selection may 
operate so as to produce new varieties of organisms, but it does not 
operate so as to produce non-organisms. Whatever explanation a 
constitutionalist gives of the appearance of a new kind of thing – a 
 
8 It’s important to note that the AAA does not entail that no human organism is a human 
person. Insofar as ‘person’ isn’t a substance concept, animalists can still accept that most 
human animals are persons and, at the same time, accept that at one point in our evolutionary 
history there were animals that were not persons (Blatti 2012, p. 687). 
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person non-identically constituted by a human animal – it will not be 
an evolutionary story (Blatti 2012, p. 686). 
 
It’s not possible for human animals to evolve into some other substance that 
isn’t a human animal (such as a neo-Lockean person) because, according to 
Blatti, natural selection is not in the business of producing different substances 
from those that are currently in play. Given this, constitutionalists must give a 
non-evolutionary story for how we (persons non-identically constituted by 
human animals) came to be.  
 Blatti notes, however, that constitutionalists could suggest that at some 
point in time, something that can be properly understood as a new kind of 
thing was observed in some animals that are sufficiently psychological. The 
non-overlapping properties and capacities that are distinctive of animals and of 
this new kind of thing can be appealed to explain why the new kind of thing is 
associated with, but not identical to, animals. As such, we can explain animal-
constituted persons that are consistent with, but do not appeal to, evolutionary 
theory (2014, pp. 686-687). However, he suggests that we should be sceptical 
of non-evolutionary explanations of these new kinds of things because the 
capacities that are attributed to personhood (such as self-consciousness, 
rationality, etc.) can be explained in terms of adaptation to selective pressures 
(2014, p. 687).  
Furthermore, Blatti argues that an appeal to non-overlapping sets of 
properties and capacities isn’t really an argument against animalism but an 
assertion of its falsity given that this is precisely what is at issue between 
animalists and their rivals. Animalists claim that animals bear properties and 
capacities that are associated with personhood, and their opponents claim that 
they do not (Blatti 2014, p. 687). 
Another objection that the AAA helps dissuade against accepts that we 
are animals but argues that we are not identical to animals. Blatti refers to this 
objection as overstatement. According to overstatement, Anti-animalists could 
object to animalism by noting that, although evolutionary theory results in each 
of us being an animal, it doesn’t result in our being identical to an animal. Given 
this, evolutionary theory does not entail that animalism is true (likewise, 
animalism being false doesn’t entail evolutionary theory being false). As Blatti 
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correctly notes, it is the stronger identity claim (i.e., the claim that we are 
identical to animals) that animalists accept and that their opponents deny.  
 Sydney Shoemaker (2016) has suggested a distinction that Blatti 
considers to be a version of overstatement. Shoemaker suggests that the term 
‘animal’ has two equivocal senses: ‘biological animals’ and ‘animals’. Whereas 
‘biological animals’ have purely biological persistence conditions, ‘animals’ are 
psychological things that are constituted by (rather than identical to) biological 
animals (from here, I will refer to this narrower sense of ‘animals’ as p-animals 
to avoid confusion). 
Using the distinction between biological animals and p-animals, 
opponents of animalism may contend that it’s Shoemaker’s narrower sense of 
‘animal’ (i.e., p-animals) to which evolutionary theorists refer, and not the 
‘biological animals’ which animalists assume them to refer. If this were true, 
then animalists would be wrong to suggest that evolutionary biologists are 
referring to ‘biological’ animals, and thus would be wrong to argue that a denial 
of animalism entails a denial of evolutionary theory (i.e., because both 
‘biological’ animals and p-animals can be the result of evolution).   
In response to overstatement, Blatti notes that there is no evidence that 
evolutionary theorists understand ‘animals’ to refer to things that are not 
identical to animals but to things that are non-identically associated with 
animals (such as beings that are constituted by animals, i.e., p-animals). There is 
also no evidence that the word ‘animal’ is used differently depending on 
whether the animal in question is human or non-human. Given this, he 
concludes that “[. . .] the simplest interpretation of evolutionary theory’s 
assertions about animals treats them as referring non-derivatively to the 
animals themselves” (Blatti 2012, p. 688). 
In addition to this, proponents of Shoemaker’s version of overstatement 
have the problem of explaining the appearance of p-animals (a similar problem 
faced by those forwarding evolving persons.) The issue, similarly to evolving persons, 
is that any explanation of p-animals must be evolutionary if the belief in our 
having evolved is to be maintained. At the same time, p-animals are not the 
kinds of things that can result from evolutionary processes because, as Blatti 
believes, evolutionary processes do not produce non-organisms from 
organisms (Blatti 2012, pp. 688-689). 
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An argument against the AAA that hinges on evolutionary 
considerations will be considered and argued against in chapter 6, but for the 
present purposes, what needs to be appreciated is the driving assumption 
behind the argument—that evolution has produced the kind of thing that we 
are (i.e., human persons). That we are products of evolution seems to be a very 
common belief and, contra Shoemaker, understanding ourselves as biological 
organisms that have evolved (rather than p-animals) seems the most 
straightforward interpretation of this common belief. Still, there is another 
attempt that has been made to avoid the conclusion that we are organisms 
produced by evolutionary processes: deny that we are the kinds of things that 
evolve altogether. It is outside the purview of this project to take an in-depth 
look at objections that claim we are not the kind of things that evolve. 
However, a brief overview of two possible arguments made in this manner 
may be helpful.  
There are at least two kinds of arguments that could be made to 
conclude that we are not the kind of things that have evolved: Arguments from 
Meaning and/or Normativity, and what I will call Arguments from Human 
Exceptionalism. Arguments from Meaning and/or Normativity propose either that the 
search for any meaning and moral standards are futile insofar as we take 
ourselves to be biological organisms, or that given that there is such meaning 
and moral standards means that we must be more than biological organisms. 
Proponents of such ways of thinking can easily be found in the 
creationism/evolution debates, such as when Albert Mohler states that:  
 
[. . .] evolutionary theory stands at the base of moral relativism and the 
rejection of traditional morality. If human beings are not made in the 
image of God, and if the entire cosmos is nothing more than a freakish 
accident, morality is nothing but a mirage, and human beings -- cosmic 
accidents that we are -- are free to negotiate whatever moral 
arrangement seems best to us at any given time. Human life has no 
inherent dignity, morality has no objective basis, and we are alone in 
the universe to eat, drink and be merry before our bones join the fossil 




The point that Mohler is making here is that if we are organisms (as 
evolutionary theory states), then social contrivance rules the day: there is no 
inherent meaning (except, perhaps, whatever meaning we create for ourselves,) 
no inherent dignity (dignity is given to those that society deems worthy), and 
morality is relative to the norms of any particular social group.  
 A similar conclusion has been made by Baker (2000), who takes moral 
agency to presuppose personhood (p. 148). According to Baker, moral agents 
necessary (1) have the ability to ‘do things’, and (2) appreciate their ability to do 
things (p. 154). The first clause in the above conditions for moral agency is 
more restrictive than simply doing anything; it must have occurred in virtue of 
some attitude. Baker states:  
 
S does something in the relevant sense if and only if there is some 
occurrence o and some attitude of S’s such that o would not have 
occurred if S had not had that attitude (p. 149).  
 
An example of doing something in this restrictive sense is when I take a drink 
of coffee because I’m tired. There is a particular action (i.e., my drinking the 
coffee) that only comes about because of a particular attitude that I have (i.e., 
my belief that drinking coffee will help me stay awake to finish this chapter, 
along with a desire for me to do so). In this sense, Baker takes ‘doing 
something’ in this way to be conceptually tied to having attitudes such as 
beliefs, desires, and intentions (p. 150).  
‘Doing things’ in Baker’s sense isn’t sufficient for an entity to be a 
moral agent, however, as the entity must also appreciate ‘doing things’ in this 
way (Baker 2000, p. 152). By appreciate, Baker means that the entity that does a 
thing in the relevant way described above would be able to (1) claim or 
disclaim moral responsibility for the thing that was done in that sense (e.g., 
they would be able to claim that they are responsible for drinking the coffee) 
and (2) the entity would be able to recognise that they did a particular thing 
because of some attitude and that they would have done something different if 
they had a different attitude—they could try to change their attitudes (e.g., they 
could learn that water is better than coffee for staying up long-term, and thus 
drink water rather than coffee in the future.)    
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All of this is important to Baker’s understanding of a moral agent 
because only persons can satisfy the second condition (i.e., only persons can 
appreciate the fact that they ‘do things’ in the relevant way). Some animals can 
satisfy the first condition (i.e., ‘do things’ in such a way that they satisfy the 
above description), such as when cats eat because they are hungry. However, 
no non-human animal has the ability to think of itself as itself (p. 155). Only 
entities that conceive of themselves as themselves in this way can satisfy the 
second condition. As Baker argues:  
 
[. . .] to have a first-person conception of oneself as oneself just is to 
have a first-person perspective. Therefore, having a first-person 
perspective is a necessary condition for being a moral agent. Since, on 
the Constitution View, having the capacity for a first-person 
perspective is both necessary and sufficient for being a person, it 
follows that only persons are moral agents (pp. 155-156) 
 
That Baker takes moral agents to be persons necessarily, creates a problem for 
animalists because, if she is right, then animalists have to face either concede 
that their position is wrong (i.e., we aren’t biological things essentially, but 
rather persons essentially) or else claim that no human person has the 
necessary qualities to make them a moral agent. Both of these options are 
unsavoury. Luckily, there is good reason to think that Baker is wrong in her 
claim. To understand why, however, we must first take a look at the second 
argument against our having been evolved.  
What I’m calling Arguments from Human Exceptionalism claim that if we 
are animals (as evolutionary theory suggests), then we can expect ourselves to 
act like animals. We don’t act like animals (as these arguments suggest); 
therefore, we are not animals. Baker has argued that we are not animals using a 
similar argument to the one above. She notes that:  
 
[i]f we are nothing but animals, then either goals that people die for—
for example, extending the rule of Allah, furthering the cause of 
democracy, or something else—should be shown to promote survival 
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and reproduction or those people who pursue such goals should be 
deemed to be malfunctioning (p. 14) 
 
Baker is starting an Argument from Human Exceptionalism to show that if we 
are animals, then we would expect ourselves to act like animals (e.g., have the 
same propensities and limitations of animals). To Baker, these propensities and 
limitations begin and end with things that promote survival and reproduction. 
As such, anything that goes against these two propensities should be 
considered malfunctions as they would not be doing what is good for the 
organism (which are limited to things that promote survival and reproduction). 
As Baker continues to claim, “[w]e are not limited to goals derived from those 
of survival and reproduction” (p. 14), and since we lack these limitations of 
animals, she concludes, we must not be animals.  
That human persons have goals that go beyond survival and 
reproduction, goals such as “extending the rule of Allah” and “extending the 
rule of democracy” is indicative of their first-person perspective, according to 
Baker, as is our being moral agents. Moreover, first-person perspective (and 
thus personhood) is not a property that is capable of being just a phase that 
most human organisms can go through (i.e., it’s not a phased sortal) (Baker 
2000, p. 16). She states: 
 
Although I agree that human animals normally develop the capacity to 
support first-person perspectives, it seems obvious (to me, anyway) 
that anything capable of having a first-person perspective is basically 
different from anything incapable of having one. [. . .] But Darwin’s 
message is that human animals are not basically different from 
nonhuman animals. 
Those who take us to be essentially like nonhuman animals want to 
describe and explain our traits in terms of general biological traits 
shared by other species. But the first-person perspective, whether 
selected for or not, is a biological surd in this respect (Baker 2000, p. 
15-16).9 
 
9 It’s not clear what Baker means by ‘surd’ in this context. I take her to mean that the first-
person perspective is something that, even if biological, cannot be explanatorily reduced any 




This is an interesting move to make because, unlike others that may endorse 
some version of human exceptionalism, Baker is resistant to a biological 
explanation of the kind of thing we are.10 She states this more emphatically 
later on, stating: 
 
The first-person perspective, or the abilities that it brings in its wake, 
may well be a product or a by-product of evolution by natural selection. 
My claim is: However the first-person perspective came about, it is 
unique and unlike anything else in nature, and it makes possible much 
of what matters to us. It even makes possible our conceiving of things 
as mattering to us. The first-person perspective—without which there 
would be no inner lives, no moral agency, no rational agency—is so 
unlike anything else in nature that it sets apart the beings that have it 
from all other beings. The appearance of a first-person perspective 
makes an ontological difference in the universe (p. 163).  
 
Thus, according to Baker, whether or not we evolved is irrelevant; what 
matters is that the kind of thing that we are is not biological (even if it is, 
perhaps, a product of biological processes). But, as I’ve shown earlier in this 
section, whether it is possible or not for a non-organism (such as Shoemaker’s 
p-animal or Baker’s first-person perspective) to be the product of evolutionary 
processes is uncertain.   
Furthermore, as Snowdon (2014b) has argued, several premises that 
Baker uses to support her arguments are either unsupported or false. Take, for 
instance, her argument that we cannot be animals because whereas all non-
malfunctioning animals are limited by properties that promote survival and 
reproduction, humans are not limited by such properties. Baker’s argument 
here relies on the premise that non-malfunctioning animals only have 
 
10 This has been observed by Daniel Dennett (2018), a proponent of human exceptionalism 
himself. The difference between the two on this matter is that Dennett’s version of human 
exceptionalism is based on Darwinian natural selection and Baker (as shown in the main text) 
is “at pains to distance herself from my [Dennett’s] bottom-up, naturalistic elevation of our 
species above the rest, which by her lights is an unworthy substitute for a more traditional 
version that descends from the myths of Western Civilization, and of Christianity in particular” 
(p. 346).  
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properties that promote survival and reproduction—a premise that is not only 
unsupported by Baker but is also false. Animals could easily have capacities 
that that evolved such that they promoted survival and reproduction, but that 
also had the unintended consequence of functioning in a way that didn’t 
support these things (e.g., we’ve evolved the capacity to solve practical 
problems that could aid in our survival and reproduction, but that same 
capacity could be used for non-practical problems that don’t benefit for 
survival and reproduction). Similarly, two or more traits may have evolved that 
aid in survival and reproduction, but that together confer a trait that doesn’t 
aid in these things (e.g., we’ve evolved an advantageous arm length and to have 
our waist at an advantageous area, but that doesn’t mean that the trait of our 
arms being at waist level is advantageous) (Snowdon 2014b, p. 241). 
 Baker’s position that we aren’t animals also stems from what she seems 
to believe is something true about biological entities—namely, that they can be 
fully explained in biological terms. This is why she claims, for instance, that 
animalists want to describe our traits in the same way that we describe the 
traits of any other species of animal. But, as Snowdon points out, the premise 
that biological entities can only be fully explained by biology is false given that 
many non-biological sciences contribute to our scientific understanding of 
animals (e.g., ethology and animal psychology). Furthermore, if biology was the 
only science at our disposal, then there would be many aspects of animals that 
we would be unable to ascertain, such as why there are the number of sheep in 
Australia as there are (Snowdon 2014b, p. 242). 
Lastly, Baker’s position relies on an argument that is partly premised on 
our having a property or several properties that animals do not have (namely, a 
first-person perspective and all of the properties that follow from that, e.g., 
moral accountability). But, why assume that animals don’t have these 
properties? To illustrate what Baker is doing here, Snowdon represents her 
argument thus:  
 
P1: We (in virtue of self-consciousness, etc.) have properties P1…Pn.  
P2: Things which are agreed so far to be animals lack P1…Pn. T  




And then compares it to the parallel argument here: 
 
P1*: Rolls Royces can cruise silently at 150 mph.  
P2*: Things that are agreed to be cars so far cannot do that.  
Conclusion*: Rolls Royces are not cars. 
 
Given that the conclusion of the Rolls Royces argument is false, but that the 
premises could be true, we should instead conclude that Rolls Royces are either 
not cars or that Rolls Royces are a new type of car that has capabilities that 
aren’t yet included in the agreed-upon things cars can do. Yet, Baker hasn’t 
stated the later disjunct, nor does she support her favouring the first disjunct in 
the conclusion (Snowdon 2014b, p. 239).  
It is at the very least odd that Baker has decided that certain (e.g., newly 
discovered, advanced, and/or evolved) properties are so exceptional in the 
biological world as to necessitate categorising anything that has them as being a 
metaphysically distinctive kind of thing from those that don’t have them. This 
is especially bizarre when considering the range of different capacities found 
within the animal kingdom (not to mention the other kingdoms of biology). As 
Snowdon himself acknowledges:  
 
We should be struck, too, when considering [Baker’s] argument, by the 
manifest and colossal diversity within the class of what are agreed to be 
animals. There are enormous differences between amoeba and gorillas. 
Why should some more differences within the class of animals be significant? 
(Snowdon 2014b, p. 239, my emphasis). 
 
Baker has provided us with no principled way in which to judge the significant 
number of differences found within the animal kingdom. She has also not 
provided us with an unproblematic reason to suppose that our capacity for a 
first-person perspective couldn’t just be a capacity of a human animal. Given 
this, we should consider this particular argument against our being animals 
sufficiently defused.  
So, what are we meant to take away from the above objections to the 
AAA? Although the argument isn’t perfect, the criticisms I’ve described above 
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aren’t effective. First, when listening to biologists, we ought to take care to 
consider what the most straightforward interpretation is when they make the 
claim that we are human animals that are products of evolution. Trying to 
gerrymander our linguistic or conceptual practices to force person essentialism 
compatible with evolution isn’t a feasible or charitable way to solve this issue.  
Similarly, claiming it as obvious that our moral agency and/or first-
person perspective is incompatible with our being biological organisms even if 
they are products of biological processes is going to be more difficult to defend 
than I believe Baker takes it to be. Given that such approaches have been 
found wanting, I take it that the best—if not only—way to argue against the 
AAA is to assume that a common sense understanding of biological theory 
takes us to be biological animals (i.e., the kinds of things that evolve) and show 
why that common sense understanding of evolution is incomplete or incorrect. 
One such argument has been made by Gillett (2013), who argues that Blatti is 
wrong to assume that organisms are the only kinds of entities that go through 
the process of, or are products of, evolution. He correctly notes that 
evolutionary theory can explain how one kind of thing can result in another 
kind of thing. In fact, it is precisely evolutionary theories being able to do this 
that makes it so attractive and useful to scientists (Gillett 2013, p. 277). As 
such, a denial of animalism doesn’t entail a denial of evolutionary theory. In 
fact, evolutionary theory can be accepted by a variety of positions regarding 
what we are, including parts of organisms (e.g., brains), psychological entities, 
and even souls.  
In chapter 6, I will argue that what’s important to take away from the 
AAA isn’t that only organisms can be the products of evolutionary theory, but 
that only biological entities11 can be the products of evolutionary theory. As 
such, a slightly modified version of the argument that emphasises this fact 
withstands the force of Gillett’s objection (unless, of course, we take 
psychological things or souls to be biological entities.) More groundwork is 
needed before I can spell this position out in more detail. 
 
 
11 As I will explain later, I use ‘entities’ here in a heuristic sense. In particular, I make a 
distinction between thick entities (k-entities) and thin entities (n-entities), the former of which is 
a metaphysically robust entity of the sort typically discussed in metaphysics. The latter, n-




As I’ve said in the introduction, I believe pursuing the evidence question of 
personal identity first to be helpful in answering the other questions of 
personal identity. That is, rather than answering the personal-ontological 
question (i.e., “what are we?”) or the persistence question (i.e., “how do we 
persist?”) first, I believe that we should consider a broader question: “what 
evidence do we take to answer such questions?” Once we have done this, we 
can see how these different pieces of evidence relate to one another to come to 
some plausible conclusions as to what we are and how we persist. 
In this chapter, I explained three arguments that have been made in 
favour of animalism and evaluated some of the objections that have been made 
to them. My goal was two-fold: first: I wanted to identify which objections 
pose the most threat to the animalist response to the personal-ontological 
question—to the animalist’s conception of what we are. Second, I wanted to 
show that these arguments suggest things about our nature that can count as 
evidence for what we take ourselves to be. That is, animalists take certain 
assumptions we have about ourselves (such as that we were once foetuses and 
have evolved) as well as certain capacities of animals (such as that they can 
think) to be evidence for the fact that we are animals.  
In the chapter that follows, I will conduct a similar evaluation but of 
arguments that have been made against animalism. As I will show, these 
arguments focus on certain mental and personal capacities that we take 
ourselves to have and thus focus on ‘mental’ or ‘psychological’ evidence for 
what we are. At the same time, I will show that certain arguments are 
problematic because they fail to refer to things that exist in the actual world. 
Thus, I will argue that such arguments shouldn’t carry much weight in debates 
regarding what we are and, in doing so, I will set some standards for how to 










In the introduction of this work, I said that I would be taking what might be 
called an evidence-first approach to personal identity. That means that I am going 
to prioritise what evidence counts for our identity.  Only once we have an idea 
of what counts as evidence of identity can we start building up to an 
understanding of our identity and persistence (recall from the introduction that 
I showed how identity claims and persistence are tightly linked.)  We will also 
be able to begin to consider which kinds of evidence are better or worse in 
reaching this understanding. In this way, my project is a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
to identity—first, we articulate what properties we often refer to when we refer 
to ourselves. These properties may be bodily, psychological, biological, or 
perhaps even social. It is these properties that will underpin what will serve as 
evidence, and such evidence can be compiled in such a way as to tell a story 
about the kind of thing that we are—they offer us a theory of identity. This 
chapter is meant to provide the first part in constructing a plausible evidence-first 
foundation for identity. To this aim, I will be taking a look at some of the 
arguments for and against animalism and seeing what it is that these arguments 
can be shown to illuminate about us (i.e., human persons).  
In sections 1 and 2, I will walk through some arguments that have been 
made against animalism and/or that were made in favour of mentalism (i.e., 
that we are essentially something mental or psychological.) I will be basing my 
exposition of these arguments using a taxonomy developed by Paul Snowdon. 
I use Snowdon’s taxonomy for two reasons: first, Snowdon’s taxonomy 
succinctly uncovers the common threads that link most (if not all) of the 
arguments in favour of mentalist conceptions of personal identity. The second 
reason I will base my exposition of this section on Snowdon’s taxonomy is that 
it highlights an interesting difference in the methodologies that have been 
utilised to understand the limits of what we are. This difference is one of where 
we focus our attention: do we focus on what Snowdon calls ‘‘real’’ cases (i.e., 
cases in which we have real-world examples)? Or, do we focus on what 
Snowdon calls ‘imaginary’ cases (i.e., cases in which we don’t have real-world 
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examples to which to refer).12 The preference between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ 
cases can, I think, be understood as stemming from two different approaches 
to metaphysics: what we might call traditional metaphysics, which tends to 
emphasise linguistic practices and conceptual analysis, and scientific or naturalised 
metaphysics, which tends to emphasise scientific evidence. The difference 
between these metaphysical traditions will be explored in the chapter following 
this one (i.e., chapter 3.) 
 
2.1. A&~P 
We can begin Snowdon’s taxonomy of anti-animalist arguments by considering 
cases in which at one point in time, there is an animal and associated person, 
but at a later time, there is only an animal. Snowdon refers to these cases as 
A&~P cases.13 A&~P cases come in three forms: Eliminated Person (EP) cases, 
Different Person (DP) cases, and No Personal Unity (NPU) cases.14 There is also a 
kind of case that is similar to, but distinct from, A&~P cases called Animal 
Only (AO) cases. AO cases are those in which there is an animal with which no 
person was ever associated. Call AO cases a category of Lone Cases, cases in 
which there only ever existed an animal or person (Person Only cases described 
later will also belong to this category.)  I will briefly explain what these cases 
are as well as (where appropriate) briefly consider some of Snowdon’s 
criticisms of them. Several of his criticisms of A&~P cases are the same, and 
those I will leave to the end of the section to analyse all at once.  
The first type of A&~P case we can call Eliminated Person (EP) cases.15 
EP cases occur when there existed an animal and a person at one point but, at 
a later point, the person ceases to exist. Snowdon fleshes these cases out in two 
 
12 I’m refraining from calling these ‘imaginary’ cases ‘thought experiments’ here because there 
is an important difference between the two, namely, that ‘imaginary’ cases are such that they 
cannot, in principle, occur in the real world. ‘Thought experiments,’ on the other hand could 
be implemented in the real world (insofar as they are ‘useful’ in that they are constrained by 
experimentation.) This difference will be made clearer and also defended in the next chapter 
(chapter 2.) 
13 A&~P cases, along with P&~A cases, belong to a larger category of dissociation cases that I 
refer to as ‘Former Association Cases.’  
14 Although Snowdon does name some of these forms of A&~P cases, I’ve renamed them 
here for easier reference.  
15 Snowdon 2014 refers to these as Type-1 cases (p. 12), or scenarios in which a ‘termination 
verdict’ is made (p. 126).  
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different (but similar ways), first being Shoemaker’s account of a ‘brain zap.’ 
Shoemaker claims:  
 
If ‘philosophical amnesia’ is taken to mean total and irretrievable loss 
of all memories of all kinds, then it, the claim that a person can survive 
such amnesia, is far more questionable. For what we are now imagining 
is something close to what has been called a ‘brain zap’—the total 
destruction of all the effects of the person’s past experiences, learning, 
reasoning, deliberation, and so on…Suppose that in a terrible accident 
a person suffers brain damage amounting to a total brain zap, and that 
somehow the surgeons manage to repair the brain in such a way that its 
possessor is able to start again…Eventually that body is the body of 
someone with the mental life of a mature human being…It is anything 
but obvious that this person would be the person who had the body 
prior to the accident. So if total amnesia means this sort of brain zap, it 
is far from uncontroversial—indeed it seems just false—that it is 
something a person could survive (Shoemaker 1984, p. 87). 
 
In the ‘brain zap’ EP cases, we are meant to imagine an animal and associated 
person that has undergone some kind of damage such that the animal survives, 
but any psychological capacities that we would associate with the person are 
destroyed. Such cases are meant to pose a problem for animalism in that it is 
counter-intuitive to believe that the individual remains after such a zap, despite 
‘being there’ with no psychological capacities it previously had. It’s much more 
intuitive, proponents of these cases claim, that the person is eliminated in the 
process of the zap, and only the animal that that person was formerly 
associated with remains.16 
 The second kind of EP cases to which Snowdon refers are scenarios in 
which we commonly talk about persons going through mental loss prior to 
death (2014b, ch. 6.4). Such cases can occur when a loved one is in a 
permanent vegetative state (PVS) in which all of their higher-brain functions 
(i.e., the functions responsible for what we commonly refer to as 
 
16 See Snowdon 2014, chapter 6.3 for Snowdon’s response to Shoemaker’s ‘brain zap’ cases, 
and chapter 6.4 for his response to the other termination cases.  
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consciousness) are no longer functioning, but the animal associated with the 
person is still alive. In such scenarios, it can be common to hear a loved one 
say something along the lines of “they (i.e., the deceased individual) are not 
really with us anymore.” Similarly, if someone dies after a period of being in a 
PVS, or if they die after some time of being in a state of extreme dementia, you 
may hear statements such as “they (i.e., the deceased individual) passed away 
recently, but they were gone way before that.” 
 Of course, there are different interpretations of the scenarios in which 
someone speaks of an individual in such a state. Perhaps the person uttering 
the words “my grandmother is still alive, but she is no longer with us” is 
speaking figuratively—as a way of saying something akin to “my grandmother 
is still here, but she isn’t in the right state to talk, remember, etc.” But, even if 
the utterer of these statements did take their words to be literally true, that 
doesn’t mean the beliefs are, in fact, true (Snowdon 2014b, p. 134). 
A second type of A&~P case can be called Different Person (DP) cases17. 
Such cases occur when there is a single animal over time, but at different times 
there exist different persons. To illustrate this, imagine an animal (A) and a 
person that was initially associated with A (P1) and one (or more) ‘alternative’ 
persons that became associated with A at a later point in time (P2). DP case 
occurs when, during A’s life, it ‘houses’ these persons at different times: at T1 
A houses P1, at T2 A houses P2, and at T3 A houses P1 again. Such cases, if 
possible, pose a problem to animalism because it would allow for cases in 
which two non-identical persons can be identical to the same animal. 
 As with the other A&~P cases, many of Snowdon’s objections to DP 
rely on either how he takes us to interact and refer to persons in our everyday 
discourse, or else to common intuitions that he believes most of us have 
regarding the nature of persons (see, e.g., 2014b, pp. 146-148). As I mentioned 
previously, I take these objections to be problematic (although I do sympathise 
with them). Although I will address these problems later, there are two 
interesting points that he makes that I feel are worth addressing: The first 
concerns Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD), a condition now referred to by 
 
17 Snowdon refers to these as Type-2 cases (2014b, p. 13), or Multiple Personality Disorder 
(MPD) cases (2014b, ch. 7). 
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psychiatrists as Dissociative Identity Disorder. It has been argued that MPD is 
a real-world DP case. Snowdon states:  
 
The point is that there are two independent debates. The first, a debate 
in psychiatry, is whether MPD is a genuine disease. The second, a 
debate in philosophy, is whether it would be correct to suppose that 
what we have in an MPD case as conventionally described is a genuine 
and real plurality of persons (2014b, p. 145). 
 
This is to say, DP cases supposedly occur in real life. It is disputed by 
psychiatrists whether or not anything like MPD, as described and used by 
philosophers when discussing DP-type cases, actually exists (Snowdon 2014b, 
p. 144).  Whether or not MPD does exist in the way philosophers use it doesn’t 
really matter for our present purposes because those that use it in this way 
need only to show that such cases are possible for it to pose a problem for 
animalism.  
 A second interesting point that Snowdon makes follows from the first, 
namely, that MPD is a psychological disorder (although, as I mentioned earlier, 
it is now referred to as Dissociative Identity Disorder) from which sufferers 
can recover. Those that suggest MPD cases are DP cases must then be 
committed to at least one of several unintuitive and problematic positions. For 
instance, if each alternative person (i.e., any person that ‘inhabits’ the animal 
after the original person) has its own unique identity, then we can only 
interpret MPD cases as DP cases if we believe that there is no single individual 
that can be recovered from MPD (thus believing that MPD is incurable.) Even 
further than this, such a proponent would have to argue that that MPD isn’t 
really a psychological disorder. If MPD is a disorder, then it implies that there 
is a single individual who classifies as suffering from the disorder who can 
likewise be tracked through time (Snowdon 2014b, p. 153).  
Alternatively, such proponents could accept that MPD is a real 
psychological disorder that a single person can be cured of. If this is the case, 
then they must suggest that anyone trying to help a sufferer of MPD recover 
from the illness is thereby attempting to end the existence of one or more real 
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persons. As Snowdon puts it, “[t]herapy becomes akin to mass murder” 
(Snowdon 2014b, p. 154). 
A third type of A&~P case that Snowdon refers to can be called No 
Personal Unity (NPU) cases. Such cases occur when there is a single animal (A) 
that ‘houses’ several different persons (e.g., P1, P2, and P3) at the same time, 
but there exists no unity between these persons. Thus, at T1 A houses P1, P2, 
and P3 despite P1, P2, and P3 having no connection with one another. I don’t 
have much to comment about NPU cases here as they will become very 
relevant later in chapter 6, where I discuss Dicephalic cases—a kind of 
conjoined twinning. Dicephalic cases occur in real life (see, e.g., Abby and 
Brittany Hensel) and are arguably a kind of real-world dissociative case.  
 Lastly, Snowdon refers to what he calls Animal Only (AO) cases, in 
which there exists an animal but at no point was there a person associated with 
it, and at no point will there ever be a person associated with it. The argument 
goes thus:  
 
P1: If I am identical to an animal, then that animal couldn’t exist 
without my existing 
P2: AO cases are possible cases in which the animal I’m (supposedly) 
identical to exists without my also existing 
Conclusion: I am not identical to an animal 
 
A purported example of an AO case would be a counterfactual scenario in 
which an animal (A)—rather being conceived, developed, and normally born 
such that I now call that animal (A) ‘I’—developed abnormally, such that it 
never developed the properties necessary to be a person. In such a 
counterfactual scenario, A was not able to develop the necessary properties 
required to be the person that I (in the actual world) refer to as ‘I’.  
Those that endorse the psychological criterion of identity take AO cases to be 
problematic for animalists. If, as animalists claim, I am identical to an animal, 
then how do we make sense of the claim that I could have existed (as that 
animal) whilst having no psychological states that would allow me to identify 
myself as such? It has been pointed out, however, that AO cases could be 
interpreted differently: that I could have existed (as an animal) but in such a 
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way that I wasn’t conscious and couldn’t ever be conscious (someone born in a 
PVS may be a good example here.) As Snowdon aptly puts it, “The question is 
whether this is a scenario in which I did not exist at all, or it is a scenario in 
which I existed but did not attain consciousness?” (2014b, p. 136). If the 
scenario is such that I did not exist at all, then AO cases are possible (and thus, 
there is a problem with animalism). However, if the scenario is such that I 
existed but did not attain consciousness, then supposed AO cases are not 
problematic for animalism (i.e., AO cases would just be cases where there is an 
animal that is me, but where I never have and never will have conscious 
experiences.) 
 AO cases can be fleshed out in two ways: the first is that AO cases 
occur for some period of time in normal human development. According to 
this approach, a human animal that will at some point be associated with a 
person exists prior to that person—this can be explained as the biological 
animal developing as a foetus prior to the development of whatever parts or 
properties are necessary for a person to come into being. In the imagined 
counterfactual scenario, the foetus dies prior to acquiring mental capacities, or 
else is born with a defect such that it has never (nor will ever) develop such 
mental capacities (Snowdon 2014b, p. 137).   
This approach to AO cases leads quickly to the Foetus Problem. Recall 
from the previous chapter that the Foetus Problem is a problem that neo-
Lockeans are said to face by taking our identity conditions to be something 
essentially mental. If neo-Lockeans are right, the objection goes, then no 
human person was ever a foetus (because foetuses don’t have the requisite 
mental capacities), a conclusion that is unintuitive and goes against our 
understanding of our development. As was also noted in that chapter, Baker 
(2000) has defended this view on the (unfounded) basis that foetuses don’t 
have the requisite capacity for first-person perspective.  
 The second way one can approach AO cases is to take the animal and 
person to begin at the same time in normal development, with the AO case 
occurring in a counterfactual scenario in which some abnormal development 
leads to only the animal developing. Consider the example I noted earlier—a 
scenario in which a particular individual was born into a PVS. Such an 
58 
 
individual would likely still be considered an animal, but they would have no 
proper functioning parts to have ever counted as a person. Snowdon notes that 
this way of thinking is counter-intuitive, stating, “[w]e do not normally think 
that the identity of the item we have as a result of a certain process (in our 
example, conception) can depend on what subsequently happens” (p. 140).  
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, I am sympathetic to 
many of the points and conclusions that Snowdon makes and argues for 
regarding the possibility of A&~P cases. However, many of Snowdon’s 
responses to all of the above A&~P cases aren’t as dialectically strong as they 
could be due to the fact that he often structures the debate in such a way that 
he doesn’t have to argue against the metaphysical background that motivates 
the conclusions many anti-animalists come to. That is, Snowdon sets up his 
objections to proponents of A&~P cases in such a way that he turns the 
metaphysical discussion mentalists are having into a linguistic discussion. The 
change in the discussion is apparent when Snowdon writes of A&~P scenarios: 
 
The most important thing, it seems to me, to remember when thinking 
about such scenarios is that the verdict that they are [not P] cases is not 
itself validated by the correctness of the claim (assuming it is correct) 
that the developments in the described cases involve the lapsing of 
application in them of the term ‘person’. The reason that this is not 
enough is that it cannot simply be assumed that the ordinary category 
of a person cannot cease to apply to continuing objects to which it has 
previously applied. The claim that is needed, then, is not that there is no 
longer a person in the scenario, but rather that there is no longer in the 
scenario that thing which, at the start, was the person P (2014b, p. 127, 
original emphasis).  
 
Snowdon takes it that the extinction of a person in a scenario is not enough to 
show that such a scenario is one of A&~P. Doing this relies on the assumption 
that the term ‘person’ cannot be applied to objects that were once referred to 
as such. Rather, Snowdon believes that what we really need are ways to identify 
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the objects that we are referring to as ‘persons’ such that those ways cannot 
stop picking out those objects no matter how the envisioned A&~P cases 
develop.  
Snowdon takes such objects to be identified by, for example, personal 
pronouns, proper names, and properties that the object in question cannot lose 
(Snowdon suggests such properties include ‘my father,’ ‘my sister,’ etc.). Once 
we consider A&~P cases using these terms, we can ask whether the objects to 
which those terms apply still exist at the end of the envisioned case. For 
example, if we imagine an A&~P case in which tomorrow my grandmother 
loses all of her psychological states but is still alive, we should ask whether the 
resulting individual is still my grandmother. The objects to which ‘person’ (in 
this case, my grandmother) is attributed is what we care about, and such 
questions (in this case, “is this still my grandmother?”) help us track those 
objects (Snowdon 2014b, pp. 127-128).  
I agree with Snowdon that we ought to be tracking the objects that we 
care about and that biological organisms are those objects when it comes to 
issues regarding the identity of human persons (I’m an animalist, after all). 
However, Snowdon doesn’t properly consider the fact that non-animalists 
disagree with animalists as to what the objects of those interests are. This could 
be seen in at least two ways that both a) accept Snowdon’s own standards of 
picking out the objects to which ‘person’ is attributed as well as b) take 
seriously the mentalist’s view that we are essentially something psychological. 
First, mentalists commonly accept that we track objects by properties that they 
cannot lose, but they claim that such properties, at least when we are tracking 
persons, are essentially psychological. Snowdon suggests that such properties 
include ‘my grandmother,’ ‘my daughter,’ etc., but he has not given us a reason 
to believe that we don’t possess any essential properties that are psychological. 
He also hasn’t given us a reason to believe that an essential psychological 
property isn’t necessary for other properties such as ‘being my daughter’ to be 
something an object cannot lose (i.e., perhaps the property ‘being my daughter’ 
is a property certain objects cannot lose because such a property depends on a 
daughter necessarily being something psychological.)  
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There is a second way in which proponents of the psychological 
criterion accept Snowdon’s own standards of picking out the objects to which 
‘person’ is attributed whilst still claiming animalism is wrong. That is, 
mentalists argue that the object we are interested in—the object we call 
‘person’—is essentially something psychological. Snowdon (and other 
animalists) assume that these objects are organisms, but it is conceivable that 
proponents of the psychological approach are right—that such objects are 
actually souls that are embodied in animals, persons non-identically constituted 
by animals, brains that are enclosed in animals, etc.  
Snowdon hasn’t given us a reason to believe that the object we are 
interested in is something biological, merely that we commonly refer to 
something biological when discussing the identity of human persons—a 
common occurrence that may be unjustified. As we will see in the following 
section, there are scenarios where intuitions commonly take us to persist in 
virtue of something other than persisting as an organism.  
 
2.2. P&~A cases 
P&~A cases are cases where there is a person that continues to exist despite 
the animal ceasing to exist.18 Such cases, as Snowdon describes them, can be 
divided into those in which the person continues to exist in virtue of some 
physical link and/or process and those in which the person continues to exist 
without a physical link or process. The former can then be divided into three 
separate cases (which I will describe shortly), whereas the latter he refers to as 
Pure Person Transfer (PPT) cases.  
A PPT case is one in which a person is associated with some animal at 
some time and associated with a different animal at a different time. In PPT 
cases, there is no physical link or process by which this change of body 
occurs—it just happens that the person was transferred from one animal to 
another. If possible, PPT cases would be a P&~A case because the person is 
transferred without the originally associated animal accompanying it.  
 
18 P&~A cases, along with A&~P cases, belong to a larger category of dissociation cases that I 
refer to as ‘Former Association Cases.’ 
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Whether or not a PPT is even something that can be imagined will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Let’s assume for the moment, however, that 
such a case is imaginable. That something can be imagined doesn’t imply or 
even suggest that such a thing is possible (Snowdon 2014b, p. 192). If PPTs are 
imaginable, then the most that we can derive from such an imagined case is 
that they are imaginable, nothing more—yet, such cases are meant to show that 
we aren’t animals.  Following this, one can reject the claim that PPT cases are 
legitimate reasons to object to the animalist claim that we are identical to a 
biological organism.  
Even if PPT cases are imaginable, they don’t pose a threat to the 
animalist position. Even so, it’s unclear to me how we are to imagine PPT 
cases (let alone entertain the possibility of them.) Snowdon has claimed that it’s 
possible to imagine such a case, although it’s not clear to me that his imagined 
scenario would count as a real PPT case. He states: 
 
I can imagine that at one moment I am occupying the same space as 
my present animal body, and then suddenly occupying the same space 
as another animal body looking back at my previous body. I can 
imagine seeing the world from the new location. This task of 
imagination is not particularly difficult (Snowdon 2014b, p. 192). 
 
Although I understand the kind of picture Snowdon is trying to paint with his 
example, the focus is on perspective rather than persons. I can imagine what 
the perspective would be like from any number of different places and angles 
(including imaginary ones!) Yet, there is more to a person than a simple 
perspective one has. 
An even bigger problem with Snowdon’s imagined scenario is that it 
doesn’t take into account that a PPT is said to occur without any cause or 
other explanation as to how the transfer took place—the transfer merely 
happened. Snowdon recognises this problem and shows that proponents of 
such cases might insist that some non-physical structure grounds the transfer 
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of the person—a move that would not only imply some form of dualism but 
also “impugns the purity of PPT” (Snowdon 2014b, p. 193). 
Snowdon’s response here still doesn’t address the real problem with 
imagining PPT cases, and I believe this problem is shown in the ‘impurity’ 
created in providing a PPT case that relies on some non-physical structure to 
ground the transfer of the person in such cases. This impurity, I suggest, is the 
result of going against the very idea of PPT cases: namely, such cases don’t 
take the nature of the transfer to be mysterious. Rather, PPT cases are those in 
which no explanation of the transfer is to be had at all! Given this aspect of 
PPT cases, the nature of the transfer itself is not mysterious (a mystery implies 
that there is an answer even if that answer is unable to be reached for, e.g., 
reasons regarding cognitive capacities.) Rather, the nature of PPT cases is non-
existent. PPT cases propose that a person ‘housed in’ a human animal at one 
time can be transferred without any cause or by any means to a different body. This 
is why I’m not sure that it’s possible even to imagine such cases; it’s not clear 
to me how to imagine a transfer without any means of the transfer to take 
place. A magical spell, curse, brain transfer, soul relocation, etc. that causes a 
person to transfer from one body to another is something that is imaginable 
(even if they are impossible) because there is a means by which the transfer 
occurs (even if that means isn’t real). However, PPT cases seem incoherent in 
that any way of fleshing such a case out turns it into a different type of P&~A 
case.  
Unlike PPT cases, the other three P&~A cases that Snowdon proposes 
would, if possible, undermine animalism are suggested to occur in virtue of 
some physical link or process. Non-Substantial Transfer (NST) cases, for 
instance, are said to occur when a person is transferred from one location to 
another whilst the animal that it had previously been associated with remains at 
the initial location. Take, for example, a scenario commonly seen in science 
fiction in which a person (call them P1) steps into a machine at some location 
(L1) that perfectly detects and records their mental states (call this record of 
mental states R1). R1 is then reproduced into a different body at a different 
location (L2), at which point the original R1 states of the initial animal of 
which P1 was associated are irreversibly destroyed. At L2, there is a body and 
an associated person with the R1 mental states (call this person P2). Those that 
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take the possibility of NST cases seriously believe that P2 is identical to P1; 
they believe the person transferred from L1 to L2 in virtue of R1 being 
replicated into P2 whilst R1 was destroyed in P1.  
 There is a point of clarification that is important here to understand 
NST cases correctly: NST cases are those in which no substance (such as 
matter) is transferred. To understand why NST cases cannot involve the 
transfer of substance, imagine if the body associated with P1 in the example 
above is broken into the individual particles that make up that body. These 
particles were then transported to L2, where they were immediately put back 
together in the exact same way as they were on L1. The modification made 
here would not have been an NST case, nor would it be a straightforward 
P&~A case. This is a result of it not being clear that the animal initially 
associated with P1 didn’t transfer from L1 to L2 alongside them (via the 
substance that transferred). Given this, such a scenario is unclear on whether a 
person existed at any given point whilst an animal did not (that is, that there 
was a real P&~A case), or whether there was simply teleportation of matter 
itself from one location to another (Snowdon 2014b, p. 194).  
 With this clarification in mind, are NST cases possible? It’s not clear to 
me that they are. First, even if we admit that P2 truly believes themselves to 
have been transferred from L1 to L2 (such that they are identical to P1), that 
doesn’t mean that their beliefs about their identity are true (Snowdon 2014b, p. 
193). As Snowdon point out, “[. . .] identity is objective, whereas a sense of 
identity is subjective. A thing’s objective identity is not fixed by its subjective 
sense about, or convictions about, its identity” (Snowdon 2014b, p. 193). This 
is to say that just because a person (in this case P2) believes that they are P1, 
that subjective fact about P2 doesn’t entail that they are in fact identical to P2—
their belief may be mistaken. 
 There could very well be reasons to treat P2 as if they were identical to 
P1, perhaps for practical or ethical reasons. However, even if one were to 
endorse this normative claim, they wouldn’t, therefore, have to endorse the 
metaphysical and descriptive claim about P2’s identity; we could agree that P2 
should be treated as if they were identical to P1 without actually taking P2 to 
be identical to P1 because we could agree that there may be reasons to treat 
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someone as someone else (Olson 1997a, p. 66).  At the same time, it should be 
noted that there is an emotional pull that comes with supposed NST cases that 
could easily shape the intuitions people have towards them. It’s an easy 
transitional trap to fall into: going from ‘it feels like x is the case’ to believing 
‘we ought to treat x as if it were the case’, and then even further to ‘x must be 
the case.’ This can be seen as an emotional grip that NST cases can have on 
people, e.g., ‘it seems like this is my child’ quickly turns into ‘I ought to treat 
this like it’s my child’, and then even further to ‘this must be my child.’  
 It seems like Snowdon may have fallen into this sort of intuition in his 
examples against NST cases. Snowdon’s aim is to cast doubt as to whether or 
not a person actually moves from one location to another in NST cases by 
showing scenarios where this is purported to happen, but where he assumes 
the reader will be suspicious of such an event (Snowdon 2014b, p. 194). For 
instance, Snowdon asks us to imagine a scenario in which your child is infected 
with a virus that will completely and permanently erase their mental states. 
When this occurs, the doctor of the child tells you that there is a very good 
chance that the cognitive capacities of the animal originally associated with 
your child will recover such that it will be able to once again develop and learn. 
You could also decide to have the child put into a cloning machine with the 
resulting clone having perfectly replicated mental states as the original child 
pre-virus. Snowdon expects that no person whose child went through such a 
predicament and was faced with these two choices would actually take the 
replica to be their child rather than the body lying in bed with a good chance of 
recovery (p. 194). 
 In a similar example, Snowdon asks us to imagine that our daughter is 
going through an NST whilst, at the same time, we are holding their hand. 
Once the process is done, the individual body laying before us that was 
originally associated with our daughter is in obvious and incredible pain. In 
such an instance, he writes, “[. . .] I do not think that anyone could sensibly 
claim that it really seems very clear that your daughter is no longer before, that 
her hands are not the ones you are holding, and that her pain is not what you 
are witnessing” (Snowdon 2014b, p. 196).  
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 Both of the pictures imagined above get their anti-NST appeal based 
on what the reader’s intuition is regarding what the appropriate response 
would be. In the first case, the intuition is meant to suggest that the child who 
has a good chance of regaining cognitive capabilities is your child. In such a 
case, the intuition would then be that the clone of your child isn’t really your 
child at all (even if it has all of the mental states of your child pre-virus). That is 
to say, Snowdon’s story is meant to make the reader feel like an NST case 
never happened. Likewise, his second scenario is meant to make the reader feel 
like their daughter was in pain after the NST took place, therefore denying that 
the body at the other end of the transfer is not really their daughter. Once 
again, Snowdon’s example is meant to make the reader rely on their intuition 
that the NST didn’t result in their daughter being in another body (thus 
denying the plausibility of NST cases).  
 As I mentioned earlier, such cases rely on an intuition that is motivated 
by feeling something must be the case. In the same way that NST proponents 
could argue that the clone of their child is their child, and not the body lying 
before them with a good chance of cognitive recovery (i.e., that their child 
transferred from one body to the other during the cloning process) because it 
feels to them that the clone, having all of the pre-virus mental states, was their 
child. Or, perhaps Snowdon is wrong about the reader’s feelings towards the 
example regarding their daughter—perhaps, the reader doesn’t believe that the 
body lying before them isn’t their daughter, a belief that causes them relief 
given the pain that the body is in. Rather, they could claim that their daughter 
is the one that is not in pain but the one that is having a conversation with 
them about how awful it would have been to be in such a painful state.  
 One issue with NST cases that have been previously addressed is that 
it’s not clear where the person goes during the transition. It’s assumed that it 
takes time for the person to replicate—for P1 to replicate into P2. Where is P1 
(the person) between the transfer from the body associated with the person at 
L1 to the body associated with the person at L2? It can’t be at the body at L1 
since it has been destroyed; however, it can’t be at the body at L2 since the 
replication would take time. The obvious response would seem to be that the 
person is located in whatever machine is doing the replication. Snowdon has 
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objected to this on the grounds that it’s not clear how to make sense of that 
location (2014b, p. 195).  
I don’t understand why it’s difficult to understand the person as being 
located in the machine. NST cases rely on a person being something that can 
be abstracted away from whatever substances constitute it and transferred as a 
record of mental states—a blueprint—that can then be used to replicate the 
person later on. If we take this view of personhood, then there doesn’t appear 
to be anything strange about imagining a person being able to be stored in a 
machine. What would make this objection to NST cases stronger would be to 
show that a record or blueprint view of persons must be embodied in some 
relevant way such that a person couldn’t possibly be stored in a machine that 
doesn’t embody the person in some relevant way. As I will show in a later 
chapter, structuralist animalism could suggest such a move by taking persons to 
be a sub-structure of some substance-based entity (a biological organism in the 
case of human persons).  
 A second objection that Snowdon suggests is a slight modification of 
the one above (see 2014b, p. 195). Imagine if, during the time it takes for R1 
(the record of mental states) to replicate into the new body, there is a problem,  
and the replication ends early. If the replication ends 90% complete, then can it 
really be said that the person transferred from one location to another? Can P2 
be identical to P1 if P2 is only 90% of P1?   
I agree that this poses a problem, but I don’t see how it is anything new 
or how it is any more or less problematic than any other case that questions the 
limits of changes a person can endure. Imagine a similar but different example 
in which I am hit on the head hard enough to lose some of my memory. Is the 
person post-hit still me? What if all of my adult memories are lost, and the 
resulting person only has the memories of me when I was a child? Is that 
person still me?  
Snowdon’s example of the ‘blueprint’ copying over at only 90% (or 
only 80%, or 75%, and so on) is just a reupholstering of an old and common 
philosophical question about what a person can endure. As such, it does pose a 
problem, but I don’t see it as any different than one that a mentalist would 
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probably already have considered and would most likely have some response 
to.  
Snowdon describes Animal Replacement (AR) cases as those in which a 
person survives through a process in which their associated animal body is 
slowly replaced by non-biological parts until there are no longer any original 
animal parts remaining (2014b, ch. 9.3). Such a case is said to be a possible 
P&~A case because the person has survived (e.g., as an android) whilst the 
animal has ceased to exist.  
 The first objection someone might make against the possibility of AR 
cases is that it’s uncertain whether or not a person could actually survive a 
process in which their associated animal body is slowly but completely replaced 
by non-animal parts. It can be acknowledged that a person can survive the 
partial replacement of their associated animal’s parts (such as in cases 
concerning prosthetic limbs), but that does not at all suggest that they could 
survive a whole replacement (Snowdon 2014b, p. 196). If a person could not 
survive such a procedure, then AR cases would not be possible P&~A cases.  
 Alternatively, we could question whether the person that is now 
associated with the android is, in any obvious sense, identical to the person 
that was previously associated with the now destroyed animal (Snowdon 
2014b, p. 197). As noted above, just because someone has a particular belief 
about themself doesn’t entail that such a belief is true. It is plausible that the 
person now associated with the android believes that they were once an animal 
and that they survived the replacement process, but that they are wrong.  
 The above objections to AR cases rely on whether or not they are 
actual cases in which the person survives, but another form of worry one 
might have about such cases stems from the assumption that such cases really 
are such that there is no animal at the end of the replacement process. 
Snowdon spells this type of worry out in two ways: first, it could be argued that 
we are animals, but that we can remain in existence once the animal that we are 
ceases to exist. The second way in which Snowdon spells out this worry is by 




There is reason to question whether the animal in AR cases was ever 
destroyed. If we could exist and no longer be an animal, then ‘animal’ would 
not be what Snowdon calls an abiding sort—a thing that has an abiding property. 
An abiding property is any property that an entity has at a given time that it 
cannot lack at any later time (Snowdon 2014b, pp. 17-18). Thus, if ‘being an 
animal’ is an abiding property, and we are animals, then we (and any other 
animal) couldn’t be an animal at one point in time and then be a non-animal at 
a later point. However, if ‘being an animal’ is not an abiding sort, then we 
could be animals now and then continue to exist at a later point as a non-
animal.19 AR cases would not be possible P&~A cases if ‘animal’ is an abiding 
property because we could be an animal prior to the replacement procedure 
 
19 The claim that we are animals at one point in time and could be something other than an 
animal at a later time follows from ‘non-essential animalism’ (Thornton 2016a), ‘weak 
animalism’ (Olson 2015), and (arguably) ‘new animalism’ (Olson 2015). The animalist positions 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter 6.  
Figure 1: Snowdon's (2014) taxonomy: arguments against animalism 
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and then be whatever the resulting thing was (such as an android) at the end of 
the procedure.  
On whether or not ‘being an animal’ is an abiding sort, I have little to 
comment on. In chapter 4, I will demarcate ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ animalism, 
where the former takes us to be animals fundamentally and essentially whilst 
the latter does not. Given that ‘strong’ animalism is the variety that is 
commonly under attack from anti-animalists, and given that ‘strong animalism’ 
would take ‘being an animal’ to be an abiding sort, I will (for present purposes) 
continue assuming that ‘being an animal’ is an abiding sort. 
Snowdon also suggests that it may be the case that the animal survives 
the AR case in virtue of the resulting non-organic entity being identical to the 
organic animal prior to the process. If the animal does survive the process, 
then AR cases cannot be real P&~A cases because they wouldn’t be real ~A 
cases. Given that it’s not clear what counts as an animal, it’s not clear that an 
animal cannot be whatever the non-fleshy entity results at the end of the 
replacement process. To make such a claim is to exclude certain definitions of 
organismality (i.e., what it takes for something to be an organism), namely, any 
definition that counts entities with non-biological parts or mechanisms as 
organisms. Is there reason to assume that organisms couldn’t be made entirely 
of non-organic material? 
To my knowledge, no one has put forward a definition of ‘organism’ 
that could accommodate a completely inorganic entity. In chapter 5, I will 
outline some of the prominent definitions of organismality proposed by 
biologists and philosophers of biology. It’s not surprising that all of the 
definitions concern known properties of organisms, all of which are organic. 
At the same time, it will be shown that there are reasons why defining 
organisms to be more inclusive would be useful and realistic to scientific 
practices. I am not claiming that we ought to include completely non-biological 
entities in the category of ‘organism,’ but I will argue that the boundaries of 
that category enclose entities we wouldn’t normally consider organisms (e.g., 
arguably corpses).  
As Snowdon notes, the above concerns come about when one realises 
that two assumptions are being made about animals: a) ‘being an animal’ is an 
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abiding sort and b) that an animal cannot be made of non-organic material 
(Snowdon 2014b, p. 198). These assumptions are never acknowledged by those 
that endorse the possibility of AR cases and, as such, there is a weakness in 
utilising AR cases as examples of why animalism cannot be true. Given that, 
for practical reasons, I will be assuming that ‘being an animal’ is an abiding 
sort, I acknowledge that I am leaving this assumption undefended. However, I 
will be bolstering the assumption that animals cannot be made completely of 
non-organic parts later on. This might seem to strengthen the plausibility of 
AR cases. However, I will argue that AR cases are not possible because the 
kind of replacement scenario involved is not scientifically possible.  
Shrinkage cases are a third kind of P&~A case that are said to occur 
when an animal loses a bulk of its parts such that it can no longer be judged to 
exist. At the same time, there are enough of the psychological-grounding parts 
associated with the animal remaining that one could claim that the person still 
exists (Snowdon 2014b, p. 15). The Shrinkage cases that are most considered 
in the literature are ‘brain transplant’ cases: cases in which a brain is 
successfully transplanted from the organism it currently resides in (organism1) 
into a different organism (organism2). Organism2 wakes up with all of the 
phenomenal properties (e.g., memory, beliefs, desires, etc.) that were associated 
with Organism1 prior to the surgery. This scenario is meant to uncover the 
intuition that we must be identical to the brain because, intuitively, it seems 
more like we must be organism2 (who thinks, acts, believes, etc. like we do) 
rather than organism1 (who is brainless on an operating table.)  
I will save my comments on Shrinkage cases for the following chapter 
because I not only take such cases to be impossible but, contrary to Snowdon, 
I don’t even think such cases are imaginable in the way needed to generate 
metaphysical conclusions.20 I mention Shrinkage cases here not only to include 
them in Snowdon’s taxonomy of arguments against animalism but to also 
show that they are similar to the other anti-animalist arguments in that they 
focus on the importance of our psychological properties.  
 
20 As I will argue in chapter 3, for something to be ‘imaginable’ in the sense that it can be used 
to draw scientific and metaphysical conclusions is for the imagined scenario to be properly 
constrained by experimentation. 
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Snowdon suggests that there could exist ‘Person Only’ (PO) cases. 
These cases are said to occur when there exists a person that has never been 
associated with an animal or any other substantial form. Snowdon does not 
cover PO cases in any detail as he takes belief in their existence to require an 
assumption that he is not interested in making, namely, some form of dualism. 
The thought here is that there could exist a thing that we are identical to, i.e., a 
person, that existed independently of any animal and only perhaps later did it 
come to be associated with an animal. Although a proponent of dualism could 
argue against animalism on the grounds of the possibility of PO cases, I will 
not engage with them here for similar reasons to Snowdon. PO cases would 
belong to the larger ‘Lone Cases’ category along with AO cases because in 
both scenarios there was only ever an animal or person. 
Lastly, Snowdon considers arguments against animalism that do not 
rely on any of the above P&~A cases, nor do they rely on A&~P cases—such 
arguments he calls ‘non-dissociative’ arguments. Non-dissociative arguments 
are cases that don’t rely on apparent dissociations of animal and person 
(Snowdon 2014b, pp. 19-20). Interestingly, the examples of non-dissociative 
arguments that Snowdon provides happen to also be arguments that could be 
made against the three arguments in favour of animalism that I described in 
the previous chapter (e.g., the ‘Thinking Animals,’ ‘Foetus,’ and ‘Animal 
Ancestors’ arguments).  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I’ve shown that Snowdon’s taxonomy of the arguments against 
animalism provides a useful tool for thinking about what anti-animalists take to 
be important about ourselves, namely, something mental (e.g., consciousness, 
first-person perspectives, etc.) This focus on the importance of psychological 
capacities stands in contrast to the importance animalists attribute to us that we 
saw in the previous chapter. Animalists believe that the properties important to 
our identity are our biological properties. Anti-animalists believe that the 
properties important to our identity to be our psychological properties.  
Snowdon argues that mental capacities are not really what we care 
about above all else; rather, we care about whatever object is associated with 
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those mental capacities (in our case, human animals). A flaw in Snowdon’s 
arguments is that he doesn’t take seriously the metaphysical underpinnings of 
anti-animalist thought, namely, that a ‘person’ is not just a property that 
something has, but a thing that exists in its own right. Because of this, 
Snowdon’s arguments can be said to lack dialectical force. Anyone that 
endorses animalism is already likely to accept that we should focus on the 
object (e.g., the animal) to which personhood is attributed. Likewise, anyone 
that denies animalism is likely to assume that a ‘person’ is something 
metaphysically distinct or significant—the very position that Snowdon easily 
dismisses.  
In the following chapter, I will continue my discussion about the 
arguments against animalism. In particular, I will argue that Snowdon is too 
quick to dismiss the importance of the distinction between ‘real’ and 
‘imaginary’ thought experiments. Once this distinction is made, the animalist 
can then help themselves to important tools that would allow them to readily 
dismiss some of the anti-animalist arguments for not only being impossible but 
also being unimaginable.  
   




Chapter 3. A defence of ‘real’ cases 
 
In the previous chapter, I provided and slightly remodelled a taxonomy created 
by Paul Snowdon (2014b). The resulting taxonomy organises the kinds of 
arguments that could be made against animalism into two broad categories, 
each of which could be divided further:  
• Dissociative cases, i.e., arguments based on cases in which there was, at 
one point, an animal and associated person but that, at a later point, 
there exists only one or the other. 
• Non-dissociative arguments, i.e., a broad category of arguments that 
don't fit into a schema that relies on an apparent disconnect or lack of 
continuity between an animal and/or a person.  
Dissociative cases could be further broken down into two other groups I've 
called: 
• Former Association cases, i.e., cases in which there was, at one point, 
an animal and associated person but that, at a later point, there exists 
only one or the other. 
• Lone cases, i.e., cases in which there exists an animal or person that 
never had an association with an individual of the other kind. 
Former Association cases could be further broken down into those in which 
there exists an animal but no associated person (A&~P cases) and those in 
which there exists a person but no associated animal (P&~A). Lone cases 
could further be broken down into Animal-Only (AO) and Person-Only (PO) 
cases. Non-dissociated arguments can be broken down into further categories, 
each containing arguments that share specific traits. I’m sure there are a 
number of plausible and helpful ways to do this, although formulating them is 
beyond the scope of this project (although this would be an interesting and 
worthwhile endeavour.)21 
 
21 Snowdon (2014b, p. 20) suggests one way of doing this would be to divide non-dissociative 
arguments into those that a) would, if sound, justify (or lead to) dissociative cases, and b) 
would, if sound, prove animalism false without any need for a dissociative case.  
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 Although this taxonomy delivers a useful way to consider arguments 
against animalism, it isn't the only way to understand such arguments. 
Snowdon acknowledges himself that the arguments that are made against 
animalism could be sorted differently, offering as an example a different way to 
organise arguments stemming from dissociative cases in particular. Although 
Dissociative arguments have been organised into those that refer to what I've 
called Former Associative and Lone cases, I suggest an alternative taxonomy: 
cases that are 'real' and those that are' imaginary.' If a case that is taken to 
exemplify a dissociative case exists out in the world, then it is said to be real. If 
such a case can only occur in a thought experiment, then it is said to be 
‘imaginary’. 
 This chapter concerns ‘real’ versus ‘imaginary’ cases. In particular, I will 
argue that such a distinction aids the animalist much more than it might appear 
because it allows animalists to avoid certain criticisms. In section 1, I will take a 
step back from the immediate topic of the chapter to argue that we ought to 
adopt some form of scientific metaphysics, especially when it concerns defending 
animalism. In fact, I will show that this approach has, to some degree, already 
been adopted by those in debates around personal identity (especially by those 
that propose animalism as a solution to the personal-ontological question, i.e., 
the question of personal identity that asks what kind of thing we are). I will 
argue that adopting such an approach gives those working in personal identity, 
especially animalists, a significant amount of un-hypothetical, real-world 
evidence to work with.  
With a version of scientific metaphysics in hand, in section 2, I will be 
able to make better sense of the difference between how thought experiments 
are used by philosophers and scientists. Wilkes (1988) has done a great service 
in making this distinction clear. However, although Wilkes has argued against 
the use of thought experiments in philosophy due to their not having the 
proper constraints found in scientific thought experiments, I will argue that we 
can save philosophical thought experiments insofar as we apply the proper 
constraints to their use. It's ultimately the difference between the constraint-
free 'traditional thought experiments' and the constrained 'scientific thought 
experiments' that will determine which apparent Dissociative cases are ‘real’ 
and which are ‘imaginary’. 'Real cases are to be understood as those in which 
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the apparent dissociation of animal/person can be understood in terms of 
scientific thought experiments. If a Dissociative case cannot be understood in 
terms of a scientific thought experiment, then it is 'Imaginary' and is no use to 
metaphysics (although it may have a role to play in fiction).  
In section 3, I will consider and ultimately reject Lynne Rudder Baker's 
'Big Tent Metaphysics’—a way of doing metaphysics that can be seen as an 
objection to the kind of scientific metaphysics that I propose. According to 
'Big Tent Metaphysics,' our metaphysics should be guided by things that we 
value. It is the things that we value, Baker argues, that should have ontological 
weight—the things that we value are, ontologically speaking, more significant 
than things that we don't value. According to such a position, persons are 
more ontologically significant to organisms because we value the properties of 
persons more than the properties of organisms. The tension between the 
scientific approach and the 'Big Tent' approach to metaphysics can be seen as 
due to the fact that each approach values evidence differently. 
Good clear introduction – it might be good to say just a little more up front 
here about what you’re going to be arguing – i.e., that some of the criticisms of 
animalism stem from the methodological toolkit of the traditional 
metaphysician and need not be taken too seriously by someone (e.g., a 
scientific metaphysician) who regards that toolkit as suspect.  
 
3.1. Scientific metaphysics 
In this section, I will give a broad explanation of what the scientific metaphysics 
program is and why its proponents believe it is more conducive to knowledge 
than traditional metaphysics. I will suggest that a worthwhile broad view of the 
relationship between metaphysics, epistemology, and science is one in which 
there is a reflective equilibrium between them. This relationship is one in 
which each domain provides different knowledge and tools to the others, 
which then can then be used to adjust or constrain the way in which each 
domain works. I will then show how naturalistic metaphysics has already been 
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utilised by the animalist but conclude that there is still much work to be done 
to flesh out a fully naturalised animalist picture.22  
It's difficult to define precisely what scientific or naturalised metaphysics is 
and how it differs from what many metaphysicians have done and continue to 
do. In the introductory chapter to Scientific Metaphysics (eds. Ross et al. 2013), a 
collection of original essays concerning the topic, Kincaid (2013) notes that the 
volume in question is: 
 
[. . .] about the prospects for a naturalised metaphysics and its relation 
to traditional metaphysics. One overarching theme is that traditional 
metaphysics, especially in its current incarnation as analytic 
metaphysics, is a questionable enterprise because of its lack of scientific 
standing. The thesis is that any legitimate metaphysics and conceptual 
analysis must be tied into the results and practices of the sciences (p. 1). 
 
With this broad depiction in place, we can see naturalised metaphysics as being 
in some relation to what I'll call traditional metaphysics, with the primary 
difference being that the former comports with science in some way that the 
latter does not.23 Thus the two approaches can be said to differ in how 
metaphysics is meant to be founded and which methods are appropriate in this 
endeavour—traditional and scientific metaphysics differ in their metametaphysical 
perspective.24 This relationship to science that naturalised metaphysics has is 
meant to make it legitimate, unlike the enterprise of traditional metaphysics, 
which is suspect.25  
 
22 Unless otherwise stated, I will be using the terms naturalised metaphysics and scientific 
metaphysics interchangeably although there is a possible worthwhile distinction to be made 
between them that isn’t relevant here. Bryant (2020), for instance, takes naturalised metaphysics 
and the inductive metaphysics utilised to by Scholz (2018) to be distinct forms of scientific 
metaphysics. 
23 What I’m calling traditional metaphysics shares traits with, or has also been referred to as ‘free 
range metaphysics’ Bryant (2017, 2020), ‘analytic metaphysics’ (Kincaid 2013), ‘neo-scholastic 
metaphysics’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007), ‘autonomous metaphysics’ (Tahko 2015), and ‘non-
naturalistic metaphysics’ (Maclaurin and Dyke 2012; Dyke and Maclaurin 2013). 
24 Here I’m relying on Tahko’s (2015) definition of ‘metametaphysics’ as “[. . .] the study of the 
foundations and methodology of metaphysics” (p. 5). 
25 Some have argued that aspects of traditional metaphysics may be of instrumental use (see, 
e.g., French and McKenzie 2012, 2015). 
77 
 
 Traditional metaphysics has been met with suspicion by its opponents 
for its defending claims that are factually false (Humphreys 2013, p. 56; Bryant 
2017); giving inflated importance to appeals to intuition (Wilkes 1988; 
Ladyman and Ross 2007; Humphreys 2013; Bryant 2017); using conceptual 
analysis informally (Ladyman and Ross 2007; Humphreys 2013); assuming 
scale invariance (Humphreys 2013); utilising problematic philosophical 
idealisations (Wilkes 1988 can be regarded as making this point; Humphreys 
2013); generating theories for which the constraints on the theories’ content 
are not sufficiently robust (Bryant 2017); and for generally being epistemically 
inadequate (Bryant 2017). Although I will not be going through these 
criticisms, in turn, they (or specific cases of them) will be popping up 
throughout the rest of this work.  
Sellars' (1962) distinction between the scientific and manifest images 
has been used to articulate the difference between scientific metaphysics and 
traditional metaphysics (Dennett 2013) as well as to defend scientism 
(Kornblith 2018).26 The manifest image, according to Sellars, is the world in 
which we inhabit in our everyday lives—it's filled with people, everyday objects 
such as tables and cups of coffee, and the inevitable succumbing to existential 
angst. The scientific image, on the other hand, is the hidden world as science 
reveals it—a world filled with strange organisms, neurons, particles, caffeine 
molecules, and the inevitable succumbing to existential angst.  
 With Sellars' images in mind, Dennett argues that analytic metaphysics 
still has something to offer to our collective knowledge about the world. 
However, the aim of the traditional metaphysician needs to be 'rolled back' and 
should focus solely on the manifest image. Dennett sees the analytic 
metaphysician as playing the role of a sophisticated naïve (auto-) anthropologist 
who analyses what everyday people think about themselves and the world 
(Dennett 2013)(98-99). With this role in mind, the metaphysician qua (auto-) 
anthropologist can, for example, create a catalogue of various problems the 
metaphysician of the manifest image needs to deal with—a catalogue 
containing the various concepts that exist in the unrefined and often 
 
26 Scientism is, roughly, the view that scientific knowledge exhausts all knowledge. Although I 
don’t discuss scientism in any detail in this project, it does play a role in how some scientific 
metaphysicians have formulated or defended their views (see, e.g., Ladyman and Ross 2007). 
78 
 
contradictory landscape of the manifest.27 Once these unrefined folk concepts 
have been collected and catalogued, they can then be refined by the 
metaphysician into an organised and generally agreed-upon picture of the 
manifest image. It would be this (more-or-less) unified picture of the manifest 
image that philosophers would refer to when working with our best current 
science (Dennett 2013, p. 100).  
 Kornblith (2018) is more critical of the manifest image. He uses the 
differences in the first-person experiences of belief acquisition by deliberation 
and the third-person research investigations by psychology and cognitive 
science on the same kind of doxastic deliberation to illustrate how the images 
of the manifest and science can conflict. When we consider what happens 
during belief-forming deliberation, Kornblith states, we find that we are able to 
intervene in the mechanistic, non-deliberative processes that would normally 
produce our beliefs. When intervening in this fashion, we appear to have extra 
checks on the processes that produce our beliefs by making sure that the 
beliefs we are producing respond appropriately to our reasons. These extra 
checks make our beliefs more likely to be true. Similarly, the intervention we 
make on our belief-making processes during deliberation make us more aware 
of which considerations went into forming those beliefs. On this phenomenal 
account of doxastic deliberation, we are the authors of our beliefs and, as such, 
the reasons for those beliefs are available to us (Kornblith 2018, p. 132). 
 The picture of doxastic deliberation painted by the third-person 
research found in psychology and cognitive science differs considerably. Our 
ability to intervene in the mechanistic, non-deliberative processes that form our 
beliefs is merely illusory—both our deliberative and non-deliberative belief-
forming processes are mechanistic in nature (Kornblith 2018, p. 136). 
Furthermore, research conducted by psychologists suggests that doxastic 
deliberation often plays the role of increasing our confidence in our pre-
established beliefs, not in creating extra checks. As such, deliberating on our 
beliefs may actually decrease the reliability of such beliefs rather than increasing 
the likelihood that they are true (p. 137). 
 




 Given the mechanistic nature of doxastic deliberation, Kornblith notes 
that much more is going on with the belief-forming processes than is apparent 
to us—there is a large gap between the causally relevant factors in play during 
the deliberative processes and those that the subject perceives there to be from 
a first-person perspective (Kornblith 2018, p. 137). As a result of the 
phenomenally hidden processes in play during our belief-forming deliberation, 
the reasons we hold beliefs that were formed deliberatively are not transparent 
to us. In fact, a subject may believe that a factor plays some causally relevant 
role in their deliberated belief when, in fact, that factor plays no role (pp. 137-
138).  
These differences between the first-person and third-person accounts 
of doxastic deliberation lead Kornblith to argue that the manifest and scientific 
images have irreconcilable differences. When we consider this fact in addition 
to the history of cases in which science has undermined our everyday 
conception of the world, we should be hesitant to embrace common-sense 
concepts of the manifest. As such, Kornblith concludes that the manifest 
image should only include things that are endorsed by the scientific image 
(Kornblith 2018, pp. 142-143).  
 I'm not currently concerned with whether we should be optimistic 
about the usefulness of the manifest image (á la Dennett) or (following 
Kornblith) reject any part of it that isn't endorsed by the scientific image. What 
I want to shine a light on is that these opposing views highlight an interesting 
point about the manifest/scientific distinction, namely, that it seems plausible 
that any metaphysics concerning the manifest landscape is going to be unlike 
anything analytic metaphysicians are currently doing. If metaphysics is best 
understood as a sophisticated naïve (auto-) anthropology, then the purview of 
metaphysicians is not to uncover deep truths of reality. On the other hand, if 
metaphysicians are to work within the realm that science affords us, then we 
have reason to reconsider how we understand the many illusions of the 
manifest. 
 If the metaphysician has been persuaded that her work regards the 
scientific image, then it's still not obvious what exactly her job is because it's 
not obvious what the relationship is between scientific metaphysics and science 
itself. Ladyman and Ross (2007) suggest a very constrained relationship in that 
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the only role for a naturalised metaphysics, in their view, is to unify the 
sciences according to the Principle of Naturalistic Closure (PNC). According 
to the PNC:  
 
Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t 
should be motivated by, and only by, the service it would perform, if 
true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses, at 
least one of which is drawn from fundamental physics, jointly explain 
more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken 
separately, where this is interpreted by reference to the following 
terminological stipulations: [. . .] (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 37). 
 
The terminological stipulations that follow are in regards to how we are to 
understand the use of "scientific hypothesis," which isn't of importance here. 
For our current purposes, we only need to see that Ladyman and Ross are 
suggesting tight constraints for metaphysics (if the study is to be legitimate): 
not only would the metaphysical claim have to explain more, when combining 
two or more scientific hypotheses, than those theories can explain on their 
own, but at least one of those hypothesis has to be from the science of 
fundamental physics. 
 The importance that Ladyman and Ross put on fundamental physics 
adds a further constraint for naturalistic metaphysicians in the form of the 
'Primacy of Physics Constraint' (PPC) (Ladyman and Ross 2007), according to 
which:  
 
Special science hypotheses that conflict with fundamental physics, or 
such consensus as there is in fundamental physics, should be rejected 
for that reason alone. Fundamental physical hypotheses are not 
symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of the special sciences 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 44). 
 
This asymmetric relationship between the physical and special sciences is 
meant to pick out a methodological 'rule' that is found in the history of science, 
namely, that those working in the special sciences shouldn't suggest 
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generalisation or causal relationships that go against the broad consensus of the 
physical sciences at that time (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 38). The PPC is 
committed to some form of physicalism and is meant to be compatible with 
even some weak forms of physicalism (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 39).  
 Again, a precise understanding of the PPC and Ladyman and Ross's 
arguments for its acceptance isn't necessary here. I only include it to show one 
suggestion of how metaphysics ought to be constrained. In the PNC, Ladyman 
and Ross argue that the only legitimate goal of metaphysics is to unify scientific 
hypotheses (at least one of which is from fundamental physics) such that there 
is more explanatory power than the two or more hypotheses produce on their 
own. In the PPC, Ladyman and Ross add a constraint to the hypotheses 
themselves by arguing that those in the special sciences ought to be rejected 
insofar as they conflict with the consensus found in fundamental physics.  
 The incredibly strict constraints that Ladyman and Ross place on 
metaphysics hasn't failed to meet (many) objectors. Melnyk (2013), for 
example, has criticised Ladyman and Ross for being too restrictive in the role 
that a naturalised metaphysics could play in our scientific understanding. There 
is no reason a naturalised metaphysics has to be restricted to the goal of 
unifying the sciences (Melnyk 2013, pp. 82-83), he argues, and there's reason to 
deny that science itself is exclusively authoritative in the way that Ladyman and 
Ross make it out to be (pp. 83-85).  
 There is also a positive claim Melnyk (2013) makes, and one that I 
think can lead to a fruitful framework for metaphysical/scientific relations. If a 
naturalised metaphysics were to utilise the methods of science, he suggests, it 
may correct problems in science (for instance, by pointing out that some part 
of science is imprecise or needlessly agnostic). Even further, a naturalised 
metaphysics could perhaps (when combined with some suitable naturalised 
epistemology) reveal certain scientific theories to be unfounded because they 
rely on faulty reasoning (2013, pp. 85-86) 
 As I noted before, a full breakdown of all of the internal debates about 
scientific metaphysics and/or its difference from traditional metaphysics isn't 
relevant to the aim of this chapter, which is primarily to argue that the ‘real’ 
and 'imagined' distinction in purported dissociative cases is a worthwhile one. 
The above exposition helps us better understand this distinction by offering us 
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a set of tools to determine what counts as ‘real’ and what counts as ‘imaginary.’ 
Before I can put those tools to use, however, I will finish up this subsection by 
referring to three desiderata of scientific metaphysics offered by Soto (2014). I 
think the three desiderata, along with some of the examples provided above, 
lead us to a framework in which we can best understand the role of scientific 
metaphysics. 
 Soto (2014) provides what he takes to be three desiderata with which, 
at minimum, philosophers pursuing scientific metaphysics should agree: an 
epistemic desideratum, a methodological desideratum, and an ontological 
desideratum. These three prerequisites of scientific metaphysics offer a general 
account of what such a metaphysics has to offer, and I will be referencing 
them throughout the rest of this project. As such, a brief overview will be 
helpful at the start. 
Soto takes it that scientific metaphysicians have a different set of 
epistemic commitments than our 'traditional' colleagues, which leads him to 
formulate the epistemic requirement. He writes:  
 
[. . .] scientific metaphysics rejects the appeal to some forms of a priori 
epistemic tools, such as intuition, conceptual analysis, and 
philosophical idealisations. By contrast, it accepts mathematical 
modelling and mathematical idealisation, empirical testing, statistical 
analysis of data, predictions, and manipulation, as more reliable 
epistemic tools (2014, pp. 121-122). 
 
Whereas traditional metaphysics refers to intuitions, conceptual analysis, and 
philosophical idealisation to support their theories, a scientific metaphysician is 
more likely to point to the tools often used by scientists. Consider, for 
example, the Non-Substantial Transfer (NST) cases discussed in the previous 
chapter: a scenario in which a person is said to transfer from one animal to 
another. In one such case, an animal's mental capacities are perfectly recorded 
and then copied over to a different animal. Defenders of such an argument tell 
us that in such an imagined scenario, the intuition we ought to have is that the 
person transfers from one animal to another. From this intuition, they 
conclude that we ought to believe that we are the recorded mental capacities, 
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not the animal from which they were recorded. But, why make this leap from 
our intuition to our beliefs?  
Animalists in the traditional metaphysical mould fare much better in 
this regard. Recall Snowdon's response to such NST scenarios. He tells us to 
imagine that the mental capacities copied from the initial animal are associated 
in some way with a loved one. In such a scenario, he suggests, the intuition 
that we should have is that our daughter is the initial animal—not the recorded 
mental capacities that have been recorded and are then copied over to a 
different animal. Similarly, to the proponent of NST cases, why should anyone 
take Snowdon's intuitions to tell us how the world actually is? What reason do 
we have to take Snowdon's intuitions to be more conducive to knowledge than 
the intuitions of those with whom he disagrees? The scientific metaphysician 
would claim that there is no such reason and that, therefore, we shouldn't use 
our intuitions to justify our beliefs. We certainly shouldn't think our intuitions 
lead us to knowledge.  
If the scientific metaphysician doesn't have a priori tools at their 
disposal, what do we have? In the following chapters, I will refer to several 
methods that are conducive to knowledge: observations made by biologists of 
entities that push the boundaries of what it means to be an organism, 
mathematical models that biologists can use to better understand sex ratios, 
and experiments that have been conducted which help us better understand 
how we cognise the world around us. I will argue that these examples give us a 
better understanding of ourselves and the world.  
The second prerequisite of scientific metaphysics follows naturally 
from the first, epistemic, desideratum: the methodology that scientific 
metaphysicians utilise in their investigations differs in some respects from 
those used by traditional metaphysicians. Soto writes:  
 
[. . .] scientific metaphysics acknowledges that scientific methods are 
our best guide to the knowledge of reality. At a minimum, the 
methodological procedure employed in metaphysics must cohere with, 
and in no case contradict, scientific methodologies. Needless to say that 
both scientific and metaphysical theories should be assessed according 
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to similar criteria to decide whether they are to be provisionally 
accepted or outright rejected (Soto 2014, p. 122). 
 
Because the scientific metaphysician uses different epistemic tools than the 
traditional metaphysician, they likewise rely on different methods to acquire 
knowledge. The epistemic tools used by the scientific metaphysician are those 
that are used by the scientist. As such, the methods by which the scientific 
metaphysician will also be closely aligned with the methods used by those 
working in the sciences. Consider the above example again: traditional 
metaphysicians take it that intuitions can tell us something about the world—
that they can give us some kind of knowledge. As such, those metaphysicians 
often use methods that comport themselves with intuitions, such as thought 
experiments and other kinds of imagined scenarios. Such methods adhere to 
the view that intuitions lead us to knowledge because they help generate our 
intuitions. 
 Later on in this chapter, I will reject the idea that intuitions give us 
some kind of epistemic access to the world and, as such, scientific 
metaphysicians can't avail themselves of the same kind of methods (e.g., 
imagined scenarios) in the same way as their traditional colleagues. The kind of 
imagined scenarios that scientific metaphysicians can utilise will be discussed 
later on in this chapter. 
Lastly, Soto suggests that philosophers pursuing scientific metaphysics 
should consider what they include in their ontology. To this end, 
 
[. . .] scientific metaphysics recognises that our currently bona fide 
scientific theories are the best account that we have of the furniture of 
reality. There is no fundamental metaphysical realm. In particular, 
metaphysics should contribute to the understanding of our scientific 
worldview and in no case to inflate it with non-scientifically motivated 
spooky entities (Soto 2014, p. 122) 
 
The desideratum described by Soto summarises the commitments had 
by naturalistic or scientific metaphysicians, even if there is still some 
disagreement as to how to best interpret them. This is important for my goal 
85 
 
of this chapter as well as the overall goal of this project in that, with these 
naturalistic requirements of metaphysics, I suggest we can undermine the very 
foundation of a lot of metaphysical claims that raise problems for the view that 
we aren't identical to biological organisms. Why do I make such a bold claim?  
With the differing views of scientific metaphysicians, along with the 
desiderata provided by Soto, I take it that we can formulate a broad reflexive 
relationship between science, epistemology, and metaphysics (see figure 1). In 
particular, we can picture an ongoing conversation between naturalised 
metaphysics, science, and naturalised epistemology. During this ongoing 
conversation, the three areas learn from, adjust, and reflect on the information 
provided by each. In understanding the relationship broadly in this way, we can 
get a clearer picture of how each domain of study can benefit from each other 
by creating a reflective equilibrium in which each domain evaluates, 
incorporates, and revises the output of the others. For example, the sciences 
can be seen as providing necessary empirical evidence and scientific theories, 
which constrains how epistemology and metaphysics are practised. A 
naturalised epistemology offers a needed normative foundation to science and 
metaphysics in terms of epistemic adequacy of theories, methodologies, etc. 
Properly constrained metaphysical theories, ontologies, etc., can be provided 
by metaphysicians that, in turn, can be used to make sense of the metaphysical 
aspects of epistemic and scientific theories.  
 It's the reflexive constraints provided by metaphysics, epistemology, 
and the sciences that I take many anti-animalists (and some pro-animalist) 
positions to be lacking. That being said, the utilisation of something coming 
close to scientific metaphysics can already be found in the animalist literature 
in terms of occasional references to the biological sciences and the philosophy 
of biology. This shouldn't be surprising given that that the animals (or 
organisms, human animals, etc.) that animalists refer to are meant to be 
something biological.28 In addition to this, one subject of enquiry in the 
philosophy of biology is how to understand the concepts such as 'organism.' 
As such, it should be obvious that philosophers of biology at least partly share 
and are interested in the same work that animalists are doing. Furthermore, 
 
28 A non-exhaustive list of sources that explicitly state this include Blatti (2014), Olson (1997a, 
2015), and Liao (2006).  
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one form of philosophy of biology occurs when biology is appealed to in order 
to provide answers to traditional philosophical problems (Griffiths 2017, sect. 
2). All of this is to suggest that animalism (in general) is at least partly an issue 
of philosophy of biology and (correctly) vulnerable to biological and other 
scientific criticisms.  
This overlap between animalism and the philosophy of biology can be 
seen in, e.g., Blatti (2012, 2014) and Snowdon (2014b), who have both used 
arguments from biology to motivate animalism. According to Blatti's (2012) 
Animal Ancestors Argument (AAA), for instance, if one denies animalism, they 
must deny evolutionary theory (at least, as it concerns us). The argument here 
is that if one denies animalism, then they must hold the view that we are not 
animals. If this is the case, then our parents were not animals. Thus their 
parents couldn't be animals, and so on. Therefore, Blatti concludes, denying 
animalism leads to the denial of evolutionary theory since one would deny that 
our distant ancestry includes animals. This price is too high, he argues, and as 
such we must accept animalism (p. 686). The AAA is arguably naturalistic in 
that it uses a theory in the biological sciences (in this case, the theory of 
evolution by natural selection) to argue that a metaphysical claim is true (in this 
case, that we are human animals).   
 Scientific knowledge has also been referred to by Olson (1997a) when 
claiming that the nature of organisms is for the biologist to determine (p. 126) 
but offers what he takes to be features we ought to expect any living organism 
to have: a metabolism (p. 127), teleology (pp. 127-128), and organised 
complexity (pp. 128-131). Although I will later (in chapter 5) show that 
organisms are much stranger than Olson may have anticipated, his 
acknowledgement that biology will tell us about our features (as human 
animals) is insightful and naturalistic in its outlook. The animalist can gain a 
Figure 2: Possible structure of science, epistemology, and metaphysics 
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significant amount of insight into our nature, as well as fuel to motivate the 
animalist position if they pay closer attention to the philosophy of biology and 
biology. This insight, however, will go against some of the views commonly 
held by animalists. Despite this, I will show that the tension between the views 
held by the philosophers of biology and biologists on one side, and the 
animalists on the other, can be alleviated if animalists adopt a version of new 
animalism.  
I've argued here that at least some of the work that the animalist has 
been doing is better suited for the philosopher of biology and biologist, 
although I don't claim that all of the work is best left to the scientists and 
philosophers thereof. Answers to questions such as "are we animals?" can (and 
have) been given without reliance on biology (as we've seen in chapter 1). 
Whether or not biology can provide anything that comes to bear on this 
question is another story and one that some [e.g., Blatti (2012, 2014) and 
Snowdon (2014b)] seem to take seriously. I will later suggest that the view that 
sees positions in biology as applying pressure to certain views of our 
metaphysical nature is helpful. I will also show that current debates in the 
philosophy of biology can put pressure on the animalist in such a way that 
suggests a form of “new animalism” to be a good candidate for describing 
what we are.  
This is all to show that current discussion around animalism already 
benefits from a version of scientific metaphysics that gives at least some 
acknowledgement to the sciences. In this regard, I believe the animalist can 
venture further and utilise stronger scientific metaphysics to strengthen their 
position and undermine the traditional metaphysical tactics put forward by our 
anti-animalist objectors. In the section that follows, I will offer at least one way 
in which this can be done: we jettison philosophical thought experiments from 
metaphysical conversations that aren’t properly constrained. 
 
3.2. Thought experiments: scientific vs traditional metaphysics 
In the previous section, I briefly explained what naturalised/scientific 
metaphysics was and how it differed from traditional metaphysics. I also 
offered some brief criticisms that naturalised metaphysicians have made of 
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analytic metaphysics, including how Bryant (2020) has argued against the latter 
due to its posited theories not being robustly constrained in the same way that 
scientific theories are. I refer to this complaint specifically because a similar 
complaint has been made by Wilkes (1988), who argues that thought 
experiments in philosophy are not constrained appropriately in the way that 
the thought experiments in science are. If Wilkes’ criticisms are taken seriously, 
we have a way in which to critically assess the thought experiments utilised in 
so-called dissociation cases. If we were to assess these cases and the thought 
experiments that are behind them, then we can find out which, if any, are 
properly constrained and which are not. If a thought experiment involving a 
dissociation case lacks the necessary constraints, then we can dismiss the 
dissociation case as merely ‘imaginary’ (rather than ‘real’) and not take it as 
offering any metaphysical truth unless it can be made to meet the proper 
constraints.  
In this section, I will run through the constraints Wilkes’ sees scientific 
thought experiments as requiring and which philosophical thought experiments 
lack, thus creating what can be understood as the factors that feature in the 
‘real’/‘imaginary’ distinction in apparent dissociation cases. I will explain these 
constraints fairly broadly at first, as I will later offer some rebuttals of 
Snowdon’s criticisms against Wilkes scientific/philosophical distinction in 
thought experiments which will highlight more specific aspects of Wilkes’ 
thoughts on constraints. As I will show, many of Snowdon’s criticisms are 
specifically addressed by Wilkes. Once I’ve defended the ‘real’/‘imaginary’ 
distinction from Snowdon’s criticisms, I will show which dissociated cases can 
be considered ‘real,’ and which ‘imaginary.’ ‘Imaginary’ cases can be 
disregarded as offering no metaphysical problem to animalism in the same way 
that stories of magical cures offer no metaphysical problem to germ theory. If 
an apparent dissociation case is deemed ‘real,’ then the onus is on the animalist 
to show that such a case isn’t really one of dissociation. 
 The first problem that philosophical thought experiments have, 
according to Wilkes, is that they do not state what the relevant background 




The experimenter—any experimenter, in thought or in actuality—
needs to give us the background conditions against which he sets his 
experiment. If he does not, the results of his experiment will be 
inconclusive. The reason for that is simple and obvious: experiments, 
typically, set out to show what difference some factor makes; in order 
to test this, other relevant conditions must be held constant, and the 
problematic factor juggled against that constant background. If several 
factors were all fluctuating, then we would not know which of them (or 
which combination of them) to hold responsible for the outcome 
(Wilkes 1988, p. 7). 
 
Thus, Wilkes suggests that we adopt what Brown (1986) calls ‘thesis 1,’, 
namely: 
 
Thesis I: The burden of any thought experiment rests on the 
establishment (in the imagination) of a phenomenon. Once the 
phenomenon is established, the inference to a theory is fairly 
unproblematic: that is, the jump from data to theory is relatively small 
(p. 4). 
[. . .] if we got the phenomenon right then the theory followed more 
or less automatically (Brown 1986, p. 13). 
 
Consider the thought experiment, which imagines a world in which human 
persons were able to split like amoebae. Wilkes suggests that, in order for the 
thought experiment to adequately describe the relevant background, we would 
need to know whether or not the splitting was predictable, controllable, 
preventable, how often it occurred, etc. Also important to Wilkes is the 
relevant social background against which these occurrences took place: does 
the society have the institution of marriage, and how does it deal with splitting 
people? Does it have universities, and if so, how do they deal with the splitting 
of its students/faculty/staff/etc.? Do pregnant women split? (Wilkes 1988, p. 
11). 
 The person/amoeba thought experiment, if fully fleshed out with all of 
the relevant background assumptions, is mysterious and incomprehensible, and 
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it’s not even clear what the ‘we’ is in such an experiment when asked what we 
would say about our intuitions in such cases. Even if solutions to Wilkes’ 
questions were filled in—if, for example, we were to state that the society in 
this thought experiment had the institution of marriage, that it deals with 
splitting people in the same way that our world deals with childbirth, etc.—
such a world would be incredibly dissimilar to our own. It’s for this reason that 
Wilkes suggests that:  
 
[I]n a world where we split like amoeba, everything else is going to be 
so unimaginably different that we do not know what concepts will 
remain ‘fixed,’ part of the background; we have not filled out the 
relevant details of this ‘possible world,’ except that we know it cannot 
be much like ours. But if we cannot know that, then we cannot assess, 
or derive conclusions from, the thought experiment (Wilkes 1988, p. 
12). 
 
The person/amoeba thought experiment is meant to pump the intuitions we 
have about our persons, but in order to imagine a world in which we could 
exhibit such behaviour, we must first imagine a world that is so radically unlike 
our own that we cannot rely on our current understanding of persons. In 
imagining such a world, we lose any semblance of the thing we are supposed to 
be trying to understand—the explanandum in such a situation has thus 
changed. As such, any explanations will be of something other than what we 
want. Otherwise, what is it that we are actually learning? 
 Another problem Wilkes finds with philosophical thought experiments 
is that the notion of imagination that is often used in philosophical thought 
experiments is different from that which is used in scientific thought 
experiments. She writes:  
 
In science, [. . .] because of the firm backing theories, our ‘intuitions’ (if 
we rather misleadingly call them that) are usually unproblematic. But 
when we are dealing with the rich and riotous chaos of common-sense 
concepts, we are dealing with terms that generally do not pick out 
natural kinds, and so there is no body of explicit theory or shared and 
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agreed generalisations about them; we are rather dealing with implicit 
and partial, rough and ready, common-sense assumptions. Hence the 
importance of intuitions grows in direct proportion to its 
precariousness. We must deploy it; for we must [. . .] have some way of 
agreeing about the relevant background to the thought experiment in 
question. But when is intuition reliable?” (Wilkes 1988, p. 16). 
 
In scientific thought experiments, scientists are likely to have the same 
intuitions about a thought experiment insofar as they share the same relevant 
theory. The likelihood of this shared intuition comes from the clearly 
established conditions of the imagined scenario, along with whatever 
background theory is being held. The shared intuition that is presumed to be 
had by such scientists comes naturally after some simple inference or 
deduction, and as such, Wilkes questions whether it’s fair to refer to these 
thoughts as “intuitions” at all (Wilkes 1988, p. 15).  
 The imagination that is involved in scientific thought experiments is 
constrained by background conditions and held theory. Compare this to the 
less constrained imagination used in philosophical thought experiments in 
which common-sense concepts are often utilised. These common-sense 
concepts lack any theory or agreed-upon generalisations because such concepts 
don’t pick out natural kinds.29  
The terms to which our scientific thought experiments refer are picking 
out natural kind terms. The terms to which philosophical thought experiments 
refer, on the other hand, are common sense, and thus the entities that they 
pick out lack any established generalisation.  At the same time, however, we 
need intuitions to find agreed upon background assumptions to be held in 
thought experiments. The importance of intuitions (despite how they can 
occasionally lead us astray) creates a problem: when we should trust those 
intuitions and when shouldn’t we? Regarding this problem, Wilkes takes it that 
we can support some of our intuitions with the current scientific knowledge 
that we already have on hand, but we shouldn’t let our imagination run wild. 
She writes: 
 
29 In general, Wilkes takes it that common-sense isn’t in the business of discovering or 





[. . .] what is fine in literary fantasy (where the ambition is to entertain) 
is not necessarily enough to ‘establish a phenomenon’ (from which the 
ambition is to draw conclusions.) 
So, we should look rather to the ‘theoretical’, or ‘in principle’ 
possibility of the relevant background conditions—the conditions we 
need to specify before we can be sure both that the imagined scenario 
is adequately described, and that the inference from the imagined state 
of affairs to the conclusion can be made. This would be the test of 
validity for a thought experiment. This we can characterise as a matter 
of what could or could not happen given our backing scientific 
knowledge: what our theories allow to be possible or not (Wilkes 1988, 
p. 18). 
 
Wilkes uses George Seddon’s (1972) example of iron floating on water to 
illustrate how a theory can tell us what is possible or not. Once we have a 
backing theory of metals to provide some relevant information—such as ‘iron’ 
is a natural kind with the specific gravity ranging from 7.3 to 7.8—and other 
relevant theories (e.g., buoyancy, density, etc.), we can conclude that it’s not 
possible for iron to float on water. This conclusion follows from the fact that 
water has a specific gravity of 1, and only things that have a specific gravity less 
than that of water can float (Wilkes 1988, p. 18). 
 Broadly, Wilkes’ holds that there is an important difference in the 
thought experiments used in science and those used in philosophy which 
makes such experiments useful in the former but not the latter. The relevant 
background conditions of any thought experiment used in science are clear and 
held constant so that the variable of interest can be tested. Thought 
experiments in science also use terms that refer to natural kinds, and thus there 
is less work to be done by the imagination of the scientist, who can constrain 
their thought experiments to what is possible given the background conditions 
of their imagined scenario along with whatever theory is being held. Thought 
experiments used in philosophy, on the other hand, do not lay out clear 
background assumptions that are to remain constant, nor do the terms in such 
experiments refer to natural kinds. As a result, it’s not clear what the variable in 
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question is being tested against or whether there is any agreed upon 
generalisation about the variable itself!  
There are more fine-grained distinctions and points made by Wilkes 
that are important to the position she is fleshing out. Rather than list them, 
however, I will instead address them in how they relate to criticisms made by 
(Snowdon 2014b). Snowdon’s objections, I believe, are a result of 
misunderstandings that he has regarding her position and, in highlighting some 
of the finer details in her view, we can defend Wilkes’ portrayal of thought 
experiments in philosophy as well as the ‘real’ vs ‘imagined’ distinction in 
apparent dissociation cases. 
Snowdon takes issue with Wilkes’ understanding of “thought 
experiment” in that he takes her to mean that thought experiments are 
imaginary and thus cannot be realised in the real world (Snowdon 2014b, pp. 
217-218). Snowdon does cite Wilkes in describing thought experiments in this 
way (particularly Wilkes 1988, p. 2), but he doesn’t note that Wilkes 
immediately clarifies this point by stating that she takes ‘thought experiments’ 
to be either ‘useful’ or not, and to also be distinct from two other kinds of 
experiments that take place in thought. As such, Wilkes clearly doesn’t define 
‘thought experiment’ as “any experiment that takes place in thought” but in a 
narrower sense: “any experiment such that the experiment itself can only exist 
in thought.” A ‘thought experiment’ in Wilkes’ view is distinct from what she 
(and Brown 1986) refer to as ‘merely imagined’ experiments—experiments 
which could be done in reality but, for whatever reason or other, have only in 
fact been done in thought. She also finds them distinct from experiments 
‘which take place in thought’—experiments that are done to determine 
whether certain sentences are grammatical or not.  
 A closer look at the kinds of experiments that take place in thought 
would be useful here. First, ‘thought experiments’ come in two kinds: those 
that are useful and those that are not. Useful thought experiments are 
constrained by experimentation on Wilkes’ view. A thought experiment that 
isn’t constrained by experimentation is not useful. For a thought experiment to 
be constrained by experimentation is to be constrained by the kinds of things 
94 
 
noted above: relevant background conditions, in-principle possibility, etc.30 
Whether useful or not, thought experiments are done in the imagination and 
cannot occur in the real world. 
Similarly, ‘experiments which take place in thought’ are constrained by 
experimentation and are limited to the mind; however, Wilkes takes such 
experiments to be different from ‘thought experiments’ because they are “real 
experiments and not imaginary ones” (Wilkes 1988, p. 3). The difference 
Wilkes’ makes between ‘real experiments’ and ‘imagined experiments’ here isn’t 
clear, although she presumably follows Brown in taking ‘experiments that take 
place in thought’ to be those “where thinking is the object, not the method, of the 
experiment” (Brown 1986, p. 3). 
‘Merely imagined’ experiments are those that are imagined and 
constrained by experimentation but are not limited to the mind; such 
experiments could be done in the real world. Wilkes’ admits that ‘merely 
imagined’ experiments frequently occur in moral philosophy. For example, the 
famous trolley problem is an experiment that is merely imagined—an 
experimenter could put an individual in a position where they need to decide 
whether to save a single life or many lives. Similarly, Brown (1986, p. 3)and 
Wilkes (1988, p. 3) use an experiment Galileo merely imagined to illustrate 
what a merely imagined experiment in science looks like. In this experiment, 
Galileo imagined what would happen if a cannonball was dropped at the same 
height as a musket ball. In imagining this, Galileo showed that, if Aristotelian 
mechanics were right, a less heavy ball would have to fall both faster and 
slower than a heavier one. This revealed an inconsistency in Aristotelian 
mechanics. This illustrates a ‘merely imagined’ experiment because Galileo 
could have (although probably didn’t) actually drop a cannonball and a musket 
ball from the same height.  
Browns and Wilkes’ distinctions between the three kinds of 
experiments that take place in thought can be seen as being determined by 
three different criteria: first, whether or not the experiment is, in principle, 
limited to thought (i.e., whether or not the experiment is, in principle, unable 
 
30 Of course, we can agree with Wilkes regarding the need for experimental constraints on 
thought experiments (at least when it comes to them being useful to metaphysics and science) 
but disagree with her on what precisely those experimental constraints entail. Here I’m 
referring to the constraints that she proposes, but whether these particular constraints are 
necessary and/or sufficient is beyond the scope of this project. 
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to be performed outside of thought); second, whether or not the scenario is 
appropriately constrained by experimentation; and third, whether thinking is 
the object or the method of experimentation (see table 1). The problem with 
Snowdon’s objections to Wilkes’ position is that they don’t consider the 
different criteria provided by Wilkes. As I’ve already shown, Snowdon initially 
believes Wilkes is wrong to think that thought experiments cannot be 
actualised in the world. However, this objection ignores her distinction 
between ‘thought experiments’ and experiments that are ‘merely imagined.’ As 
such, Wilkes doesn’t deny (as Snowdon claims she does) that some 
experiments that occur in thought can be actualised in the world; she just 
denies that ‘thought experiments’ are such experiments.  
Snowdon is also sceptical of Wilkes’ contention that many thought 
experiments in philosophy are objectionable, but those in the sciences are not. 
He states that “[. . .] according to her, thought experiments, per se, are not 
suspect. She must suppose that something goes wrong in philosophy (and 
perhaps elsewhere) when envisaged, but impossible, cases are used in 
arguments” (2014b, p. 218). Snowdon takes Wilkes’ position to be based on 
the idea that it’s not clear what background assumptions are being relied on in 
philosophical thought experiments such that they suggest a particular 
conclusion and, as such, that no conclusion can be drawn from these thought 
experiments. Snowdon objects to this idea, stating that it’s not clear that there 
is any truth to the claim that thought experiments in philosophy lack clear 
background assumptions. 
Snowdon objects to Wilkes’ suggestion that thought experiments used 
in personal identity debates lack clear background assumptions (call this the 
Background Objection). Snowdon suggests that a ‘background assumption’ could 
mean one of three things. The first meaning would be whatever assumption is 
in play that enables a particular conclusion given a particular imagined scenario. 
That is, when the experimenter is considering a particular imagined scenario, 
they will often claim that, if actualised in the real world, a particular conclusion 
would follow given some theory (i.e., the background assumption). If the 
derived conclusion is false, then the assumed theory (and thus the background 
assumption) must be false (p. 219).  
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Table 1: Wilkes' (1988) kinds of thought experiments 






Thinking the object 









Yes No Method 
Merely imagined 
experiments 
No Yes Method 
Experiments 
which take place in 
thought 
Yes Yes Object 
 Although Snowdon doesn’t provide an example of such a case, it’s 
easy to fill in the variables. For example: If my brain were to be transplanted 
from my current body (Body-1) into another, brainless, body (body-2) such 
that body-2 had all of the mental faculties that were associated with body-1 
(which is kept alive by some fantastic machine) (this is the imagined scenario) 
then, according to animalism (i.e., the theory of personal identity and the 
background assumption), we would be identical to body-1 (now brainless, but 
still alive) and not with body-2 (i.e., the conclusion of the argument). Such a 
conclusion must be false and, therefore, animalism (the background 
assumption) must likewise be false.  
This example suggests that philosophical thought experiments do, 
contrary to Wilkes, have background assumptions (at least ones understood in 
this first meaning of ‘background assumption’). As such, Snowdon argues that 
Wilkes is wrong to say that thought experiments in philosophy always lack 
such an assumption.  
 The second way of interpreting the ‘background’ of the experiment is 
that the background is the envisaged scenario itself. On this account, to reuse 
the above example, the background assumption is the scenario involving the 
transplant of my brain from my current body to a new, brainless body such 
that the new body has all of the mental faculties of the previous body. It would 
be implausible for us? to adopt this interpretation of ‘background assumption’ 
(in our interpretation of Wilkes) because there would be many cases of 
philosophical thought experiments with clear background assumptions (we just 
‘read them’ off of the envisioned scenario!) (Snowdon 2014b, p. 219).  
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 Lastly, the ‘background assumptions’ could be interpreted as meaning 
whatever background brings about the envisaged scenario. If this understanding 
of background assumption is to be taken, then we must know not only by what 
means I found myself getting my brain transplanted into a new body, but 
perhaps even why I agreed to such an operation, where the surgeons got the 
other body, what medical experiments were done to suggest the operation 
could be undertaken, etc. As Snowdon notes, such information is often not 
provided in thought experiments, occasionally only gestured towards, he states, 
“The best that could be done would be to say: let us assume that, somehow or 
other, A [where A is the envisioned scenario]” (p. 219). The problem with 
‘background assumptions’ in this sense is that it seems unavoidable in all 
thought experiments, not just ones in philosophy.  
The issue with the Background Objection is that it ignores some important 
facets of Wilkes’ point. First, none of the potential interpretations of 
‘background assumptions’ that Snowdon has offered are sensitive to the 
importance of such a background being fixed with natural kind concepts. That 
is, of course, philosophical thought experiments have background assumptions 
in the sense that a particular conclusion will follow given a theory and 
background (if we accept the first interpretation), or in the sense that there is 
an envisioned background scenario (if we accept the second interpretation). 
However, although we can accept that these interpretations have background 
assumptions in a vague sense, both interpretations rely on common-sense 
concepts and assumptions that make it unclear if the conclusions that follow 
from such thought experiments are possible in anything like the real world. In 
the brain-transplant scenario, for example, it’s not clear whether the 
background assumption includes a generalised account of personhood, 
memories, beliefs, etc., or whether such concepts are necessarily embodied 
(i.e., if personhood, memories, etc. are embodied, then any transplant from one 
body to another, could plausibly affect those capacities, complicating the 
possibility of the thought experiment.) 
The second problem with the Background Objection is that it ignores 
Wilkes’ point that some background assumptions are going to be more 
relevant than others. This is particularly a problem with the third interpretation 
of ‘background assumption’ suggested by Snowdon, in which we need a full 
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explanation of how the envisioned scenario came about. Of course, such a 
fully fleshed out background isn’t needed! How Galileo imagined he arrived at 
the location where he imagined he dropped a cannonball and musket ball is 
irrelevant to the thought experiment in the same way that it’s irrelevant for the 
brain transplant case to know how the surgeon arrived at the operating room. 
What is relevant in such situations are those things that actively affect the 
experiment, such as whether or not a brain transplant is possible, whether 
memories or other mental capacities are necessarily embodied, etc. Such 
assumptions are relevant in that they will affect what follows from the thought 
experiment: again, if mental capacities are necessarily embodied in a certain 
way, then any scenario in which they are incorrectly embodied is going to 
conclude differently than if they were embodied correctly (or, if mental 
capacities don’t need to be embodied at all.)  
 Snowdon’s last objection to Wilkes’ view can be called the Possibility 
Objection. According to the Possibility Objection, Wilkes is wrong to suggest that 
our intuitions or judgements about scenarios become more dubious or 
uncertain the further they are from reality. Snowdon offers two reasons to 
reject this point: first, it’s simply not true that we cannot make judgements 
about envisioned cases simply because they are unlike real situations. For 
example, a train that consists of 10,000 carriages will never exist, yet we could 
clearly apply a description to such a train (i.e., “a very long train”) (Snowdon 
2014b, p. 220).  
The second reason we ought to reject Wilkes’ view about the 
relationship between our judgements and the reality (or lack thereof) of a given 
scenario is that such a suggestion conflicts with our normal view of language. 
On the normal view of language, Snowdon claims, we interpret sentences in 
such a way as to determine them as true or false depending on the possibilities 
they express. Given this, it doesn’t matter if a sentence expresses an actuality for 
that sentence to be interpreted as containing something true (or false) 
(Snowdon 2014b, p. 220).  
 The Possibility Objection misses two important points, namely, that not 
all thought experiments are the same (i.e., an imagined scenario may be 
envisioned as part of a useful thought experiment, as a merely imagined 
experiment, as an experiment that takes place in thought, etc.), and that (at 
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least on Wilkes’ view) some envisioned scenarios that aren’t real lead to 
dubious judgements precisely because they aren’t possible. Let’s begin with the 
first point (i.e., that not all imagined scenarios are the same): Snowdon is right 
to say that a train consisting of 10,000 carriages has (probably) never existed, 
but that we can reasonably describe a scenario in which one did. Wilkes would 
agree to all of this but still deny that such an envisioned scenario had to be a 
part of a thought experiment (useful or not). This is because such a train could 
(presumably) exist and, as such, the scenario itself isn’t, in principle, limited to 
thought. Such a scenario could be the background of a ‘merely imagined’ 
experiment, and thus such a non-actual scenario wouldn’t pose a problem to 
her view.  
 What about non-actual scenarios that are limited to thought (i.e., 
scenarios that can’t, in principle, exist in the real world)? Such scenarios also 
don’t pose a problem to Wilkes’ view insofar as the scenario itself is properly 
constrained by experimentation: that such a scenario is the background of 
either a useful thought experiment or an experiment that takes place in thought 
(i.e., an experiment in which thinking is the object, not the method, of the 
experiment.)  
The second point that Snowdon doesn’t account for in the Possibility 
Objection is that, in Wilkes’ view, some scenarios are not real simply because 
such scenarios are not possible. Recall the point made by Seddon (1972) and 
reiterated by Wilkes (1988) that theories can help us determine which situations 
are possible and which are not. A scenario in which an iron bar floats on water 
is not possible, in their view, precisely because our best theory of metal (and 
buoyancy, etc.) don’t allow for such a scenario to occur. Thus, Wilkes and 
Seddon have no need to reject Snowdon’s point that a sentence can be 
interpreted as expressing something true or false depending on the possibilities 
they express. Seddon explicitly states that we can imagine such a scenario; we 
can talk about bars of iron floating (such talk is meaningful), but that such a 
scenario is, nonetheless, impossible (Seddon 1972, p. 481). 
 As I’ve shown, Snowdon’s criticisms of Wilkes are unfounded because 
they don’t actually refer to any position that Wilkes expresses in her view. As 
such, he has not successfully defended philosophical thought experiments 
from Wilkes’ criticisms, and the ‘real’ vs ‘imagined’ distinction remains a 
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plausible and worthwhile way of determining which apparent dissociative cases 
are of genuine concern. In the section that follows, I will face a final potential 
problem with scientific metaphysics (and thus the foundation of the ‘real’ vs 
‘imaginary’ distinction I’ve defended here.)  
 
3.3. An alternative to ‘traditional’ and ‘scientific’ metaphysics 
Thus far, I’ve shown that Snowdon’s taxonomy of arguments against 
animalism helps illuminate a difference between metaphysical methodologies—
methods that differ between what I’ve been calling ‘traditional’ and ‘scientific’ 
metaphysics. Scientific metaphysics, which A&~P cases could be said to be 
based on, are based on phenomena that are actually confirmed to exist in the 
world (even if such cases are sometimes unfamiliar or modified in some way as 
to be unrecognisable). Traditional metaphysics, such as those used in P&~A 
cases rely on hypothetical thought experiments. I’ve shown that, contrary to 
Snowdon, there is good reason to object to at least some of the methods used 
by traditional metaphysics, specifically methods that rely on thought 
experiments that aren’t constrained by experimentation (thus making them not 
useful). By objecting to the use of thought experiments that aren’t useful, we 
are able to weaken the appeal to P&~A cases on the basis that the background 
assumptions are too unstable to accurately claim any valuable intuition from 
them.  
 As shown above, Snowdon objected to Wilkes’ arguments against a 
certain kind of thought experiment. I also showed that Snowdon’s objections 
were based on him conflating various distinct kinds of thought experiments to 
which Wilkes refers. A full analysis of all of the objections to scientific 
metaphysics and its methodologies and restrictions cannot be considered here, 
but there is a rival metametaphysical position that I should spend some time 
discussing.  
Baker has offered an account that could plausibly serve as an argument 
for why we ought to take constituted entities to be more ontologically 
significant than the entities that constitute them. It could be argued that such 





According to Big-Tent Metaphysics, there exist many different kinds of 
things; each kind of thing has a nature, and the nature of any kind of 
thing includes what distinguishes that kind from the other kind and what 
is most significant and most distinctive about that kind. [. . .] 
Big-Tent Metaphysics looks to metaphysics of Fs to tell us the nature of 
F’s, what is distinctive or unique about Fs, and what is significant about Fs. 
What we consider to be real should not be independent of what we 
consider to be important. Else, why bother with metaphysics? (Baker 
2008a, p. 10).  
 
Baker is formulating an interesting metametaphysical position by way of Big-
Tent metaphysics (i.e., Big-Tent Metaphysics is making a prescriptive claim 
about how metaphysics itself ought to be done, thus making it meta). There are 
two metametaphysical claims being made here: first, metaphysics shouldn’t just 
tell us about the nature of reality, but it should seek to include in reality things 
that are distinctive or significant to human beings? in some way. Second, 
metaphysics shouldn’t be independent of what we take to be important. 
Regarding this latter claim, I take Baker to mean that there ought to be some 
kind of normative dimension to our metaphysical claims in at least two regards: 
(1) that there is a necessary, and thus an important relationship between claims 
about reality and claims about value, which leads to, (2) our ontology should 
only include things that we take to have value.31 
 As we can see, Big-Tent Metaphysics and scientific metaphysics offer 
different sets of standards by which we are to conduct our metaphysical 
investigations. Of course, proponents of scientific metaphysics may debate 
amongst themselves as to how we ought to best do metaphysics (if at all). I 
assume the same can be said about Big-Tent Metaphysics. Evidently, there are 
some notable differences between the two approaches. For instance, 
proponents of Big-Tent Metaphysics take there to be an important normative 
dimension to our metaphysical claims; proponents of scientific metaphysics do 
 
31 Olson (2008) takes Baker to be making the same claim, although he attributes to her the 
more radical claim that “[a]ll value carries ontological significance” (2008, p. 34). Baker (2008b) 
emphatically denies that she holds this radical view (p. 45), although she doesn’t provide any 
evidence to the contrary, nor does she explain how we are to interpret her Big-Tent 
Metaphysics in a way that avoids this conclusion. 
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not take this normative dimension to be important. Proponents of Big-Tent 
Metaphysics claim that our ontology should contain things that have value; 
proponents of scientific metaphysics do not. Proponents of scientific 
metaphysics believe metaphysics should somehow conform to, accommodate, 
or structure our scientific knowledge—a criterion Big-Tent metaphysicians 
don’t necessarily have to consider. This suggests that the two different 
metametaphysical positions can easily clash (e.g., as in cases where what we 
value cannot be understood in scientific terms or in cases where the entities of 
science aren’t valued.)  
 The clash between what we apparently value and what science 
apparently tells us is illustrated by one of Baker’s issues with animalism. Baker 
takes animalism to be problematic, in part, because it doesn’t capture what 
makes us unique: the first-person perspective. Thus, she describes:  
 
Olson’s conception of life in terms of organisms is both too broad and 
too narrow to be adequate for understanding human life. It is too broad 
since it does not make a place for what is distinctive about human lives. 
[. . .] It is too narrow since it defines human life wholly in terms of its 
biological aspects (Baker 2008a, p. 11).  
 
Olson’s view that we are biological organisms is problematic, from Baker’s 
standpoint, because it doesn’t take into consideration the non-biological 
aspects of our nature—including aspects that Baker deems distinctive. She 
continues: 
 
[. . .] biological life is only one aspect of personal life. In a strict and 
philosophical sense, your life is a person life that includes your success 
and failures, and loves and losses, as well as your high cholesterol. To 
equate human life, in a strict and philosophical sense, with biological life 
severely truncates what we intend to talk about strictly and 
philosophically. A wholly biological conception of your life is simply not 




To Baker, animalism fails to take into account important aspects of what we 
are (e.g., our capacity for a first-person perspective) and thus fails to be an 
adequate account of what we are. 
I find the idea of Big-Tent Metaphysics interesting, even if problematic. 
There are numerous problems with such a metametaphysical view, for 
instance, the fact that the resulting ontology would include a lot of things 
(Olson 2008 notes this about Baker's ontology, p. 35). But even if someone 
accepted or desired such a bountiful ontology, there still hasn’t been an 
argument for why we should want to embrace Big-Tent Metaphysics (or similar 
metametaphysical positions). In fact, Big-Tent Metaphysics is arguably trying 
to conflate differing kinds of truths. Snowdon has noted this problem in his 
response to Big-Tent Metaphysics, stating, “[t]he answer to Baker’s question—
why do metaphysics if it does not explain value?—is that we have an interest in 
truths which are not to do with value” (Snowdon 2014b, p. 244). Snowdon is 
hitting on an important distinction here between kinds of truth and the 
importance of not conflating them into a single kind. Some truths concern 
value, e.g., the claim that all humans are created equal, whereas other truths 
have little or nothing to do with value, e.g., gold has the atomic number 79.  
If these differing kinds of truths (i.e., truths that do and do not concern 
value) are conflated, then it’s not clear how metaphysics is meant to move 
forward because, despite Baker’s contention that not all value has ontological 
significance, it’s not clear which value has ontological significance. In this 
respect, Big-Tent Metaphysics only offer us a vague aim; that is, it is vague in 
telling us what ‘value’ is when it suggests that ‘metaphysics should be about 
things that we value.’ As a consequence of this vagueness in its aim, Big-Tent 
Metaphysics is vague in what it can be included in our ontology: do we value 
currency in the right way for ‘currency’ to be included in our ontology? Do I 
value the pen next to me, the one with an empty ink cartridge, enough for it to 
be included in our ontology? What if it was my favourite pen? Should such a 
thing matter when discussing what is included in our ontology? 
Even if we had an idea of which value has ontological significance, it 
would be problematic at best if we allowed our ontology to be sufficiently 
permissive to include everything that has value. This problematic constraint 




Metaphysics, as I see it, is in the business of discovering metaphysical 
truth. The kinds and categories that figure in metaphysical truths might 
match up with the kinds and categories that are important outside of 
metaphysics. But again, I see no reason to suppose that they have to. In 
fact it would seem to be very bad for metaphysics if it were constrained 
to say something about the categories that figure outside of metaphysics. 
A metaphysical theory shouldn’t be rejected just because it treats all 
organisms alike, any more than a physical theory should be rejected if it 
treats all massive objects alike. Metaphysics shouldn’t try to tell the 
whole story of everything, any more than physics should (Olson 2008, 
pp. 35-36).  
 
The important point here is that, according to Big-Tent Metaphysics, there is a 
necessary relation between metaphysics (one sub-discipline of study) and value 
(a different sub-discipline of study) such that metaphysics recognises the 
ontological status of things that we value.  
In regards to animalism specifically, Baker contends that we value 
aspects of ourselves beyond the fact that we are biological organisms (consider 
again the two quotes by Baker provided above in which she says that 
animalism doesn’t provide an adequate ontology because it doesn’t consider 
the non-biological aspects of ourselves.) But, why should we include ‘persons’ 
in our ontology even if we accept that persons are valuable to us? As Snowdon 
points out: 
 
The problem here is that on anyone’s view a full and proper account of 
someone’s life, in the normal sense, will of course include the rich and 
fascinating psychological life of that individual. There is no implication 
from that evident fact to the conclusion that these important aspects of 
our lives ought to be regarded as types of features which are essential 
for our existence (Snowdon 244).  
 
Neither Snowdon, Olson, nor I reject the mental lives that most human 
animals have, nor do we claim that such mental lives are not valuable. The real 
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concern that we have with Baker’s Big-Tent Metaphysics on this matter is 
whether we should include such things—no matter how valuable they may be 
to us—into our ontology. There just doesn’t seem to be any reason to think 
that they should.  
 The Big-Tent Metaphysics that Baker proposes is an interesting 
metametaphysical project, but not one that has been presented in a persuasive 
or plausible way. The project is vague in its aims as well as what entities it 
could plausibly include in our ontology. It could easily allow for plentiful 
ontology (which would be an issue for those of us who want our ontology to 
include as few entities as possible). Lastly, it conflates two kinds of truth (i.e., 
metaphysical truth and truths concerning value) without any justification. Big-




I argued that endorsing a scientific metaphysics that reject certain kinds of 
thought experiments—thought experiments that are not constrained by 
experimentation—provides us with a means to reject certain thought 
experiments used to support anti-animalist claims, as well as certain anti-
animalist intuitions in general. I also responded to some objections that 
Snowdon has posed against rejecting thought experiments that aren’t 
constrained by experimentation, showing them to stem from a conflation of 
distinct kinds of thought experiments.  
 A possible metametaphysical alternative to scientific metaphysics, 
Baker’s Big-Tent Metaphysics, was critically examined. I suggested that, 
although Big-Tent Metaphysics may sound appealing, it fails to be a plausible 
alternative because, amongst other things, it is incredibly vague in its aims and 
ontology. Similarly, the ontology of Big-Tent Metaphysics could easily result in 
a very abundant ontology.   
 In the chapter that follows, I will show that endorsing scientific 
metaphysics is a double-edged sword for the animalist. That is, although 
utilising the methodologies that come with it helps us respond to anti-animalist 
criticisms, scientific metaphysics also makes certain animalist assumptions 
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problematic. An important animalist assumption that will be discussed is 
biological essentialism—the claim that biological kinds have essences that 
determine their membership of the kind. If we reject the reality of biological 
essences, as I will suggest we should, then animalists are faced with the 
problem of explaining what determines our membership in the kind ‘biological 









Despite animalism’s contention that we are animals, its proponents have paid 
very little attention to results and discussions taking place in biology and 
philosophy of biology regarding the topic of animals, organisms, etc.32 As we 
will see, questions such as ‘what is an animal?’ or ‘what is an organism?’ are 
often given by the animalist to the biologist to decide an answer (e.g., Olson 
1997a). Nevertheless, animalists have continued to offer and argue for and 
against certain persistence conditions, properties, etc., of animals, organisms, 
and human animals. When doing this, they often use a priori reasoning or 
outdated science that lead them to conclusions about the nature of animals, 
organisms, and human animals that are seen as problematic by the biologist 
and philosopher of biology. There is an obvious disconnect here: if we are 
animals (as the animalist suggests), and if little attention is paid to the work of 
those who concern themselves with the nature of animals (i.e., biologists and 
philosophers of biology), how can the animalist possibly begin to correctly 
understand the very object of their enquiry? 
 In this chapter, I will start bridging the gap between animalism and 
biology/philosophy of biology and thus create a more secure foundation for 
discussion to take place. To do this, I will start by explicating what animalism 
(in its basic form) states and to what kind of question the position is an answer. 
In section 2, I will map out two ways in which animalism has been divided into 
varieties. I will argue that a similarity between these maps supports the view 
that two separate tasks are being pursued by animalists. These tasks will 
motivate section 3, in which I argue that the questions proponents of 
animalism ask (after animalism in its basic form is assumed) are problems for 
 
32 Dupré (2014) and Wilson (1999, ch. 6) are two attempts made by philosophers of biology to 
connect their positions to problems in personal identity. The former will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Interestingly, the latter never addresses animalism by name, nor does the author 
cite any literature regarding it.  
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philosophy of biology rooted in a scientific metaphysics. In the same section, I 
will show that taking an inadequate account of biology and philosophy of 
biology has led the animalist into problems by a) being unclear about the 
nature of the very things we are supposed, by animalists, to be, and b) 
assuming that the received view in philosophy of biology and biology is that 
biological taxa are natural kinds. In section 4, I will show that, with a better 
understanding of biology and philosophy of biology, an account that states we 
get our metaphysical nature in virtue of being animals will face problems that 
the traditional animalist has not considered. Despite this, I will show that 
animalism ought not to be rejected outright, but that a form of animalism (i.e., 
new animalism) that was previously discounted by Olson (2015) turns out to be 
more tenable than initially thought. 
 
4.1. Varieties of animalism  
Two attempts that have been made to divide animalism into varieties come 
from Olson (2015) (see fig. 1) and Thornton (2016b) (see fig. 2). Both make 
the animalist’s claim that we are animals, and this claim marks the beginning of 
their categorisation of the varieties of animalism. Olson uses the phrase “we 
are animals” in the way described above and calls this position “weak 
animalism”, ‘weak’ in that it remains neutral regarding any further claims about 
the nature of animals (Olson 2015, p. 101). “Weak animalism” conjoined with 
further claims regarding the nature of animals (their status as a fundamental 
kind, their persistence conditions, etc.) is categorised as “strong animalism” 
(Olson 2015, p. 98). Strong animalism is the variety of animalism that the main 
objections are aimed at (Olson 2015, p. 98) because, “[w]ithout the further 
claims, few of the contentious consequences of animalism would follow, and 
the question of whether we are animals or non-animals would lose much of its 
interest. We may even wonder whether there is any reason to reject weak 
animalism” (p. 99). Despite wondering why anyone would reject weak 
animalism, Olson states, many philosophers have rejected the view based on it 
being incompatible with other metaphysical views of our identity, such as our 
109 
 
being things constituted by animals, bundles of perceptions, or immaterial 
substances (p. 99). 
“New animalism” is a possible variety of animalism that Olson 
imagines, but he states that he is unsure if anyone has ever actually accepted 
the view (Olson 2015, p. 102). New animalism accepts weak animalism but 
rejects one or more of the further claims accepted by strong animalism (p. 
101). One version of new animalism (the version that Olson states “comes 
most readily to mind” (2015, p. 102)) allows that at least some form of 
psychological continuity is sufficient for our persistence, human animals are 
not animals essentially, and “animal” and “organism” aren’t fundamental kinds 
(p. 102). To say a thing is a kind F “fundamentally”, Olson suggests, is to say 
two things: first, “the thing is F (in the ordinary sense of ‘is’)” (Olson 2015, p. 
95) and second, “that being F is a special sort of property, namely a 
fundamental kind — roughly one that determines the metaphysical nature of 
the things that have it, including their identity conditions” (p. 95).   
If new animalism denies that “animal” is a fundamental kind, Olson 
states, “[t]he metaphysical nature of human animals would not follow from 
their being animals; they would have a fundamentally different nature from 
 
Figure 3: Olson’s varieties of animalism 
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other animals, or at least from some other animals: oysters, for instance” (pp. 
102-103).  
Olson comments that the thought of new animalism is hopeful in that 
it would please everyone: 
 
The opponents of animalism will be happy because it lacks the 
implications they object to. And the animalists will be happy because it 
avoids the dualism of mind and life. It would have all the virtues of 
animalism without its drawbacks (Olson 2015, p. 101).  
 
Despite this, Olson does not see this version of new animalism (the version in 
which some form of psychological continuity is sufficient for our persistence) 
as a plausible one, although he does suggest that other versions of new 
animalism may have more going for them (Olson 2015, p. 106). 
To see how new animalism creates problems in how we understand 
persistence, we can refer to the Brain Transplant case. Imagine if my cerebrum 
was put into someone else’s body (such that the body would “contain” my 
psychology), and the cerebrum-less animal was still alive, the animalist would 
argue that I am identical with the now cerebrum-less animal, not with the new 
body with my cerebrum. The new animalist (at least the version Olson discusses 
here), however, would argue that we would go with the transplanted cerebrum 
since the new animalist believes psychology to be sufficient for our persistence. 
Once the cerebrum was transplanted we would be identical with the new body 
containing the cerebrum (Olson 2015, p. 102). Olson argues, however, that this 
view looks unprincipled:  
 
Why would an animal go with its cerebrum but not with its liver, or 
heart, or left hand? If anything, an animal looks less likely go with its 
transplanted cerebrum than with its transplanted liver, as it needs a liver 
to remain alive but not a cerebrum: a human being can survive for years 
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with a non-functioning cerebrum (as in vegetative cases), but liver failure 
soon causes death by blood poisoning (Olson 2015, p. 103). 
 
 Another argument against this version of new animalism is that it views 
some form of psychological continuity as being sufficient for our persistence 
(Olson 2015, p. 103). Yet Olson points out that human animals can persist 
without psychological continuity (such as in cases of irreversible vegetative 
state and ordinary prenatal development). In these instances, Olson claims, 
there isn’t any psychology, so how does a human animal persist in these 
circumstances? He suggests that it seems like some brute-physical continuity 
ought to constitute the persistence conditions for both a normal, adult male 
and an empty-headed animal that would exist if its cerebrum were removed:  
 
That is, whatever enables a human animal to survive without any 
psychological continuity as a foetus or a human in a vegetative state 
ought to enable it to survive the loss of its cerebrum if that organ were 
transplanted. But then new animalism would imply that in such a case 
you would be both the recipient of that organ and the empty-headed 
animal left behind. Since these are clearly distinct, one thing would be 
numerically identical to two, which is impossible (Olson 2015, p. 103). 
 
One thing would (impossibly) be identical to two in this situation because of 
the (seemingly) opposing views that the proponent of this version of new 
animalism hold: a) that we are animals and b) that some form of psychological 
continuity is sufficient for our persistence. If my brain were put into a new 
body, then I would go along with my brain. However, the animal from which 
my brain was removed is still alive in this scenario, so I would be identical with 
the animal as well.  
Olson insists that there are many problems the proponent of this 
version of new animalism would have to face. By denying that “animal” is a 
fundamental kind, he argues, new animalism is assuming human animals get 
their metaphysical nature by virtue of being people or thinking beings, not 
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animals or organisms (Olson 2015, p. 105). He writes, “[t]o free ourselves from 
these dogmas, we need to unlearn everything we thought we knew about what 
it takes for human animals to persist and what determines how many there are” 
(pp. 105-106). He goes on to say that the proponent of this version of new 
animalism would have to provide a metaphysics of organisms that make sense 
of the weird cases (such as an individual being identical with two or more 
things) produced by the view. Only then, he argues, can the view be taken 
seriously (p. 106).  
In chapter 7, I will show that work being done in biology and 
philosophy of biology can be used to motivate a version of new animalism 
(which I call structural animalism). This is in part due to the widely held view of 
biologists and philosophers of biology that biological taxa are not natural 
kinds. The version of new animalism I propose combines “weak animalism” 
with the rejection of the view that animals are fundamental kinds whilst 
maintaining that we are necessarily animals. In chapter 7, I will show that the 
version of new animalism I propose accepts that no animal has psychological 
states essentially (which distinguishes my version of new animalism from 
Olson’s version described above).  
As I mentioned above, Thornton (2016b) begins her categorisation 
from the animalist’s assumption that we are animals. In generating her 
taxonomy of the varieties of animalism, she relies on the alternative answers to 
three questions: the essentiality question (i.e., are humans essentially animals?), the 
persistence question (i.e., what are the persistence conditions of animals?), and the 
matter question (i.e., what are animals made of?). The essentiality question is 
independent of the persistence and matter question. The persistence and 
matter questions are, unlike the essentiality question, dependent on one 
another in that a particular answer to one can affect the possible choices 
available to the other (p. 516). Thornton gives an example for this by noting 
that if one’s answer to the matter question denies that animals could have 
prostheses as parts, then their answer to the persistence question could not 
allow an animal to survive the replacement of all their organic parts with 
artificial parts (p. 516).  
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Beginning with the essentiality question, we ask, “are we essentially 
animals?” Thornton states that an affirmative answer to this question could 
entail that wherever and whenever I exist, that I am an animal—I cannot exist 
as anything except an animal. There is, however, an ambiguity with this 
expression ‘wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal’, she suggests, in 
that it could mean either ‘wherever and whenever I exist, I am some animal or 
another’, or ‘wherever and whenever I exist, I am this one particular animal’ 
(Thornton 2016b, pp. 517-518). The first way of understanding the expression 
gives rise to what Thornton calls Broad Essentialist Animalism in that it allows for 
the same person to be identical to different animals; that is, insofar as an 
individual is an animal at two different points in time, whether or not that 
animal is the same is irrelevant. The second understanding of the question 
‘wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal’ she calls Narrow Essentialist 
 
Figure 4: Thornton's varieties of animalism 
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Animalism because the view specifies exactly which animal one has to be (which 
is the animal the individual currently is) (p. 518).  
Narrow Essentialist Animalism is the view most commonly held in 
debates concerning our persistence (Thornton 2016b, p. 518). Broad 
Essentialist Animalism, Thornton notes, “is not popularly defended or even 
explicitly taken seriously in the debate about how we persist” (p. 519). She 
attributes this lack of seriousness to two reasons: the first reason is that Broad 
Essentialist Animalism requires relative identity: 
 
[. . .] substitute ‘the animal that is A at t1’ for x, ‘the animal that is A at 
t2’ for y, ‘person’ for F, and ‘animal’ for G. If identity is relative, it is 
possible that the animal that is A at t1 is the same person as the animal 
that is A at t2 but not the same animal as the animal that is A at t2 (p. 
518).  
 
According to Thornton’s example, relative identity allows for Broad 
Essentialist Animalism because it allows two persons to be the same person, 
but for those same persons to be different animals. As it stands, however, 
Thornton notes that relative identity is an unpopular view of identity, and due 
to Broad Essentialist Animalism’s dependence on it, it is not taken seriously (p. 
519). The second reason for the lack of seriousness towards Broad Essentialist 
Animalism, according to Thornton, is the fact that Broad Essentialist 
Animalism does not afford a criterion for our continuity over time—it does 
not answer the question: how do we persist? (p. 519). 
Rather than affirming that we are essentially animals, one could deny 
that we are. These “non-essentialist” varieties of animalism, Thornton 
acknowledges, would be rejected as forms of animalism by some. Despite this, 
she suggests we count them as forms of animalism for two reasons: the first is 
that these versions are consistent with a straightforward interpretation of the 
claim ‘human persons are animals’, which is a claim shared by all varieties of 
animalism. Secondly, other animalists (e.g., Olson (2015)) seem to take non-
essentialist views to be either a variety of animalism or animalism itself 
(Thornton 2016b, p. 520).  
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 Once we have answered the essentiality question, we can then ask the 
persistence and matter questions. Answering the matter question is important 
because the persistence conditions of an animal can depend on one’s answer to 
it (Thornton 2016b, p. 521). Answering the persistence question is important 
because none of the essentialist varieties of animalism that Thornton has laid 
out entails the persistence conditions of animals (Thornton 2016b, p. 520). She 
notes, however, that this indeterminacy is not exclusive to essentialist 
animalism:  
 
Rather, it is a feature of any essentialist view that is not maximally 
precise. Consider, for example, the proposition that a human person is 
essentially a thing that persists through a given length of time if and only 
if it has the same brain throughout that time. That proposition does not 
entail anything very particular about which sorts of medical operations, 
for example, a human person can survive. The reason is that that 
proposition is indeterminate with respect to which operations a brain can 
survive as the same brain. More generally, that proposition does not 
entail what the persistence conditions of brains are (Thornton 2016b, pp. 
520-521). 
 
Much like the brain in Thornton’s example, the essentialist view of animalism 
does not determine the persistence conditions for human persons because it 
fails to offer the persistence conditions of animals. For a variety of animalism 
to provide a human person’s persistence conditions, Thornton argues, the 
variety of animalism must be essentialist, and it must afford the persistence 
conditions of animals (Thornton 2016b, p. 521). 
 Thornton’s taxonomy of the varieties of animalism has three main 
branches with different varieties stemming from each, based on how one 
answers the persistence and matter questions: Broad Essentialist Animalism 
and all of its varieties; Narrow Essentialist Animalism and all of its varieties; 
and Non-essentialist Animalism. Thornton notes that the number of varieties 
in the taxonomy will depend not only on the number of answers to the three 
questions (i.e., the essentialist, persistence, and matter questions) but on 
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restrictions created by the answers to the persistence and matter questions. 
There are also sub-varieties that have to be taken into consideration based on 
how general the answers to the questions are (Thornton 2016b, p. 517).33 
 In comparing Olson’s varieties of animalism and Thornton’s varieties 
of animalism, we can see some striking similarities. For instance, both Olson 
and Thornton recognise a version of “weak animalism”—a position that states 
we are animals but doesn’t elaborate on exactly how that statement is meant to 
be fleshed out or what the properties of “animals” are. Olson does this by 
labelling the position as such, and Thornton refers to it as animalism “in its 
basic form” (Thornton 2016b, p. 515). 
 What I want to draw attention to, however, is that Olson and 
Thornton both recognise a version of animalism in which one believes that we 
are animals, but not so essentially or fundamentally. Olson refers to this view as 
new animalism and Thornton refers to it as non-essentialist animalism. Interestingly, 
both philosophers form these respective views under the assumption that to be 
an animal necessarily, is to be an animal in some way essentially. This assumption 
is one that I want to argue against, and I will do so later (in chapter 7) by way 
of structural animalism.  
 Structural animalism, as mentioned above, is a form of new animalism. 
Unlike the form of new animalism conceived of by Olson, however, structural 
animalism rejects the view that we are essentially animals and the view that we 
are essentially psychological beings (see table 2). Structural animalism is a 
position that accepts that we are necessarily animals but is able to do so 
without the metaphysical baggage of fundamental kinds and essences, 
especially in biology.  
 
4.2. Defending “new animalism” 
As noted earlier (in section 2.1), Olson (2015) assumes that “animal” is a 
fundamental kind such that human animals get their metaphysical nature in 
virtue of being an animal or organism and not by being persons or thinking 
 
33 Thornton gives the example of a variety of animalism which takes ‘organic matter’ to be the 
answer to the matter question. This variety of animalism would be a sub-varieties of a variety 
of animalism that offers a broad ‘material’ answer to the question (Thornton 2016b, p. 517). 
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beings. In fact, this is precisely what he insists proponents of his imagined 
“new animalism” deny (p. 105). The problem with this view is that the received 
view in both philosophy of biology and biology is that biological taxa do not 
have essences (Ereshefsky 2010, p. 674). A “taxon” is “any unit used in 
the science of biological classification, or taxonomy” ("Taxon" Encyclopædia 
BritannicaTaxon, web.), and is arranged in a hierarchy which includes kingdom 
(at the top) to sub-species (at the bottom) ("Taxon" Encyclopædia 
BritannicaTaxon, web.). The view that biological taxa do not have essences has 
implications for the notion that species are natural kinds.34 As Bird and Tobin 
(2017) state,  
 
Despite its long history and intuitive appeal, the conception of species as 
natural kinds is difficult to sustain while also maintaining a traditional 
view of what a natural kind requires: a set of intrinsic natural properties 
that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a particular to be 
a member of the kind (sect. 2.1.1). 
 
Why is this the case? Historically, species were seen as paradigm cases of 
natural kinds, with higher taxa (such as the kingdom) being mere conventional 
divisions, not ontological ones (Bird and Tobin 2017, sect. 2.1), so why the 
change for the species concept?  
 To understand why species are not seen as natural kinds according to 
contemporary philosophy of biology and biology, we must first understand the 
relationship between essences and kinds. Bird and Tobin (2017) indicate two 
distinct claims that are made regarding the relationship:  
 
The first claim is that the kind a particular belongs to is essential to that 
particular: if a belongs to kind K, then it is an essential property of a that 
it belongs to K. The second claim is that the kinds themselves have 
 
34 Okasha (2002) and other have argued that species-specific essences are possible if the 




essential properties: for each kind K there is some property Φ of the kind 
such that it is essential to K that Φ(K) (sect. 1.3).   
 
The first claim (that if a particular belongs to a kind, then it essentially belongs 
to that kind) is a claim of individual essentialism (IE). The second claim (that 
kinds themselves have essential properties) is a claim about essences of kind 
(EK). Bird and Tobin go on to explain the logical relationship between the two 
claims: one can deny the second claim (EK) whilst consistently holding the 
first claim (IE). However, they state that it may be difficult to motivate the first 
claim without reason to believe the second: “[w]ould one think that some 
object’s nature requires it to belong to kind K without thinking that there is 
some distinctive (essential) property characteristic of all Ks?” (Bird and Tobin 
2017, sect. 1.3). Similarly, EK does not imply IE (sect. 1.3).   
 One argument that is made against EK is that if natural kinds are 
immutable, then species cannot be natural kinds given that they evolve (Sober 
2000, p. 149). (see also, Hull 1965, p. 320; Sober 2000). Sober (2000) notes that 
this argument doesn’t undermine the idea that species have essences, though, 
given that “[e]ssentialists regard species as perennial categories that individual 
organisms occupy” (p. 150). The result of regarding species this way would be 
that an ancestor and its descendants can be in two categories—one species can 
give rise to a different species whilst each species having their own essence (p. 
150). 
 Sober (2000) offers another argument against essentialism that he 
believes fails. According to this argument, if essentialism requires precise and 
non-arbitrary boundaries between natural kinds, then the fact that species 
evolve gradually over time poses a problem since there is no precise and non-
arbitrary line by which to distinguish the original from the new species (p. 150). 
The problem with this argument, according to Sober, is that it is based on a 
view of the speciation process that is no longer seen as standard (p. 150). The 
view that speciation can occur anagenetically has been rejected by systematists, 
who now hold the view that speciation requires cladogenesis (p. 150). The 
difference between anagenesis and cladogenesis is with the existence or not of 
branching processes. In anagenesis, speciation occurs when a species has its 
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characteristics changed over time. Eventually, these changes would add up and 
something that ought to be considered a new species comes into existence 
(Sober 2000, p. 12). In cladogenesis, speciation occurs when selection causes 
certain members of a species to undergo a change in traits creating a 
divergence in the species and creating two or more daughter species (p. 13). If 
cladogenesis is necessary for speciation to occur, Sober argues, then a line can 
be drawn between the original and the new species. Although the line will not 
be precise, he states, it can be argued that the line is precise enough (Sober 2000, 
p. 151). 
Before I spell out what Sober (2000) believes to be the best argument 
against natural kind essentialism in biology, there is a point that ought to be 
addressed. Bird and Tobin (2017) note that there is a considerable amount of 
variation in both morphology and genetic makeup within a species, meaning 
there is no genetic material or sequence of genes that all and only members of 
a particular species possess (Bird and Tobin 2017, sect. 2.1.1). Thus, even if the 
essentialist endorses Sober’s counter-arguments, they would still have to show 
precisely what the essences of a species are if they aren’t to be found in genetic 
and/or morphological similarity.  
Sober argues that the reason essentialism is a mistaken view of 
biological species is that biologists treat species as historical entities, not natural 
kinds (Sober 2000, p. 151). That is, with the exception of pheneticists, 
phenotypic and genetic similarities are not seen to define species (p. 151). As a 
result, biologists would not consider two organisms that are identical both 
phenotypically and genetically to be members of the same species insofar as 
they are not descended from the same species. Here, Sober gives two 
examples: one in which a tiger, normally carnivorous and striped, is born with 
a mutation that causes it to lack these traits, and the other concerning a 
Martian tiger that shares all the traits with a tiger here on earth. According to 
Sober, a biologist would consider the first mutated tiger to be a tiger given that 
it is descended from tigers (that the mutated tiger lacks the traits of a tiger is 
irrelevant). The Martian tiger, although sharing all the characteristics with 




 EK is not the only position that is problematic. Recall that IE is the 
position that claims that the kind of which an individual belongs is essential to 
that individual. For instance, if we assume that species are natural kinds (which, 
as shown above, we have good reason to deny), and my pet, Marvin, belongs 
to the species Atelerix albiventris (the four-toed hedgehog), then for IE to be the 
case, it must be an essential property of Marvin to belong to the kind/species 
A. albiventris.  
 LaPorte (1997) offers what I take to be a good argument against this 
position. According to LaPorte, even if natural kind essences exist, it does not 
follow that organisms essentially belong to their respective kinds. An organism 
would only belong to its kind essentially if “[. . .] every member of any natural 
kind possessed its kind’s defining structure in every possible world in which 
that member exists” (LaPorte 1997, p. 97, original emphasis). My pet, Marvin, 
then, would only essentially belong to the species A. albiventris if he belongs to 
that species in every possible world in which he exists.  
 LaPorte argues that organisms do not essentially belong to the species 
of which they belong by showing that the three most prominent and promising 
approaches to determining the boundaries of species sacrifice essential 
membership (or non-membership) of organisms to their species (LaPorte 
1997, p. 101).  The approaches to determining the boundaries of species are 
the interbreeding approach, which views species as groups of organisms that are 
reproductively isolated from other groups (LaPorte 1997, p. 101); the ecological 
approach, which characterises species based on a unique ecological niche (p. 
101); and the cladistics approach, which views species as “a lineage of organisms 
between two speciation events” (LaPorte 1997, p. 102) 
Essential membership (or non-membership) of organisms to their 
species is sacrificed if either the interbreeding approach or ecological approach 
are correct, LaPorte argues, given that these two approaches distinguish species 
on contingently possessed features of organisms (LaPorte 1997, p. 101). Given 
this, organisms divided into species using these approaches could have fallen 
into a different species (p. 102). To motivate this, LaPorte has us imagine a 
large population of organisms that has a small population splinter off and 
inhabit a new ecological niche. This new ecological niche forces the splintered 
population to adopt new ways of living, and the two species would eventually 
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become reproductively isolated from one another. According to both the 
ecological approach and the interbreeding approach, then, the two populations 
are distinct species (LaPorte 1997, p. 101). That is, according to the ecological 
approach, the splinter species cannot be a part of the larger species since they 
inhabit a different ecological niche. Likewise, the splinter species cannot be a 
part of the larger species given that its members are reproductively isolated 
from it. However, LaPorte points out that this is entirely a contingent matter: if 
the smaller population didn’t splinter off from the larger, or if the two 
populations failed to become reproductively isolated, then the two species 
would have remained a single species (pp. 101-102).  
The cladistics approach also sacrifices essential membership (or non-
membership) of organisms to their species because whether or not members 
belong to one species rather than others is dependent on contingent events 
external to those members (p. 104). This is due to the cladist’s view that a 
species becomes extinct once a new side species branches from it. This 
extinction occurs regardless of whether or not the lineage changes such that 
the earlier members and later members are distinct (i.e., if the earlier members 
and later members are indistinguishable from one another, they would still be 
two separate species as long as a side species branched from the earlier). As 
such, a member of a particular species could have been a member of an 
ancestral species if a branching from the ancestral species had never occurred 
(LaPorte 1997, p. 103).  
 Another argument against individual essences has been made by Dupré 
(2014). He argues that approaching a view of individual essences where 
“individual essence” refers to “[. . .] the property or properties of the individual 
that must be maintained if the individual is to survive” (p. 8) is also difficult to 
maintain. It is difficult to maintain, he argues, because human organisms have 
different properties over their lifespans, during which the matter composing 
the organism is continuously being recycled and replaced (p. 8). He then 
enquires why we ought to give priority to biological properties over 
psychological or any other properties when determining the identity of the 
individual. To assume that biological properties have priority when 
determining the identity of individuals, he states, “[. . .] sounds suspiciously like 
a dogmatic reductionism; its motivation, at any rate, is problematic” (p. 8). 
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 In response to Dupré, the animalist may point to the arguments 
afforded by Olson (1997a) and others (as shown in chapter 1of this thesis) for 
why we ought to give biological properties (whatever they are determined to 
be) priority over psychological or any other properties (for instance, 
psychological properties seem to be neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
persistence of human animals (Olson 1997a, p. 73), which may be a reason to 
priorities biological properties over psychological properties). Even if this 
move is made, though, the animalist would still have the problems mentioned 
earlier (e.g., the need to explain where our essences come from if they are not 
genetic nor morphological, or the need to make sense of the seeming 
contingency of our status as H. sapiens, etc.) I’m not suggesting that such 
problems cannot be overcome, but they are problems that need to be 
acknowledged. Either way, it seems like there are good reasons to believe that 
taxa (including kingdoms and species) are not natural kinds, and even if they 
are, there are good reasons to reject the view that members belong to them 
essentially. In the next sub-section, I will show why getting our metaphysical 
nature in virtue of being organisms is also problematic. 
Thus far, I have shown that there are reasons to deny species and other 
taxa as natural kinds, that the higher taxa in biology (such as the taxon kingdom) 
has been historically seen as a conventional division, and that even if species are 
natural kinds, there are still reasons to deny that we belong essentially to the 
species H. sapiens. Because of this, if we get our metaphysical nature from 
either being an “animal” or a “human animal”, then it seems unlikely that our 
metaphysical nature is a fundamental one. Still, the animalist may argue that 
our metaphysical nature comes from our being organisms, not animals or human 
animals. As I will show in this sub-section, however, holding this view will also 
cause problems for the traditional animalist.  
Common sense may tell us that humans are organisms, but Dietert 
(2016), Gill et al. (2006), and Salvucci (2012) have suggested that it is more 
accurate to describe humans as superorganisms. A “superorganism” is an 
organism that is composed of many organisms ("Organism" New World 
EncyclopediaOrganism, web.). The suggestion that we are superorganisms stems 
from research concerning the symbiotic relationship between humans and their 
intestinal microbiota. 300-500 different species of bacteria have evolved and 
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adapted to live in the intestines of humans (Guarner and Malagelada 2003, p. 
512), and these microflorae have an important metabolic function (amongst 
others) that include recovering metabolic energy for the host (p. 513). 
Furthermore, the distal gut microbiome of humans contains an estimated ≥100 
times the number of genes as the human genome, which affords humans 
functions that we have not had to acquire via evolution (Bäckhed et al. 2005, p. 
1915). This has led Gill et al. (2006) to suggest “[. . .] a superorganismal view of 
our genetic landscape should include genes embedded in our human genome 
and the genes in our affiliated microbiome, whereas a comprehensive view of 
our metabolome would encompass the metabolic networks based in our 
microbial communities” (p. 1355). 
 I see no reason why animalism is incompatible with understanding the 
kind of thing that we are as superorganisms rather than organisms. In fact, given 
the importance of certain parts—parts that help the animal live (such as the 
liver)—Olson (2015) prioritises over parts that do not (such as the cerebrum), 
we might say that our microflorae are more important to us than our 
cerebrum!35 This importance stems from the important function that or 
microflora play in our metabolic process. All the same, if us-as-superorganisms 
is the most appropriate way of understanding ourselves, then the animalist 
would have to find a way to incorporate this information into their description 
of what it means to be the kind of thing that we are. If this turns out to be the 
case—if we are, in fact, superorganisms—then our metaphysical nature would 
be that of a superorganism, not merely an organism. This could affect (apart 
from other things) our persistence conditions since we would be “tied up” with 
other organisms. Thus, if that connection were lost, so would our persistence. 
If we are organisms, on the other hand, then this connection is not required. 
 Alternatively, if it turns out that we are not superorganisms but, indeed, 
organisms, then the traditional animalist would still have to face the challenge 
posed by the view that there are degrees of organismality. The view here is that 
determining when an entity qualifies as being an organism is vague (see Clarke 
and Okasha (2013)). Okasha (2006), for instance, argues that if we accept that 
 
35 I’m referring, here, to Olson’s suggestion that a person is more likely to go with their 
transplanted liver than their transplanted cerebrum due to the former being needed for the 
animal to survive (2015, p. 103).  
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the existence of the hierarchical organisation in biology itself must have been 
produced by evolution, then the existence of grey areas within the hierarchy are 
guaranteed (p. 130):  
 
For example, multicelled organisms evolved from single-celled ancestors, 
through a series of intermediate stages. Whatever we take to be the 
defining feature of true multicellularity, it is practically certain that those 
features evolved gradually. So even if we knew all the intermediate 
stages, we could not identify a sharp cut-off point signalling the advent 
of the first multicelled creatures. Clearly, the same goes for entities at 
other hierarchical levels too (Okasha 2006, p. 130). 
 
What does this vagueness mean for the animalist? If we take ourselves to have 
our metaphysical nature by being organisms, and organisms come in degrees, 
then it must be the case that our metaphysical nature comes in degrees. This 
can be seen as problematic if the animalist wants our metaphysical nature to be 
something whose boundaries are clear. 
In this chapter, I have shown that animalism has traditional been 
unclear in its use of certain concepts (in particular “animal”, “organism”, and 
“human animal”). In particular, I have shown that it’s unclear from what, 
precisely, the animalist claims we get our metaphysical nature in virtue of 
being. It matters, I have shown, because although all three concepts may apply 
to us, our essential characteristics change depending on which concept or 
concepts we get our metaphysical nature. Despite this, I have shown that a 
biological understanding of these concepts puts pressure on the animalist’s 
claim that we are essentially or fundamentally any of them.  
Does this rejection mean disaster for animalism? I do not think so. In 
fact, I think that the credibility of, and prospects for, animalism may increase 
with this view. I think this because animalism would be consistent with our 
best science and adaptable to different positions currently being discussed 
regarding the nature of organisms. By acknowledging the rejection of 
essentialism in biology, new forms of animalism can be put on the table and 
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critically discussed. Positions of new animalism where “weak animalism” is 
accepted but “animal” as a fundamental kind is rejected, for instance, are given 
a chance to show what they can and cannot say about our nature. This may 
make animalism more complex (for instance, whether or not our nature 
includes clear boundaries is put into question), but that ought to be regarded as 
a good thing as it opens the doors to new and potentially novel views about 
our metaphysical nature (for instance, “where ought we conceptualise our 
boundaries to be?” would be an important question for the animalist). 
I am not the only person to suggest that the implications of animalism 
are greater and messier than traditionally observed. Dupré (2014), for instance, 
states:  
 
[. . .] in supposing that humans are a kind of animal, the implications of 
this observation are far less clear than is often supposed. Not only is it 
problematic to say just what an animal, qua individual organism, is, but 
there are respects in which humans are quite exceptional animals. With 
regard to personal identity I take the animalist perspective to 
problematize rather than solve the traditional question (Dupré 2014, p. 
21).  
 
The animalist position may problematize the traditional question, as 
Dupré argues, but that does not mean that it is a failed position. Dupré (2014) 
is one of the few animalists that has attempted to see what animalism can say 
about our persistence, given an understanding of contemporary biology and 
philosophy of biology. He calls his view processual animalism. According to 
Dupré, biological entities, instead of being enduring substances, are better 
understood as processes (Dupré 2013; 2014, p. 15). This processual view of 
biology, coupled with his hesitation about prioritising biological properties 
when determining the identity of an individual, ultimately leads him to be 
sceptical concerning personal identity (Dupré 2014). 
The details of Dupré’s positions regarding processual animalism and 
process ontology will be discussed and criticised in later chapters, but to give a 
brief overview: he suggests that the animalist position and the Lockean 
position (i.e., the position that looks for some form of psychological continuity 
126 
 
(Dupré 2014, p. 18))  can be reconciled if we view the Lockean position as 
providing motivation for, and the animalist position as providing a means of 
applying, the concept of personal identity (Dupré 2014, p. 19). The price of 
such a reconciliation, Dupré suggests, “is the acknowledgement that there is no 
unequivocal material reality that objectively determines the existence of 
individual persons” (2014, p. 19). 
 Once again, I am not suggesting that Dupré’s position is the correct 
one, only that it is a possible way of reconciling animalism and contemporary 
philosophy of biology,  and biology itself, when undertaking the secondary task 
of animalism. What I see as other and better alternatives to the problems will 
be discussed in later chapters. As it stands, however, animalism will have a 
better foundation (as well as afford more biologically plausible results) if we 
accept that the secondary task of animalism is a task for philosophy of biology. 
If such a position is rejected or ignored, animalists face the possibility of being 
unclear, rejecting positions (such as new animalism) too quickly, or embracing 
positions that are either difficult to defend given our current knowledge of 
biology (or are altogether incompatible with it).  
 
4.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have mapped out two attempts at organising varieties of 
animalism and how they assume our necessarily being an animal in some way 
depends on our essentially being animals or “animal” being a fundamental 
kind. I’ve briefly stated that structural animalism, the view of animalism I’m 
defending, is able to claim this necessity whilst rejecting our essentially being 
animals or “animal” being a fundamental kind.  
In the following chapter (chapter 5), I will explore attempts at 
responding to the problem of biological individuality. As I will show, a 
biological understanding of individuality poses problems for both the 
metaphysician and philosopher of biology. 
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Table 2: Comparing animalist positions 






Animal is a 
fundamental kind 
No answer Yes No No N/A 
We are animals Yes Yes Yes Yes Unclear 
We are essentially 
animals 
No answer Yes No No No 
We are essentially 
psychological beings 
No answer No Not clear No Yes 
We are necessarily 
animals 
No answer Yes Not clear Yes No 
We are necessarily 
psychological beings 
No answer No Not clear No Yes 
Our continuity is the 
same as an animals 
No answer Yes No N/A No 
Our continuity is that 
of our “psychology” 
No answer No Yes N/A Yes 
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In chapter 1, I outlined what I have called traditional animalism—a form of 
animalism, one rooted in speculative metaphysics, that has been promoted by 
several people up until this point. In chapter 3, I suggested that animalism 
would be better suited on a naturalised metaphysical foundation. The resulting 
naturalised animalism, I argued, would replace its traditional predecessor as a 
solution to the problem of our identity that would be able to account for our 
best current understanding of biology and the philosophy thereof. But, what 
does our best current understanding of biology and philosophy biology tell us 
about organisms? 
In 2008, Pepper and Herron pointed out that no operational definition 
had been given to the organism concept (p. 622). This is particularly interesting 
given how often the concept has been discussed (Pepper and Herron 2008, p. 
622), especially as a key concept in the life sciences and theories of the ‘life’ 
concept (Wolfe 2014, p. 151).  
It may come as a surprise that the term ‘organism’ has shifted in 
meaning since its earliest English usage in the 4th edition of John Evelyn’s Sylva 
in 1706 (originally being published in 1664 with no use of the word) (Cheung 
2006, p. 622). Despite no clear meaning, the ontological status (Wolfe 2014), 
meaning (Pepper and Herron 2008; West and Kiers 2009; Pradeu 2010), and 
importance (Wilson 2000; Pepper and Herron 2008; Clarke 2010) of the 
organism concept has been debated.  
The word ‘organism’ has gone through several conceptual shifts 
throughout its history (Cheung 2006), often being used in and for a variety of 
different ways that go beyond the biological to the normative and social (Wolfe 
2014). According to Cheung (2006), the origin of the word ‘organism’ seems to 
appear around the end of the tenth or eleventh century, where it is used in an 
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undated and untitled text (p. 320) to represent an apparatus that distils liquids 
(p. 321). It is used again (this time in the plural, and only once) in a text written 
between 1126 and 1132 by Gerhoh of Reichersberg where it’s used for a 
“(disharmonic) polyphony of human voices, to criticise metaphorically the 
reformation of the church, notably the world status of clerics” (p. 231). Thus, 
Cheung (2006) describes the noun organismus as, seemingly, a nonce word (p. 
321) that is related to the Latin verb organizare, meaning ‘to play an instrument 
or ‘to singe in more than one voice’. He points out that the verb has no 
equivalent in classical Greek, and the word ‘organism’ is not known to occur 
again until the seventeenth century (p. 322).  
This historical interlude isn’t merely to show that the organism concept 
is of historical interest (rather than just being one of philosophical or scientific 
interest) but to highlight a potential similarity to the argument made by Ferner 
(2016) that I referred to in chapter 1. Recall that Ferner argues that the 
metaphysical conclusions Wiggins draws from his analysis of the term ‘person’ 
are problematic in that his conceptual analysis is drawn from an unjustified 
cultural bias regarding our everyday thoughts about ‘persons.’ It’s important to 
note that a distinct but similar issue arises when the topic is shifted from 
‘persons’ to ‘organisms’ in that the concept ‘organism’ has shifted over time 
(rather than changed depending on culture, as is the case with ‘persons.’) As I 
will show, the concept ‘organism’ is contentious in contemporary debates. 
Given that the concept has changed over time, it’s unlikely that any conceptual 
analysis from history will help philosophers determine the metaphysics of 
organismality. Considering this, philosophers ought to be wary of pre-
theoretical assumptions regarding organisms in (because these assumptions 
have changed throughout history) the same way that Ferner suggests they 
should avoid any pre-theoretical assumptions regarding persons (because these 
assumptions differ from culture to culture).  
There are three aims of this chapter: the first (in section 1) is to 
explicate some accounts of biological individuality that have been formulated 
by biologists and philosophers of biology. As I will show, there is a real 
problem with providing an account of biological individuality because it’s not 
clear what a biological individual is. The second aim of this chapter (in section 
2) is to look at a metaphysical problem that is shared by all of these accounts. 
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We can call this overarching problem the existential problem of biological 
individuality, which has been highlighted by Eric Olson (2021). According to 
the existential problem, the usual definitional accounts of biological individuality 
provided by biologists and philosophers of biology presuppose the principle of 
material plenitude—a principle which states that every region of space-time 
that contains matter is also occupied by a material thing (Olson 2021, p. 76). 
This presupposition, it is claimed, is one that an adequate account of 
organismality ought to avoid making in virtue of it being a presupposition (that 
is, the principle of material plenitude may or may not be true, but it’s not 
something that an adequate theory of biological individuality ought to assume). 
The last aim of this chapter (in section 3) is to argue that any existential 
solution to the problem of biological individuality will not be adequate because 
such a solution would still presuppose a definition of biological individuality 
(and thus lead right back to the same problem such a solution was meant to 
solve).  
 
5.1. The definitional problem 
Since Pepper and Herron’s claim that no operational definition of 
organismality has been afforded, many candidate definitions have been 
suggested. Clarke (2010) shows us that there are at least thirteen different 
candidate definitions that have been afforded, including reproduction, life 
cycle, genetics, sex, developmental bottlenecks, policing mechanisms, spatial 
boundaries or contiguity, immune response, functional integration, metabolic 
autonomy, cooperation and/or conflict, adaptations, etc. (pp. 315-316). 
Furthermore, these definitions are not always compatible with one another (p. 
320). 
  As I mentioned above, at a meta-level, all of the candidate definitions 
have something in common—even if they aren’t compatible in terms of 
definitional applicability. Before this similarity is discussed, it’s important to 
first examine some of the criteria in more detail. As I will show in section 3, 
understanding the various criteria is helpful in choosing how to move forward 




1. The Genetics View 
Those that adopt a genetics-based definition of determining biological 
individuality view genotype as being the deciding factor. According to this 
view, genotypes determine individuality in one of three ways: one way this can 
occur is if an individual can have a unique genotype that marks it as different 
from other individuals of its species. A second way occurs when the genotype 
is homogeneous. The reasoning behind the genetic homogeneity criterion is 
that it explains why selection works at the level of individuals. Because 
selection works at this level, and because heritable material isn’t contained in 
every cell, the belief is that individuals must be whatever units are genetically 
homogenous (Santelices 1999, p. 152).  
To illustrate this, consider a field of dandelions. One’s immediate 
intuition would probably suggest that a field of dandelions is not a single 
organism. Similarly, according to the spatial boundaries/contiguity definition, 
according to which a biological individual must be physically cohesive and 
physically localised, the field of dandelions are not a single organism. However, 
what about a definition motivated by genetic identity whereby an individual is 
determined by its genome? Here things become trickier. Janzen (1977) has 
suggested that such a field ought to be considered a single evolutionary individual, 
an individual bearing reproductive fitness and is a candidate for being a unit of 
selection. Evolutionary individuals differ from non-evolutionary individuals which, 
insofar as an individual dandelion is concerned, is “that small green thing that 
grows on a small bare spot in your lawn” (p. 586).  
Janzen’s argument is based on the assumptions that 1) a general non-
evolutionary dandelion will produce, via apomixes, a plant that is genetically 
identical to it, and 2) occasionally a non-evolutionary dandelion reproduces a seed 
via fertilization from a dandelion belonging to a different evolutionary individual. 
With these assumptions in mind, Janzen argues that the evolutionary individual 
dandelion is an organism that lives a very long time and “is composed of parts 
that are moving around (“seed” produced by apomixes), growing (juvenile 
plants), dividing into new parts (flowering plants), and dying (all ages and 
morphs)” (Janzen 1977, p. 586). Janzen’s account of the evolutionary individual 
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gives us reason to think that an organism can, contrary to our immediate 
intuition, be dispersed through time and space.  
 The existence of clonal organisms provides reason to question whether 
the genetic uniqueness and genetic homogeneity criteria of individuality are 
invariant, however. In clonal organisms, autoreplication results in units that are 
genetically identical and that can grow and propagate in differing 
environments. This means that the same genome can exist in more than one 
environment at the same time (in cases where the clonal units are separated). 
In such cases, the genotype would have a different probability of survival and 
propagation in each environment (Santelices 1999, p. 152). In brief, clonal 
organisms present cases in which, contrary to the genetic uniqueness criterion, 
there exist more than one biological individual with the same genome.  
Similarly, genes that have changed during the ontogeny of clonal 
organisms are known to be heritable. The genes of unitary organisms can also 
undergo changes during ontogeny, however, this happens less often, and the 
changes are not heritable. This suggests that genetic homogeneity is also 
variable in biological individuals (especially clonal organisms) (Santelices 1999, 
p. 152)  
 A third way in which genetics can determine biological accounts of 
individuality is to combine the above two accounts (that is, genetic uniqueness 
and genetic homogeneity). Santelices (1999) offers such a view by combining 
the two genetic views with the autonomy and physiological unity view of 
biological individuality. He notes, “[g]iven that all the attributes of individuality 
can be present or absent, they can no longer be thought of as absolute, 
invariable character” (p. 153). Santelices thus combines the different attributes 
together as separate axis on a 2x2x2 matrix, creating eight possible 
combinations of potential biological individuals based on whether the 
attributes are present or not (p. 153, see esp. box 1).  
 
2. The Evolutionary View 
 A definition of biological individuality that is taken more seriously by 
biologists and philosophers is in terms of the role that the individual plays in 
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the process of evolution by natural selection. According to those who hold the 
evolutionary view of biological individuality, an evolutionary individual (EI) is 
such in virtue of being a biological object that the process of natural selection 
treats as an individual.  
 Although I’ve been using the terms ‘biological individual’ and 
‘organisms’ interchangeably throughout this thesis, the terms come apart in this 
case as an individual organism is understood as only one kind of EI. This 
distinction has been taken seriously since the Major Transitions literature, 
which made us aware that some organisms are composed of other individuals 
(i.e., cells)—making such organisms higher-level individuals. Given this insight, 
it is clear that group selection is possible (e.g., groups of cells that form higher-
level organisms, such as humans, can be selected in virtue of the higher-level 
organisms being selected). Determining what the properties of an EI include is, 
then, determining which properties are required by groups such that they can 
be selected for in the same way as a higher-level organism (such as humans) 
(Clarke 2016, p. 894).  
 
3. Metabolic View 
Peter Godfrey-Smith has claimed that “[o]rganisms are essentially 
persisters, systems that use energy to resist the forces of decay…” (2013, p. 
25). This claim, in its broadest form, is central to the metabolic view of 
organisms. The idea is that an individual organism is something composed of 
various parts that are able to organise and work together in such a way that 
they can continue to go on as a unified whole. Focusing on the persistence of 
organisms is to focus on their ontogeny (rather than phylogeny)—to focus on 
their spatiotemporal careers (Smith 2017, p. 2).  
Recently, Subrena Smith has developed a metabolic account of 
organisms that puts into focus the kind of background conditions that are 
necessary for organisms to persist. According to Smith, organisms are 




[O]ne cannot in fact disengage organisms from their environments. 
Organisms are constitutively embedded in their worlds. They are organisms-
in-the-world rather than just organisms in the world. This principle 
means having a commitment to the inseparability of organisms and 
environments, both internal and external, as well as to a commitment 
to theorizing about them as beings that are inseparable from their 
worlds” (Smith 2017, pp. 7-8) 
 
Organisms, according to Smith, can be conceptually differentiated from their 
environments, but they cannot actually be understood outside of their 
environments. As such, any theory of organisms must include a story about the 
necessary role of the environment.  
The importance of the inseparability of organisms and their 
environment follows from an understanding of the metabolic picture. Smith 
clarifies exactly what kind of organisation is needed for there to be organisms, 
that is, that there is development in the phenotype such that there are 
distinctive parts that each serve a particular function. Once these individual 
parts become integrated and organised in the right way, they allow the whole to 
persist as a whole (2017, p. 6).  
There is an important factor that comes into play once it has been 
accepted that an organism is to be understood in this way (i.e., as a biological 
system in which the phenotype has been differentiated into functionally 
discreet parts that have integrated to sustain the biological system as a whole). 
Considering that it is through developmental processes that systems can 
develop functionally discreet parts and that the same is true of the integration 
of those parts, the context in which these developments take place is a 
necessary factor for organisms to develop. She argues:  
 
Because persistence requires development, if organisms are “essentially” 
persisters, then to understand what organismality comes to, one needs to 
approach it from the standpoint of development, conceived of as 
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involving the wide array of factors that make and sustain organisms 
(Smith 2017, p. 6). 
 
Smith refers to these factors as “contexts for development,” and emphasizes 
that “context” here refers to the external to the surface membrane of the 
organism, that is, “an external world is a necessary condition for the 
development of any kind of living system” (Smith 2017, p. 16). This is the key 
move for Smith’s argument because it’s the necessary role of the environment 
in the development of the organism that makes organisms constitutively 
embedded in the world. Without the environment, there is no development 
and therefore no persistence. Without persistence, there are no organisms.  
 
4. The Immunological View 
 Lastly, one could opt to define a biological individual in terms of 
immunology. Immunology can determine biological individuality by finding a 
criterion of immunogenicity—that is, immunology is in the business of 
determining what abnormally strong patterns expressed by entities in the 
organism lead to the immune system rejecting them. Immune reactions occur 
between immune receptors and antigenic patterns. These reactions can lead to 
an immune response/immune activation, and when this occurs, it can result in 
either “lytic activity” (i.e., activity by which the target is destroyed) or “down 
regulatory activity” (i.e., activity by which the destruction of the target is 
prevented.) Entities that are present in the organism express molecular patterns 
that are under permanent surveillance by the immune system. When these 
molecular patterns are abnormally strong, the immune system rejects them 
(Pradeu 2010, p. 253). 
 Given that the acceptance or rejection of entities within the organism is 
determined by the immune system, Thomas Pradeu has claimed that: “[. . .] the 
immune system is certainly not the same thing as the organism, but it is a sub-
system of the organism, the activity of which leads to the discrimination 
between what is a part of the organisms and what is not” (2010, p. 253).  
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Two criteria of immunogenicity that have been suggested are the self-
nonself criterion and the continuity criterion. According to proponents of the self-
nonself criterion, the role of the immune system in any particular individual is to 
know its own identity and discern what components belong to itself and those 
that do not. With the ability to discern which things belong to “self” and which 
things belong to “nonself,” the immune system is able to defend the former 
from the latter by eliminating any foreign bodies (Pradeu 2012, pp. 5-6). 
Although the self-nonself criterion of immunogenicity was the 
proposed view by immunologists for sixty years, it has recently been criticised 
(Pradeu 2010, pp. 255-256; see also, Pradeu 2012) on the grounds that it 
cannot adequately account for autoreactivity and immune tolerance. Autoreactivity 
occurs when immune interactions and/or immune-activating mechanisms 
occur with self constituents. This occurs, for example, because lymphocytes 
need to be continuously stimulated by endogenous antigenic patterns. Immune 
tolerance occurs when there is a presence of foreign entities (i.e., entities 
belonging to “nonself”) and there is no immune response (even in cases where 
there is immune interaction with the foreign entities.) Immune tolerance has 
been shown to be very common, with examples of it including hosted bacteria 
by multicellular organisms as well as foetuses that are not rejected by their 
mothers (Pradeu 2010, p. 256). 
In place of the self-nonself criterion, Thomas Pradeu has proposed the 
continuity criterion of immunogenicity. According to the continuity criterion, it’s not 
the origin of the molecular pattern that is important in determining whether or 
not there is an immune response (contrary to the self-nonself criterion), but 
that the molecular pattern is unusual in some strong way, such strongly unusual 
molecular patterns are “discontinuous” (Pradeu 2010, p. 256) 
The continuity criterion accounts for autoreactivity in that the immune 
receptors interact at a medium-strength level when dealing with the body’s 
normal constituents. It’s only in “discontinuous” cases (i.e., when the 
molecular pattern is unusual in some strong way) that the receptors interact 
strongly (Pradeu 2010, p. 257).  
The continuity criterion also accounts for immune tolerance by induction 
of continuity (Pradeu 2010, p. 257). The second immune response is usually more 
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rapid and efficient than the first when responding to unusual antigens. At the 
same time, however, induction of tolerance by induction of continuity occurs when the 
second response of the immune system is weaker when reacting to a usual 
antigen. In these cases, small amounts of antigen are gradually introduced with 
no proinflammatory signals (these are called “non-immunogenic conditions.”) 
A tolerance to an antigen is formed when the antigen is repeatedly presented to 
these non-immunogenic conditions (Pradeu 2010, pp. 256-257). 
Pradeu takes immunology, in conjunction with what he calls physiological 
accounts of individuation, to afford us a working definition of organismality. 
Proponents of physiological accounts of individuation (broadly) argue that an 
organism “is a coherent, functionally integrated whole, undergoing continuous 
change and made of causally interconnected elements” (Pradeu 2010, p. 252). 
Considering this, the metabolic definition of organismality discussed earlier is an 
example of a physiological account of individuation. Physiological accounts of 
individuation are not satisfactory on their own, Pradeu argues, because 
“functional integration” is too vague and too close to phenomenal views of 
individuation to offer an adequate account of individuation (Pradeu 2010, p. 
252). Furthermore, functional integration is too local to give us an account of 
individuality, meaning that two distinct subsystems within a single organism 
can be quasi-independent (Pradeu 2010, p. 258)—something that Pradeu 
believes an adequate account of organismality should avoid.  
 This is where Pradeu takes immunology to make a critical contribution 
to physiological accounts. Whereas functional integration is local, immune 
interactions concern the whole organism because they are systemic—that is, 
the immune system influences all of the tissues and cells of the organism. In 
addition to this, Pradeu takes the role of immune interactions in accepting or 
rejecting constituents in the organism to mean that such interactions afford us 
a criterion of inclusion (Pradeu 2010, p. 258). All of this considered, Pradeu 
defines an organism as: 
 
[. . .] a functionally integrated whole, made up of heterogeneous 
constituents that are locally interconnected by strong biochemical 
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interactions and controlled by systemic immune interactions that repeat 
constantly at the same medium intensity (Pradeu 2010, p. 258). 
 
Now that some potential options have been explained in some detail, 
one may enquire as to why it’s so difficult to determine what is and is not a 
biological individual. Similarly, it’s not clear whether or not a single criterion is 
sufficient or if multiple definitions are needed depending on the scientific 
context.  
 Clarke and Okasha (2013) have suggested two potential 
characterisations of the problem of biological individuality: vagueness and 
criteria. According to the vagueness characterisation of the problem, it is 
difficult to determine what is and is not an organism because there are certain 
borderline cases that resist being neatly put into either category. This suggests 
that the predicate ‘organism’ is vague, and as such, it is difficult to reach an 
agreement on what counts as, and how to define, a biological individual (pp. 
60-61). 
  Another characterisation is that the criteria themselves are to blame. 
This position takes the issue to be with how biologists use the term ‘biological 
individual’ in a multitude of different ways (illustrated above) and how these 
terms do not always overlap in any universal way (also illustrated above). As 
such, it’s difficult to determine what criteria are essential to biological 
individuals and which are not (Clarke and Okasha 2013, p. 62). Importantly, 
Clarke and Okasha see the vagueness problem and multiple criteria problem as being 
logically distinct aspects of the problem of biological individuality (p. 66). They 
write:  
 
The [vagueness problem] regards borderline cases, which resist easy 
classification, as giving rise to the problems; this is quite different from 
the idea that multiple nonequivalent criteria are the root cause. For the 
“multiple criteria” problem would still exist even if each of the criteria 
for being a species or an organism was not vague, and thus did not admit 
borderline cases. Conversely, even if all biologists could agree on a single 
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defining criterion, for species or organisms, we could still end up with 
borderline cases if that consensus criterion were vague, so there could 
still be a problem (Clarke and Okasha 2013, p. 66). 
 
The “multiple criteria” problem is the problem most relevant to this chapter 
(the problem of vagueness in biological individuality will be discussed in the 
following chapter), and there are two (broad) ways of responding to this 
problem: one can be a monist regarding biological individuality, or one can be a 
pluralist.36 
 According to monists, there is either a single criterion of biological 
individuality or two or more criteria are unified by a single mechanism (Pradeu 
2016, p. 763). Those that hold an evolutionary account of individuality, for 
instance, are monists in that they take evolution to be the mechanism by which 
all criteria of biological individuality are realised.  
 Pluralists about biological individuality argue that different questions 
and contexts give rise to different criteria of individuality (Pradeu 2016, p. 763). 
An extreme form of pluralism can be found in John Dupré’s promiscuous realism, 
according to which there are countless ways in which nature can be “carved at 
the joints.” Of course, this form of pluralism is meant to be ontological (Dupré 
1993, p. 18); however, it would apply to the case of biological individuality in 
that there would be many legitimate ways in which one could conceptualise 
“biological individual.”37 
Wilson (1999) has offered a less radical pluralism by limiting the kinds 
of biological individuality to six (1999, p. 60): 
 
1. Particulars: If a biological entity is neither a universal nor a class then 
it is a particular individual.  
 
36 Pradeu (2016) notes that the monist/pluralist debate also focuses on whether a single 
discipline or multiple disciplines should establish the concept “biological individual.” This 
focus of the debate will be discussed further in the following two chapters. How the forensic 
sciences can shine light on the metaphysics of biological individuality will be explored in detail 
in chapter 6.  
37 Promiscuous realism will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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2. Historical: If a biological entity is composed of parts that are 
spatiotemporally continuous then the entity is a historical individual.  
3. Functional: Functional individuals are those biological entities that are 
functional units composed of parts that are causally integrated.  
4. Genetic: Biological entities are genetic individuals insofar as their parts 
share a common genotype. 
5. Developmental: If a biological entity is the product of some 
developmental processes then it is a developmental individual.  
6. Unit of evolution: A unit of evolution is a biological entity that plays 
some important function in the process of evolution.  
 
Once qualified in this way, Wilson argues that we can see them as distinct from 
one another, and thus any combination of biological individuals can extend to 
any single biological entity.38 Importantly, once the problem of individuality is 
qualified in this way, the question “is some entity x and individual?” becomes 
ambiguous to answer (Wilson 1999, p. 59). It is only once the kind of 
individual being referred to becomes clarified that the question can be 
answered (e.g., “is entity x a developmental individual?”)  
 The kinds of biological individuality that Wilson defends here aren’t as 
important as the metaphysics that he uses to motivate them. As I will show in 
section 3, there is a problem (acknowledged by Wilson) in adopting a pluralism 
in which the same matter composes multiple substantial kinds insofar as the 
overlapping matter which composes these natural kinds entails identity. Before this issue 
can be addressed, I first need to explicate Olson’s problem with the definitional 
accounts that have been shown above.  
 
5.2. The existential problem 
This problem arises when accounts of organismality are afforded by 
philosophers of biology and biologists that are either metaphysically 
unsophisticated or else based on a problematic or controversial metaphysical 
 
38 Wilson believes the “higher animal” is special in that all six kinds of biological individuality 
coextend to them (1999, p. 59).   
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thesis. Recently, for example, Olson (2021, especially pp. 74-76) has shown 
that the very way in which the question ‘what is an organism’ has been 
answered results in the acceptance of a metaphysics that tacitly endorses two 
metaphysical theses: unrestricted composition and temporal parts. 
 To begin with, Olson states that the problem of biological individuality 
has to do with how life divides into distinct units; that is, the problem can be 
understood as the challenge faced when determining the boundaries of an 
organism or the boundaries that separate one organism from another. He 
notes that these boundaries do not have to be precise, but they must exist. In 
answering the problem of biological individuality, we can answer questions 
about the spatial boundaries of organisms (e.g., their size, location, etc.) as well 
as their temporal boundaries (e.g., when they begin and end) (Olson 2021, p. 
64). 
Furthermore, the problem of biological individuality can include the 
problem of what parts an organism has, what it takes for something 
(potentially another organism) to be a part of a larger organism. He notes that 
this latter problem is not one that is concerned with boundaries as we could 
know which parts compose an organism but still not know anything further of 
the boundary of the organism (other than that the parts are included in said 
boundary). Vice-versa, knowing the boundaries of organisms doesn’t tell us 
what organisms there are within those boundaries since we don’t know if a 
larger organism is composed of smaller organisms who partake in the same 
boundary (Olson 2021, pp. 64-65).  
Given all of this, Olson suggests that what it takes to answer the 
problem of biological individuality will tell us what determines how many 
biological individuals there are and what distinguishes them from one another. 
However, he states that what philosophers of biology take to answer the 
problem of biological identity is a completion of the formula (call it the 
definitional formula) “x is an organism iff…x…” (Olson 2021, p. 67). This, he 
states:  
 
[…] is puzzling. How could an account of what it is to be an organism 
tell us what determines an organism’s location or boundaries, or how 
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many there are or what distinguishes one from another? An account of 
what it is to be an F does not generally tell us what determines the 




No proposition about how many organisms there are follows logically 
from a proposition about what it is to be an organism together with 
propositions about non-organisms (the ‘underlying facts’). That to be an 
organism is to be F can tell us nothing about what organisms there are 
unless we know something about what Fs there are: what material things 
with biological properties are candidates, so to speak, for being 
organisms. A definition of ‘organism’ cannot solve the problem of 
biological individuality without a principle about the existence of the 
candidates to which it is to be applied. And the definition itself cannot 
provide such a principle (Olson 2021, p. 69). 
 
What Olson is arguing here is that the standard definitional account of biological 
individuality fail insofar as they do not offer an account of the very thing the 
definition is meant to apply to. The philosopher of biology is stating, “this 
thing is x”, and, in response, the metaphysician says, “what thing?” Olson does 
suggest how definitional accounts of biological individuality can make sense of 
the thing of which they are defining, but this can only be done by presupposing 
two contentious metaphysical theses: temporal parts and unrestricted 
composition.  
 A temporal part is a part of something that “[…] takes up ‘all of that 
thing’ whenever the part exists” (Olson 2021, p. 74). Thus, one of the engines 
(call it “engine z”) of the RMS Titanic was not a temporal part of the ship 
(even though it was a part of the ship) because engine z didn’t take up the 
entirety of the ship at any given point of its existence. One way of visualising 
temporal parts is to imagine a film strip. If the entirety of the Titanic’s career 
were stretch through space and time as a reel of film, each individual image of 
the strip would be a single “instant” in time of the career of the ship. Each of 
those instances would be a temporal part of the Titanic (with the “whole” 
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Titanic the entire reel of film) because each instant in time would take up the 
entirety of the ship at that time. 
 Olson summarises temporal parthood thus: “x is a part of y at time t iff 
the temporal part of x located at t (exactly located then) is a part of the 
temporal part of y located at t” (Olson 2021, p. 74). Accordingly, engine z of 
the Titanic is a non-temporal part of the Titanic at time t (at the very instant of 
t) if the temporal part of engine z is a part of the temporal part of Titanic at 
time t.  
 Temporal parts aren’t the only contentious metaphysical claim that 
definitional theories assume. ‘Unrestricted composition’ is the view that “[. . .] 
for any things whatever, there is something composed of them: a sum” (Olson 
2021, p. 75). Olson argues that definitional accounts presuppose unrestricted 
composition because it’s the only metaphysical view that guarantees an object 
exists that is composed of, e.g., cells (2021, p. 75). He writes:  
 
Debates over biological individuality are about classification: about 
assessing individuals to sorts. That follows from stating the problem as 
how to define ‘organism’. Questions about what individuals there are—
about which homogeneous cells or cell-stages compose anything, for 
example—do not arise. This can only be because the debate presupposes 
a ‘generous’ account of composition: one implying that any entities that 
anyone might take to compose an organism or other biological individual 
compose something or other. And the only such account that has ever 
been proposed is unrestricted composition (Olson 2021, p. 75). 
 
As we can see, definitional solutions to the problem of biological individuality 
presuppose unrestricted composition (along with temporal parts). Importantly, 
these presuppositions occur because the solutions are definitional in nature. 
Questions of parthood don’t factor into definitional accounts, and, as a result, 
any such account will presuppose the metaphysical claim that guarantees parts 
will come together to compose the object that is denoted by said definition.  
 Definitional solutions to the problem of biological individuality 
presuppose the principle of material plenitude—the principle that, at any point in 
space-time, there is an object insofar as that space-time region is filled with 
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matter. The principle follows from a conjunction of unrestricted composition 
and a temporal parts ontology (Olson 2021, p. 76). Olson writes:  
 
[…] no claim about what it is to be an organism (together with 
statements about atoms, cells, and the like) can entail a claim about what 
organisms there are or how many. To reach a conclusion about what 
organisms there are from the premise that all and only organisms are F, 
we need to know what Fs there are. We need an account of the 
‘candidates’ to which the definition can be applied. The principle of 
plenitude supplies this. But any such account will be independent of a 
definition of ‘organism’. It follows that no definition can be a theory of 
biological individuality by itself, but at best in conjunction with a 
metaphysical principle about what material things there are (Olson 2021, 
p. 76). 
 
 A crude way of summarising the differences between what the philosophers of 
biology are doing on the one hand, and metaphysicians like Olson on the 
other, can be stated thus: philosophers of biology look at an object and 
attempt to determine what it means for that object to be an organism rather 
than a non-organism. The metaphysician wants to know what it takes for there 
to even be an object such that one can figure out whether or not it has the 
properties attributed to organisms. Because of this difference, the 
metaphysician is focused on part/whole relations, relations that philosophers 
of biology overlook. In overlooking the part/whole relations in biology, 
biologists and philosophers of biology presuppose the principle of material 
plenitude in order to formulate definitions of biological individuality.  
The question posed by the problem of biological individuality is 
normally formulated as such, “what is it to be an organism rather than a non-
organism?” The question, when formulated in this way, can only be answered 
with a definition: a definition tells us when there is an organism, and thus we 
can use the said definition to determine which biological entities fit that 
definition. Olson suggests a more suitable way of formulating the question, 
namely, “in what cases is there an organism rather than a non-organism.” This 
formulation doesn’t presuppose the existence of an organism and can be 
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solved by completing what he the existential statement to the problem of 
biological individuality (Olson 2021, p. 80):   
 
(ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys compose x iff…the ys…  
 
Written in this way, Olson suggests that the problem of biological individuality 
avoids the problems outlined above: it does not presuppose any metaphysical 
commitments, and it does not imply that an organism must be an organism 
throughout the entirety of its existence (2021, 80).  
 How are we meant to fill in the factors—the ys and xs—to make a 
sensible and biologically informed existential statement? One plausible solution 
is to modify the pre-existing definitional accounts provided in the literature to 
fit the existential statement Olson has provided.  
 Take, for instance, the evolutionary definition of biological individuality, 
according to which, roughly, an EI is an object that is acted upon by, or has 
the capacity to participate in, selection. We might modify this definition to fit 
into the existential statement by substituting the y in the statement for ‘lower-
level individuals’, such as “cells.” In this way, we might get some akin to the 
following: 
 
Evolutionary Existential Statement (EES): (ys)(x) x is an organism and the 
ys compose x iff the ys, as a group, have the capacity to participate in 
selection.  
 
Such a definition would seemingly avoid the problems Olson addresses in the 
standard definitional accounts. The statement, as it currently is, does not suppose 
that any of the ys—the cells—have the capacity to, as a group, participate in 




 Of course, one may object that the existence of the cells still 
presupposes the existence of some EI, i.e., the cells themselves! We can rectify 
this by going through the statement again until we get to some variable, y, that 
is not an EI, and replacing “organism” in the statement with “EI”—an EI in 
this case that would be the first (a “prime-EI”):39 
If someone is concerned with the ontogeny of a particular biological 
system (that is, they make a clear distinction between, and are concerned with, 
organisms rather than biological individuals), then the EES may not be useful 
because it implies a hierarchical view of biological individuality in that the 
‘organism’ is only one kind of biological individual (other kinds include genes, 
genomes, cells, etc.). This view of biological individuality requires us to revise 
our ontology because the folk-conception of biological individuality is just false 
(Pradeu 2010, p. 251) (e.g., recall Janzen’s illustrations between the EI 
dandelion and the ‘green thing’ in his garden). More importantly, the EES 
doesn’t seem to have a way to distinguish the kinds of spatio-temporal careers 
that the animalist is interested in (e.g., organisms) and those that they are not 
interested in (e.g., genes, cells, etc.).  
Perhaps, then, an existential statement based on the metabolic account 
of organisms might be preferred. Considering that the account Subrena Smith 
offers specifies that “persistence” refers to an ontogenetic rather than a phylogenetic 
notion (Smith 2017, p. 2), such an account would be able to provide the 
animalist with the kind of biological individual of which the animalist is 
concerned. I suggest the following as a start:  
 
Metabolic Existential Statement (MES): (ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys 
compose x iff the ys are in a context of development such that they 
develop functionally distinct parts that integrate so as to use energy to 
resist the breakdown.  
 
 
39 Of course, given the nature of natural selection, one would expect what counts as a “prime 
EI” to be vague. How best to determine such an EI is left for further discussion.  
147 
 
The MES is vague enough to allow for different accounts of what it 
means for ys to develop distinct parts as well as what it means for them to 
resist breaking down. The statement also includes the necessary factor of 
organisms being constitutively embedded in the world. Furthermore, the 
statement is remarkably similar to the view that it’s a “life” that is essential to 
the composition and persistence of organisms. A view that (following Locke’s 
account of the persistence of animals) many animalists hold! Take, for instance, 
Olson’s claim that  
 
What it takes for us to survive is the same throughout our careers: we 
persist, as other animals do, just in case our biological lives continue. At 
any point in my career I survive if and only if my vital functions—those 
complex biochemical and mechanical activities of my atoms by virtue of 
which they compose a living organisms—are preserved (1997b, p. 106). 
 
Or, more formally, van Inwagen’s principle ‘Life’: 
 
If an organism exists at a certain moment, then it exists whenever and 
wherever—and only when and only where—the even that is its life at 
that moment is occurring; more exactly, if the activity of the xs at t1 
constitues a life, and the activities of the ys at t2 constitute a life, then the 
organism that the xs compose at t1 is the organism that the ys compose 
at t2 if and only if the life constituted by the activity of the xs at t1, is the 
life constituted by the activity of the by the activity of the ys at t2 (van 
Inwagen 1990, p. 145). 
 
Olson and van Inwagen (as well as many other animalists) adopt a view 
that, in its broadest form, takes “life” to be essential to the composition and 
persistence of living entities. If we understand metabolic processes to be a fine-




(ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys compose x iff the ys are in a context 
of development such that they develop functionally distinct parts that 
integrate as to use energy to resist the breakdown, 
 
is just a more complex and scientifically accommodated version of the 
statement 
 
(ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys compose x iff the ys constitute the 
same life. 
 
In this sense, the MES of biological individuality is the closest statement to the 
traditional animalist’s account of biological individuality.  
Yet, the MES is more complex and scientifically accommodating, and with 
this comes a marked difference from the same life statement mentioned above. 
That is, in its present form, the same life statement doesn’t tell us much. This 
has been pointed out by Wilson, who accuses Locke and van Inwagen of not 
providing enough detail in their account of a “life.” He writes:  
 
[Locke and van Inwagen] have not provided a comprehensive 
description of living individuality. Assuming that we could articulate 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being alive (and no one has), we 
still do not know whether a particular mass of living tissue is a living 
being. It may be, but it could also be several living things or a part of a 
more comprehensive life (1999, p. 4). 
 
As Wilson points out, Locke’s and van Inwagen’s concept of life isn’t 
articulated in any great detail, including what the necessary and sufficient 
conditions are for a particular biological system to be alive. However, Wilson 
takes it that even if we had such conditions, we still wouldn’t know whether or 
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not something that satisfies those conditions are parts of a larger whole or the 
larger whole itself. This later claim, it seems, may not be accurate. 
 If we take Smith’s account of organism as an adequate account of what 
it takes for a biological system to be an individual then it seems, contrary to 
Wilson, that we can in fact know when there are parts of organisms or whole 
organisms once we have the necessary and sufficient conditions of “life.” The 
necessary and sufficient conditions, in this case, include a context of 
development (i.e., the organism has to be constitutively embedded in the 
world), a phenotype to develop distinct functional parts, and for these parts to 
integrate in such a way that they take in energy from the environment allowing 
them to persist as a whole. Once these conditions are met then determining an 
organism from a non-organism (e.g., an organism from a biological individual) 
becomes unproblematic.  
To see this, take the example of honey bees. Honey bees are eusocial 
insects that form a colony, with each individual bee carrying out a particular 
colony-level task to aid in the persistence of the colony (Smith 2017, p. 9). For 
example, when airflow in the hive is restricted, honey bees will regulate the 
airflow by making the hive itself “inhale” and “exhale” air. To do this, the 
hive’s worker bees fan in and out of the hive (pp. 9-10).  
Another way in which honey bees work together in order for the 
colony to survive is by regulating the temperature of the colony (i.e., 
thermoregulation). The hives of honey bees need to maintain a temperature of 
around ninety-three degrees Fahrenheit. When the temperature of the hive falls 
below this level, worker bees increase the temperature of the hive by vibrating 
their wings around the brood nest as a means of producing heat. When the 
temperature of the hive goes above the optimum temperature, worker bees 
decrease the temperature of the hive by spreading out, fanning, or evaporating 
water throughout the hive. Honey bees will evacuate the hive as a last resort if 
the temperature of the hive cannot be regulated. This phenomenon is 
particularly interesting because individual bees are ectotherms (i.e., their body 
heat is regulated internally.) As the evidence above suggests, however, honey 
bee colonies function as endotherms (i.e., thermoregulation takes place, at least 
in part, externally) (Smith 2017, p. 9).  
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 As a final example, Smith refers to Moritz and Fuchs as a way of 
illustrating the importance of the colony on the development of the individual 
(Smith 2017, p. 10). Moritz and Fuchs describe the development of honey bees 
thus:  
 
The development of an individual honey bee does not differ much from 
that of any other holometabolic insect in principle, yet there are dramatic 
biotic constraints which govern the development of a honey bee. Most 
evident is the developmental pathway from egg to adult which can only 
occur in the presence of large numbers of other bees. The large body of 
workers is instrumental for brood rearing. They provide the combs 
where the queen deposits the eggs. They feed and foster the larvae and 
maintain the correct temperature for brood development. They also 
provide a nest site which is of crucial importance for temperature control 
and protection of the stores and the brood against predators. Thus, the 
successful completion of the above developmental cycle depends intricately on the 
presence of an intact colony comprised of a nest cavity, combs and a large number of 
other bees (Moritz and Fuchs 1998, p. 9, my emphasis).  
 
Given the importance of the colony as a whole on the development of the 
individual honey bee, it’s clear that the ‘constitutional embeddedness’ condition 
of Smith’s metabolic theory is fulfilled. As Smith notes, however, it’s not just 
the individual bee that goes through a life cycle, but the whole colony. She 
writes:  
 
“[…] it begins with a single queen, grows, and eventually reproduces. 
When the hive reaches maximum capacity, more than half of the worker 
bees and the queen leave the hive to find a new one, and the remaining 
worker and the new queen (or queen-to-be cells) then reconstitute the 




Viewing the colony in this way, one can see that a particular organism begins, 
grows, and goes out of existence (by it splitting into two distinct colonies). This 
suggests that the last condition of Smith’s metabolic account is satisfied—that 
the functional integration of the parts (in this case, the individual honey bees) 
provides the ability for the persistence of the group as a whole.  
 A honey bee colony provides us with a nice example of how we can 
determine parts from wholes in biology given the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of “life.” The answer is unambiguous considering these conditions: 
Honey bee colonies are functionally integrated (e.g., the various roles worker 
bees provide to the hive as a whole), constitutively embedded (e.g., the 
development of an individual honey bee is dependent on the colony as a 
whole), and as such the colony persists as a whole. Thus, as Smith notes, “[a]ny 
particular honey bee is clearly an individual organism, but to understand some 
things about honey bees, one needs to treat their colonies as whole organisms 
too” (Smith 2017, p. 10). Yet, beyond the practical reasons for conceptualising 
a honey bee colony as an organism in its own right, an ontological status is 
determined. That is, the individual bee is an organism but is also part of a 
larger organism—the honey bee colony. 
 A consequence of including the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
“life” in the MES is that it opens up the possibility of the extended organism thesis. 
The extended organism is a possibility conceived of by Olson (2011) in his 
rejection of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind and extended self thesis. 
According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive capacities can be offloaded to 
external devices (such as a notebook or mobile phone). A possible 
consequence of this thesis is that the self can, at least in part, be offloaded to 
these devices as well (this assumes some important relationship between the 
self and the mind, and thus some form of Neo-Lockean theory of the self). Of 
course, Olson rejects Neo-Lockean theories of the self (he is an animalist, after 
all), and argues that one of the only ways the self can extend is if organisms 
(i.e., what we are identical with) extend into their environment—call this the 
extended organism thesis.  
 Olson suggests that the extended organism thesis goes against the usual 




The usual view is that an animal’s boundary lies roughly at the skin, 
because that is the extend of the self-maintaining biochemical process 
that make it a living thing—what Locke called its life […] Its metabolism, 
its immune system, and its capacity for growth and repair extend to the 
skin and no further (Olson 2011, p. 489). 
 
Reference to some version of a “life” existential statement or, more charitably, 
an MES is noticeable here. Also noticeable is the standard acceptance that an 
organism’s boundaries are skin deep—a standard that is mistaken if the 
extended organism thesis is true. According to the extended organism thesis, 
an organism can extend beyond its skin. An example of when this extension 
may occur includes when organisms get prosthetic limbs, wear eye lenses, wear 
clothes, etc. It’s not just that there are organisms that happen to wear these 
things, according to this account, but that these items become a part of the 
organism on an ontological level. An organism that doesn’t have a leg can have 
a leg by attaching a prosthetic leg to itself.  
 Olson rejects the extended organism thesis on the grounds that if there 
is an organism that gets bigger by assimilating parts of its external 
environment, then there must also be an organism that exists prior to this 
addition. He calls this pre-addition organism the ‘core organism’ and the 
organism post-addition the ‘extended organism.’ For the extended self thesis to 
be true, for human persons to be extended into their environment, then we 
must be identical to the ‘extended organism’, not the ‘core organism.’ This, 
Olson argues, is problematic because it’s in virtue of the ‘core organism’ 
existing that makes the claim “no organism gains in size by adding external 
parts” true. The consequence of this is that, if the extended self thesis were 
true, human persons cannot be identical with ‘core organisms’ but rather 
‘extended organisms’ (Olson 2011, p. 490). 
 In Carlyle (2016), I argued against Olson’s rejection of the extended 
organism thesis (and thus extended self thesis) by arguing that at least some 
animals seem to extend into the world in order to survive. But, if the MES is 
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correct, then it’s not simply that some animals extend into their environment, 
but all organisms extend into their environment by being constitutively 
embedded in their environment. Olson, in this regard, can be said to have 
over-emphasised our ability to distinguish the organism from its environment 
beyond our mere conceptual ability to do so. That is, he offered a theory of 
organismality that did not take into consideration the constitutively 
embeddedness of organisms-in-the-world.  
 Insofar as one adopts a metabolic or “life” criterion of biological 
individuality, the constitutively embeddedness of organisms suggests that 
organisms are, to some degree, extended. This picture of organisms is in 
tension with traditional animalism. Considering this, such views may not be as 
appealing to animalists as they initially seemed. The ability for an organism to 
grow in size by adding parts poses one potential problem for the animalist 
adopting the MES, but even if animalists accept this consequence, there are 
still problems with accepting it that will be addressed later on in this chapter as 
well as chapters 5 and 6 (namely, it makes organisms, and thus ourselves, 
functional kinds as well as the potential consequence that we were never 
foetuses).  
Considering Pradeu’s definition of an organism, an Immunological Existential 
Statement may be the following: 
 
Immunological Existential Statement (IES): (ys)(x) x is an organism and the 
ys compose x iff the ys are heterogenous, interconnected by biochemical 
reactions, and a systemic immune interaction is constantly controlling 
the ys. 
 
Like the EES and the MES, the IES doesn’t presuppose the principle of 
plenitude because it doesn’t presuppose the existence of organisms. Rather, 
like the other existential statements described above, this statement tells us 
under what conditions an organism (or, if it should be qualified, an 
immunological organism) exists.  
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Similar to its definitional variant, the IES is more specific than the 
MES, and in this way, it potentially avoids the consequence of the 
constitutively embeddedness of organisms-in-the-world. As a result, the IES 
also avoids the radical conclusion that all organisms extend into their 
environment. However, despite avoiding a radical form of the extended 
organism thesis, IES does allow for some organisms to be extended (such as a 
foetus extending to its mother and vice-versa). In fact, some degree of the 
extended organism thesis will be true by definition for any existential definition 
that includes heterogeneous parts!  
Given the above existential statements, one may be inclined to think 
the current problem has been solved—we are able to maintain a metaphysical 
picture of the world that is at once metaphysically open (i.e., doesn’t assume 
the principle of plenitude) and scientifically knowledgeable (i.e., the 
metaphysics stems from contemporary positions in biology). This is, 
unfortunately, not the case. This is because it’s still not clear where to start our 
existential solution after we have the initial formula. Call this the Questionable 
Beginnings problem. Recall that the initial formula, as provided by Olson, is the 
following: 
 
(ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys compose x iff…the ys…  
 
Above, I provided a possible solution by filling the variables in by modifying 
definitions found in contemporary philosophy of biology. Thus, I arrived at 
the following (to use the MES) as an example:  
 
(ys)(x) x is an organism and the ys compose x iff the ys are in a context 
of development such that they develop functionally distinct parts that 
integrate so as to use energy to resist the breakdown.  
 
But why choose “metabolic process?” Why not the EES, i.e., “the ys form a 
unit that is a variable in the unit of selection?” Or, any other variable?  
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I chose the above example because it was biological informed. This is 
understandable given that I’m committed to offering an existential solution 
that can accommodate biology. But here in lies a problem: any biologically 
informed existential solution to the problem of biological individuality will 
ultimately be based on a definitional solution, thus start with a solution that 
presupposes the principle of material plenitude—the exact thing that an 
existential solution to the problem of biological identity was meant to avoid.  
If philosophers of biology and metaphysicians aren’t supposed to pick 
out their variables from biological definitions, then where are we to start? The 
answer to this question is not clear, and some general principle is required for 
deciding which variables would be acceptable and which aren’t, and these 
principles would (if keeping in line with the naturalism defended in chapter 3) 
need to be grounded in our contemporary scientific understanding (which 
seems implausible given the nature of the problem itself.) This problem is what 
I will call the meta-problem of biological individuality. 
 
5.3. The meta-problem of biological individuality 
In section 1, I explicated several candidate definitions for biological 
individuality and that all of these candidate definitions are what Olson refers to 
as ‘definitional solutions’ of biological individuality. In section 2, I gave an 
overview of Olson’s objection to definitional solutions as adequate responses 
to the problem of biological individuality. It was shown that, to Olson, 
definitional solutions fail to adequately respond to the problem of biological 
individuality because they presuppose a contentious ontology—the principle of 
plenitude. The kind of solution that is needed is, according to Olson, is an 
‘existential’ statement—one that tells us under which situations something 
composes something else.  
 What exactly do I mean by the meta-problem of biological individuality? 
This, it seems, is precisely the problem that Olson appears to be affording a 
response to with his ‘existential’ statement of the problem. He states, “My 
concern is not how to solve the problem, but how to state it. What would 
count as a solution? What exactly is the question that theories of biological 
individuality are supposed to answer?” (2021). These are the questions that 
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Olson, and myself, are concerned with at the moment. Such questions are at a 
level above the original problem (thus “meta”). Whereas responses to the 
problem of biological individuality are meant to answer the question ‘what is a 
biological individual,’ responses to the meta-problem of biological individuality 
are meant to answer questions like ‘what would an adequate response to the 
problem look like such that it can accommodate both a metaphysical and 
scientific account of organismality?’  
 Thus far, we have two options on the table: definitional solutions and 
existential solutions. Both options come with pros and cons. If we decide 
definitional solutions are to be preferred, then we are afforded useful criteria of 
individuality for biologists to utilise. This comes at a cost, however, as we (at 
least seemingly) presuppose the principle of plenitude. If, on the other hand, 
we adopt existential solutions to the problem of biological individuality, an 
ontology of biological individuals is left open. The cost of an existential 
solution, however, is that it becomes unclear where we ought to get our 
variables from to fill in the existential statement. We run the risk of 
presupposing what counts as a biological individual with whatever definitional 
solution we adopt (which seems like a perfect case of putting the cart before 
the horse).   
A potential solution to this problem is to deny the existence of the 
entities (at least in terms of their being substances) from the very beginning. 
Olson’s problem with definitional solutions stems from the assumption that 
there exist such things as biological individuals that are composed of other 
things (e.g., cells, mereological simples, etc.) At the same time (and as noted 
above), any solution to the existential problem can only begin by modifying an 
already existing definitional solution. The problem is unavoidable insofar as we 
assume that there are such things as biological individuals. As such, I suggest we 
take seriously the idea that some form of compositional nihilism (one more 
radical than that of van Inwagen, in that there are no compositions, not even in 
living “entities”) as true, and that such a position can be used to make a fruitful 
contribution to the metaphysics of biology. 
Olson has argued against this solution on the basis that it either implies 
(1) there are no organisms (as organisms are composite), (2) Immaterialism 
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(2007, p. 224), or (3) organisms are mereologically simple (2007, p. 224, fn. 
223).  However, this doesn’t seem to be the case. A fourth implication that 
Olson doesn’t consider is that a non-substance-based ontology might be true. 
More specifically, a non-substance-based ontology that is able to make sense of 
the modal properties of biological phenomena whilst at the same time avoiding 
some of the pitfalls that come with the adoption of substantial kinds.  
In the following chapter, I will argue that one plausible alternative to a 
substance ontology is a structural ontology where organisms don’t exist as 
composite objects, but they do exist as instantiations of modally resilient 
biological structures. This move is comparable to that of Wilson’s real patterns 
approach to natural kinds; however, it will be shown that a move from this to 
substantial kinds is not necessary.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the difference between definitional accounts of 
biological individuality and existential accounts of biological individuality. 
Definitional accounts attempt to articulate the difference between organisms and 
non-organisms. In doing so, they overlook part/whole relations and thus 
presuppose the principle of material plenitude. 
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In the previous chapter, I explained what the problem of biological 
individuality is and how different biologists and philosophers have dealt with it. 
It was also argued that there is a deadlock between two parts of the debate: the 
definitional accounts of biological individuality and the existential account.  The 
philosophers of biology require a definitional account of biological 
individuality—an account that defines the necessary and sufficient properties 
of biological individuality. An account of this kind does not answer the 
existential problem. Metaphysicians (such as Olson 2021) require an existential 
account of biological individuality—an account that elucidates under what 
conditions a biological object exists. The existential account of biological 
individuality does not admit the levels of biological individuality produced by 
evolution. A solution to the impasse, I suggested, would be to develop a 
metaphysical account that was able to cut through the problems of both sides, 
that is, an account that offers an ontological account of individuality and 
explain the vagueness found in biology. I suggest that a position articulated 
already in the philosophy of science offers such an account: Ontic Structural 
Realism (OSR). 
Although OSR has typically been used in the philosophy of physics, I 
am not the first person to suggest applying it to the problems in biology. 
Steven French, for instance, has noted that, despite its seeming orientation 
towards more mathematically inclined sciences, OSR could (in principle) be 
motivated elsewhere:  
 
[. . .] in its focus on mathematical equations, this position seems to be 
oriented towards the more mathematical sciences, such as physics. 
What about biology, or even psychology, where there is far less 
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mathematization? Can structural realism find a place in these fields too? 
One answer is a blunt 'yes', since the notion of structure is broad 
enough that one can argue that maths is just one way of representing it. 
However, there is a lot more work to be done in developing structural 
realism in a biological context, say (French 2016, p. 161) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to make more progress in this development: to 
show how it could be applied in a biological context (specifically regarding the 
nature of organisms). To this aim, the chapter is divided as follows: in section 
1, I will provide a brief overview of what OSR is and what it is meant to do in 
the philosophy of science. As will be shown, laws in science are important in 
uncovering modally resilient structures; as such, section 2 will be a defence of 
laws, or law-like generalisations, in biology. Section 3 will bring all of this 
together to demonstrate how one could apply OSR to biological individuals. A 
possible objection will be raised and responded to in section 4, concluding the 
chapter. 
 
6.1. Structural realism 
In chapter 3, I argued that we should take the theories provided by our best 
current science as providing insight into the nature of reality. This naturalistic 
stance—that our best scientific theories tell us what reality is really like (in both 
is observable and non-observable aspects)—is known as scientific realism.  
When one claims to be a scientific realist, they are making a claim about the 
unobservable entities posited by our best current science. Specifically, they are 
making the claim that we ought to believe in the existence of these 
unobservable entities. Anti-realists, on the other hand, believe that we shouldn’t 
believe in the existence of these unobservable entities, but only in the 
observable ones (unobservable ‘entities’ have at best an instrumental usage or 
tell us how the world could be).  Structural realism is an attempt to formulate a 
form of realism that can reconcile the strongest arguments for realism and anti-
realism: the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic-meta induction.  
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 Scientific realists often cited the no-miracles argument as a standard 
argument for their position. As the argument goes, science is incredibly 
successful, and the best (if not only) way to explain this success is if our best 
scientific theories are true, approximately true, or the things referred to by 
scientists exist mind-independently (Chakravartty 2017, sect. 2.1). The 
alternative, it seems, would be that some miracle routinely takes place such that 
science is able to continuously advance, or as Smart (1963) formulates the 
problem:  
 
If the phenomenalism about theoretical entities is correct we must 
believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about 
electrons, etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to 
predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. 
They do nothing to remove the surprising character of these phenomena. 
Admittedly the physicist will not be surprised in the sense that he will 
find these phenomena arising in unexpected ways: his theory will have 
instrumental value in preventing this sort of surprise. But, if he is 
reflective, he ought still to find it surprising that the world should be 
such as to contain these odd and ontologically disconnected 
phenomena: i.e., the phenomena are connected only by means of a 
purely instrumental theory. Is it not odd that the phenomena of the 
world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true? On 
the other hand, if we interpret a theory in a realist way, then we have 
no need for such a cosmic coincidence: it is not surprising that 
galvanometers and cloud chambers behave in the sort of way they do, 
for if there really are electronics, etc., this is just what we should expect. 
A lot of surprising facts no longer seem surprising (Smart 1963, p. 39) 
 
The no-miracles argument is persuasive because it explains why our science is so 
successful—the best theories postulated by our best current science are true 
(or approximately true).  
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 Furthermore, the no-miracles argument is naturalistic in the sense that 
realists that employ it are utilising the same kind of reasoning that scientists use 
when it comes to scientific theories.40 That is, realists (in reference to the no-
miracles argument) are arguing that the best explanation for the success of science 
is a realist explanation; therefore, we should accept realism as true. Similarly, 
scientists (in reference to some theory T) argue that the best explanation for 
some phenomena is T; therefore, we should accept T as true (French 2016, p. 
134).  
Contra realists, anti-realists have argued that the history of science is full of 
scientific entities and theories that were successful in their time but were later 
rejected. Laudan (1981), for example, has noted the following:  
 
• The crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy; 
• The humoral theory of medicine;  
• The effluvial theory of static electricity;  
• ‘catastrophist’ geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) 
deluge; 
• The phlogiston theory of chemistry;  
• The caloric theory of heat; 
• The vibratory theory of heat;  
• The vital force theories of physiology; 
• The electromagnetic aether; 
• The optical aether; 
• The theory of circular inertia; 
• Theories of spontaneous generation (Laudan 1981, p. 33) 
 
He goes on to say that the list could be extended ad nauseam (1981, p. 33). 
 
40 This assumes that the no-miracles argument offers an inference to the best explanation, which is 
disputable (see, for example, Saatsi 2017, p. 176).  
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 Poincaré (1905 [1952]) referred to this pattern of scientific theories 
going from successful to rejected as the ‘bankruptcy of science’, stating:  
 
[t]he ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man 
of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them 
abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piles upon ruins; he predicts 
that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their 
turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain (Poincaré 1905 
[1952], p. 160).  
 
Although Poincaré would say that the scepticism motivated by the bankruptcy 
of science is superficial (p. 160), anti-realists have been motivated by the large 
number of rejected scientific theories. Why, they argue, should we consider our 
current scientific entities as being any different than the theories that were 
rejected throughout history? Given that our best current theories are similar in 
kind to those that came before it, and given that those theories were eventually 
rejected, the anti-realist argues that we should expect our best current theories 
to be rejected as well (and thus, not be realists about them). This objection is 
referred to as the pessimistic meta-induction—‘Pessimistic’ because it argues that 
we should not be realists about our best current theories, and ‘meta’ because it 
doesn’t work at the level of science itself (in contrast to the no-miracles argument), 
but at the historical level above it (French 2016, p. 135) 
 It has been said (e.g., Worrall 1989, p. 101; Ladyman 1998, p. 409) that 
the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction are both compelling, 
but because of this, there is an immediate problem: the two arguments pull us 
in opposite directions (the no-miracles argument towards scientific realism and 
the pessimistic meta-induction towards scientific anti-realism). Rather than argue 
against one or the other, Worrall (1989) held that a satisfactory position in the 
realism/anti-realism debate would be able to reconcile the two arguments.  
Inspired by Poincaré (1905 [1952]), Worrall (1989) introduced structural 
realism into contemporary philosophy of science. This form of realism states 
that what we ought to be committed to (i.e., what we should be realists about) 
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is the structure of our best scientific theories, not the entities postulated by 
them. If we are realists about structure, Worrall argued, we can account for the 
overwhelming success of science (and thus satisfy the no-miracles argument) and, 
at the same time, we are able to accommodate the history of science, and its 
rejected theories (and thus positively respond to the pessimistic meta-induction). In 
this way, structural realism gives us the ‘best of both worlds’ by reconciling the 
prominent argument of scientific realism with that of scientific anti-realism.  
To motivate this position, Worrall refers to the shift in optics from 
Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s, stating:  
 
There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel 
to Maxwell—and this was much more than a simple question of 
carrying over the successful empirical content into the new theory. At 
the same time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full 
theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in 
“approximate” form) … There was continuity or accumulation in the 
shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content 
(Worrall 1989, p. 117).  
 
Furthermore, he notes that the claim of a structural shift from one theory to 
another was already made and defended by Poincaré (see 1905 [1952], pp. 160-
161).  
 Developing structural realism further, Ladyman (1998) has 
distinguished ontic structural realism (OSR) and epistemic structural realism (ESR), 
and later crudely (although helpfully) summed up the differences between the 
two stating that “[. . .] ESR is the claim that all we know is the structure of the 
relations between things and not the things themselves, and a corresponding 
crude statement of OSR is the claim that there are no ‘things’ and that 
structure is all there is” (Ladyman 2016, sect. 4). It has been suggested by 
Ladyman (1998, p. 410; 2016, sect. 3) that ESR is the view held by Worrall, and 
it has been further divided into two versions by French and Ladyman (2011). 
According to one version, there are objects that are unobservable to us, but we 
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cannot know them. In the second version of ESR, we cannot know whether or 
not there are unobservable individual objects, and even if there are, we cannot 
know them (French and Ladyman 2011, p. 27).  
 Given that I am trying to formulate a metaphysical position that can 
reconcile the metaphysical with the biological, I am not going to address ESR 
beyond this point. Rather, I will limit my discussion to OSR, which can be 
fleshed out in a variety of different ways (see, e.g., Ainsworth 2010; Ladyman 
2016, sect. 4) but all of which, broadly speaking, give ontological priority to 
structures and relations (Ladyman 2016, sect. 4).41 To be more specific, I am 
going to assume a form of eliminativist structuralism—one defended by 
Ladyman and Ross (2007)—where relations are taken as ontologically basic. 
“Objects” (which can be individuals or non-individuals), in this view, are 
heuristic (French and Ladyman 2003) or pragmatic (Ladyman and Ross 2007) 
devices.42 As Ladyman and Ross (2007) note, “A core aspect of the claim that 
relations are logically prior to relata is that the relata of a given relation always 
turn out to be relational structures themselves on further analysis” (p. 155). As 
such, the relata are understood as abstractions (or heuristics, or pragmatic 
devices) of more fundamental relations.  
 French (2014) argues that the realist should only commit themselves to 
ontologies that can be read off from our best theories and models. These 
ontologies are understood in terms of laws and symmetries and the properties 
that play a role in them. The structuralist, in this case, do not take these 
properties to be seated in objects (French 2014, p. 330). 
 Although structural realism was originally formulated as a way of 
reconciling the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction, the 
introduction of OSR supplies us with a way to make use of structuralism 
beyond explaining theory change. Namely, the introduction of OSR provides 
us with another way to resolve ontological problems. It is in this way I believe 
 
41 For defences of OSR over ESR see Ladyman (1998); Ladyman and Ross (2007); French and 
Ladyman (2011). 
42 Ladyman has recently backed away from an eliminativist view of objects (see, e.g., Waechter 
and Ladyman 2019). 
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OSR can help us cut through the tension between vagueness in biology and the 
existential problem of biological individuality.  
 
6.2. Concerning laws 
The importance of laws in the version of OSR that I’m motivating poses a 
problem for those that want to apply the position to biology as it’s generally 
agreed upon that there are no laws in biology. Take, for instance, ‘Evolutionary 
Contingency Thesis’ defended by John Beatty, according to which:  
 
All generalisations about the living world: a) are just mathematical, 
physical, or chemical generalizations (or deductive consequences of 
mathematical, physical, or chemical generalizations plus initial 
conditions), or b) are distinctively biological, in which case they 
describe contingent outcomes of evolution (1995, pp. 46-47). 
 
Beatty’s argument is that any biological generalisations are reducible to 
mathematical, physical, or chemical generalizations, making such 
generalisations about the laws of the disciplines that biology reduces to, and 
not of biology itself. If the generalisation is biological, then it’s a generalisation 
that is contingent on the process of evolution—it’s a generalisation that could 
have been otherwise had selection occurred differently. But why believe that 
generalisations in biology are contingent outcomes of evolution? French notes 
that such contingency is an implication of our current conceptions of mutation 
and natural selection, and as such, any generalisations in biology do not admit 
of natural necessity, which is typically taken as an essential feature of a law, but 
(as I will soon elaborate) certain conceptions of lawhood reject (French 2014, 
p. 331).  
 Rosenberg (2001) has argued that biology has only one law which is 
based on the principles of the theory of natural selection (PNS) (more on the 
nature of this law in a moment) because, if biology did have laws beyond those 
of the PNS, then these laws would either link together functional kinds with 
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functional kinds (Rosenberg uses the example, ‘all amphibians reproduce 
sexually’) or would link functional kinds with structural kinds (he uses the 
example ‘all genes are composed of DNA’). This causes a problem, however, 
because, according to Rosenberg, if a mechanism selects for effects, then it is 
blind to whatever structures that instantiate those, or similar, effects—that is to 
say, biology individuates kinds that have been naturally selected for. But, 
Rosenberg argues, any science that individuates kinds by functions that have 
been naturally selected for cannot have laws, so biology cannot have laws 
beyond those of the PNS(p. 737) 
 Furthermore, Rosenberg argues that biology cannot have ceteris paribus 
laws—that is, laws that can have exceptions—because such laws must have 
their nomological character underwritten by ‘super-laws’ that determine when 
things aren’t equal (i.e., when exceptions occur); these ‘super-laws’ help explain 
why, in ceteris paribus cases, we ought to expect a lack of precision as well as 
predictive failures. Biology lacks such ‘super-laws’ because, during evolution, 
the environment sets up adaptational and design problems that evolving 
lineages are forced to solve. The resulting competition between the evolving 
lineages and their environment creates an inconsistent environment, and thus, 
Rosenberg argues, natural selection does not limit the number of outside 
forces that can interfere with any given evolving lineage (2001, pp. 736-737).  
This is where that single biological law comes in. This law, Rosenberg 
claims, comes from the principles of the theory of natural selection, which he 
describes as follows (p. 752): 
 
(1) Biological systems not on the verge of extinction or fixity reproduce 
with heritable variations. 
(2) If heritable variation obtains among biological systems, then there 
will be fitness differences among the biological systems.  
(3) In the long run, the more fit variants will leave a higher proportion 




He states that one conclusion Darwin derives from these principles is, 
  
(4) Until fixity or extinction is attained, there will be descent with 
modification, i.e., evolution.  
 
Whether or not these premises, and the resulting conclusion, are sound will be 
discussed briefly later on. For now, it’s important to note that Rosenberg 
argues that these principles should be seen as nomological generalisations 
similar to those found in the physical sciences. These principles do not run into 
the same issues that other biological generalisations do, he argues, because 
these principles are about natural selection itself and thus not subject to the 
conditions imposed by its principles (2001, p. 752). 
Interestingly, for Rosenberg, it is from this law (i.e., the PNS) that the 
contingencies in biology are derived, and why, he believes, biology is a 
historical discipline:  
 
Biology is indeed a historical discipline. But the main principles of 
Darwin’s theory are not historical narratives—not even world-historical 
ones. They are the only (ceteris paribus) laws of biology. And it is the 
application of these laws to initial conditions that generates the 
functional kinds which make the rest of biology implicitly historical: in 
our little corner of the universe, the universally ubiquitous process of 
selection for effects presumably began with the precursors of hydro-
carbons, nucleic and amino acids. That local fact and its adaptational 
consequences explain the character of the sub-disciplines of terrestrial 
biology. Their explanations are ‘historically’ limited by the initial 
distribution of matter on the earth, and the levels of organization into 
which it has assembled itself. So, their local generalizations are 
increasingly riddled with exceptions as evolution proceeds through time 




For Rosenberg, we take the PNS as forming a ceteris paribus law in biology and 
as a result of the nature of this law (by which I mean the contingent 
environment that is generated as a result of it) we get a historical discipline. 
With some of the arguments against the existence of laws in biology 
explicated, we can see the problem more clearly: with no laws in biology, where 
do we find our (modally resilient) properties from which we derive our 
ontology? Recall that the structuralist (at least the kind referred to here) bases 
their ontological commitments on the laws and symmetries that play a role in 
our best current scientific theories. Given this, if the structuralist is to 
formulate a biological ontology, they require some laws (or something similar) 
from which they find their modally resilient properties. The problem, as I’ve 
shown, is that the received view amongst philosophers of biology is that such 
laws are not to be found.   
Luckily, there are several alternatives at our disposal to solve this 
problem. For instance, in response to Beatty, French (2014) notes two possible 
responses: first, one could agree with his thesis but argue that, although 
contingent, there are biological structures that are not completely accidental 
[e.g., one could follow Mitchell (2000), and argue that (at least some) biological 
structures are more modally resilient than mere accidental generalisations]. A 
second way of responding to Beatty would be to challenge the way he is using 
‘law’ (p. 331). 
 Let’s focus on the latter possible response first: perhaps there is a 
problem with the concept, ‘law’, which is being referred to by Beatty and 
Rosenberg. There is a case to be made that biology does have laws; however, 
the concept may need to be altered a bit to fit within a biological context. 
Sober (2000), for instance, has drawn some attention to the if/then 
generalisations found in biology:  
 
Biologists usually don’t call them “laws”; “model” is the preferred term. 
When biologists specify a model of a given kind of process, they 
describe the rules by which a system of a given kind changes. Models 
have the characteristic if/then format that we associate with scientific 
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laws. These mathematical formalisms say what will happen if a certain 
set of conditions is satisfied by a system. They do not say when or where 
or how often those conditions are satisfied in nature (p. 16).  
 
He refers to Fisher’s Sex Ratio Argument (1958, specifically pp. 158-160) as an 
example of such a model.43 Hamilton (1967) explained the argument as 
follows:  
 
1. Suppose male births are less common than female. 
2. A newborn male then has better mating prospects than a newborn 
female, and therefore can expect to have more offspring. 
3. Therefore parents genetically disposed to produce males tend to have 
more than average numbers of grandchildren born to them. 
4. Therefore the genes for male-producing tendencies spread, and male 
births become commoner. 
5. As the 1:1 sex ratio is approached, the advantage associated with 
producing males dies away. 
6. The same reasoning holds if females are substituted for males 
throughout. Therefore 1:1 is the equilibrium ratio (Hamilton 1967, p. 
477) 
 
Hamilton notes as well that this argument works whether or not polygamy 
occurs in the population or if there is a difference (which is not correlated with 
the sex-ratio genotypes) in the mortality rate of the sexes (p. 477). What this 
shows is that given two assumptions in a population: first, that mating in the 
population is random, and second that there is a heritable difference in the mix 
of sons and daughters produced by each parental pair in the population,  
selection will favour an even (1:1) sex ratio in that population. This is because 
 
43 For the more mathematically-minded individuals reading this, a more formal description of 
Fisher’s argument can be found in Sober (2000, Box 1.3, p. 17).  
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selection, given the above assumptions, favours parental pairs that produce the 
minority offspring (Sober 2000, p. 16). 
 As Sober notes, Fisher’s model is an if/then statement, and as such, the 
starting conditions Fisher describes may or may not be satisfied. If the 
conditions are satisfied, then the results must follow (that is, a 1:1 sex ratio 
must evolve) since the model is not limited to a place or time. Furthermore, 
Sober sees Fisher’s conclusion as making a proposition about natural selection 
that distinguishes it from other propositions about natural selection. He argues, 
contra Rosenberg, that asking whether or not natural selection is a law is 
meaningless because it’s not clear which proposition about natural selection 
one is making—the kind of proposition determines whether it’s a law or a 
historical hypothesis. An example of a statement that is a historical hypothesis 
would be to assert that human’s apposable thumbs are a result of natural 
selection. On the other hand, to state Fisher’s conclusion that an even sex ratio 
will result from natural selection if certain conditions are met is to state a law 
(Sober 2000, pp. 16-17).  
 Another candidate for a biological law is the Hardy-Weinberg Law, 
which allows us to take the frequency of gametes and then calculate the 
distribution of genotypes that they produce. It can be roughly stated as follow 
(see also, table 1):  
  
If the frequency of the A gene is p and the frequency of the a gene is q 
at some locus in a population, then the frequencies of the three 
genotypes AA, Aa, and aa will be p2, 2pq, and q2, respectively (Sober 
2000, p. 73). 
 
Insofar as certain conditions are met (such as the occurrence of random 
mating and the alleles in the two sexes have the same frequency), we can 
expect the above genotype frequencies to occur given an infinite population 
(Sober 2000, p. 73). That is, like Fisher’s sex ratio argument, The Hardy-
Weinberg Law is mathematical truth.  
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That these models are mathematically true has led some to argue that 
they cannot be laws. According to proponents of this view, such models are 
empty insofar as they are tautologies and, as such, they lack the empirical 
quality often seen necessary in scientific laws. As Sober notes, “If we use the 
term ‘tautology’ sufficiently loosely (so that it encompasses mathematical 
truths), then many of the generalizations in evolutionary theory are 
tautologies” (2000, p. 73). This, he states, presents us with a difference between 
physics and biology: laws in physics tend to be empirical, but the kinds of 
generalisations found in evolutionary theory are not; they are mathematical 
truths (p. 73).  
 
Table 3: The Hardy-Weinberg Law 
   
Mother 
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However, there is reason to reject the idea that mathematical truths 
cannot be laws. As Sober argues, just because something is a tautology does 
not mean that it is empty or obvious. Regarding Fisher, for instance, Sober 
states, “[p]erhaps Fisher’s sex ratio argument, construed as an if/then 
statement, is a mathematical truth. Even so, it is very far from being trivial. 
And it was not obvious until Fisher stated the argument”  (2000, p. 74; see also 
1984, ch. 2).  
 Elgin (2003) has similarly argued that there can be a priori laws on the 
basis that, in regards to explanation and prediction, a priori laws in biology 
function in the same way as empirical laws in the physical sciences. Given this, 
he suggests that there is reason to doubt whether the empirical element found 
in physical generalisations are, indeed, what gives them their status as a law—
thus, the empirical requirement for laws in science is problematic.  
 Another way in which French (2014) has argued that we can respond 
to Beatty’s Evolutionary Contingency Thesis is to accept its conclusion (i.e., 
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that there are no necessary laws in biology) but to argue that this doesn’t then 
conclude that biological phenomena are purely contingent. This view is 
forwarded by Mitchell (2000, see also 2003, ch. 5.2), who takes the lack of 
“ideal laws” in the special sciences to present philosophers with an interesting 
problem. She writes: 
 
The working biologist or chemist or social scientist makes do with 
knowledge claims that fall short of the philosopher’s ideal. The 
appropriate response, I argue, is not to impugn biology, chemistry, and 
the social sciences for failing to deliver the philosophically valued 
goods. Rather, this “failure” invites the philosopher to explore just how 
it is that we manage to explain, predict, and intervene on the basis of 
these “lesser” variants of lawful relations. How universal, 
exceptionalness, necessarily true generalizations explain, predict, and 
allow successful intervention is a relatively simple matter compared 
with how “lesser” variants actually used in these sciences manage to perform 
those same functions (Mitchell 2000, p. 249, emphasis in original). 
 
The task that Mitchell presents philosophers of science is to uncover how the 
special sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, and the social sciences) can still find 
success despite lacking the ideal laws found in the physical sciences.  
One hindrance to pursuing Mitchell’s task is conceptualising a strict 
dichotomy between the necessity and contingency found in science. Dividing 
the world in this way is something that she argues Beatty is responsible for 
doing in the Evolutionary Contingency Thesis: 
 
The dichotomous opposition between natural contingency and natural 
necessity in Beatty’s discussion can be interpreted as a product of 
framing natural relations in logical terms. Logical necessity and 
contingency are indeed dichotomous alternatives. Yet imposing that 
feature onto the natural relations discovered by sciences limits what 




The problem with positions like the Evolutionary Contingency Thesis is that 
they carry the strict necessity/contingency dichotomy found in logic and carry 
that relationship over to explanations in our world. This is problematic in that, 
as Mitchell points out, scientific laws describe the world in which we live; they 
don’t describe a world that is logically necessary (Mitchell 2000, p. 251). Our 
world is messy, and the generalisations uncovered by the sciences may not fall 
so neatly into such course-grained frameworks.  
 Luckily, Mitchell provides us with a better framework, one which she 
refers to as the ‘Continuum of Contingency.’ This continuum lies between two 
extremes: “ideal laws” on one end and “accidental generalisations” on the 
other. On this continuum, we can place scientific theories based on their 
strength and stability. A similar move has been made by Dorato (2011), who 
argues that there are laws in biology and that these laws differ from physical 
laws in their degree (rather than kind) of stability, contingency, and resilience. In 
this regard, French (2014) notes: 
 
Such claims clearly mesh nicely with, and can be pressed into the 
service of, OSR, with ‘resilience’ equated with ‘stability’ and biological 
regularities regarded as features of the (evolutionary contingent) 
biological structures of the world. It is this latter aspect that accounts 
for the (relative) resilience/stability and the way that aspect of their 
nature can explain why certain biological facts obtain (2014, p. 332). 
 
 Even with the received view being that there are no laws in biology, 
there is reason to be optimistic that we can find laws or law-like generalisations 
in biology from which the structuralist can derive their ontologies. One reason 
to be optimistic is the existence of biological laws in the form of mathematical 
truths. If this is the route the structuralist decides to venture, they can use such 
models (e.g., Fisher’s model) to derive their ontological commitments. If, 
however, we don’t take such truths to be laws, the structuralist can still work 
within a continuum of contingency or stability, where we take biological laws 
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to be less modally resilient than those found in the physical sciences, but more 
resilient than the accidental generalisations of which they are commonly 
described.  
 
6.3. Eliminating biological objects 
I suggest we eliminate biological objects as metaphysically robust entities. 
Instead, we ought to take terms like “organism”, “species”, etc. as playing a 
heuristic role determined by which relevant biological structures we are 
interested in at the time. What these biological structures may turn out to be is 
the subject of this section.  
To that point, and to make discussion simpler and more streamlined, 
some distinctions are needed. I will argue that biological entities do not exist in 
a metaphysically robust sense. By this, I mean that biological entities are 
nothing more than mind-independent biological structures that, for purposes 
of their instrumental use, we conceptualise (or compose) as an object—a 
“node” that stands in relation to other nodes in our biological theories. Let’s 
call such a composition thin, or n-composition. The resulting heuristic “nodal” 
entity is likewise understood in a thin sense (or an n-entity). N-entities are not 
ontologically fundamental and thus do not belong in our ontology.44 
A thick composition would answer the composition and special 
composition problem in the traditional metaphysical sense (as discussed in the 
thesis introduction). In these cases, the resultant thick entity is understood as a 
robust metaphysical entity worthy of being a part of our ontology. I will refer 
to composition of this sort as k-composition and the resultant (metaphysically 
robust) entity as a k-entity. 
Once these distinctions are made, the position of this chapter can be 
understood thus: in biology, there is no reason to refer to k-composition or k-
entities, but only refer to n-composition and n-entities. Because of this, 
organisms are n-entities, and any talk about what composes or constitutes an 
 
44 Of course, one may hold the view that we ought to include non-fundamental things in our 




organism can be understood in terms of n-composition. In this way, taking 
OSR as a metaphysical position in biology allows the philosopher of biology a 
response to Olson’s (2021) existential problem of biological individuality by 
denying the k-composition underlying the problem. Olson wants to know under 
which circumstances there exist objects (what I call k-entities) called 
“organisms,” and the structuralist can respond, “there are no circumstances in 
which this occurs!” However, the structuralist does have n-entities called 
“organisms”, which are n-composed in virtue of their modally resilient structural 
relations. What these relations could be is the topic of this section.  
  Now let’s turn to the present concern: organisms. Recall Eddington’s 
two tables (see Eddington 1928, pp. xi-xii): table 1 is the table of our everyday 
experience—our substantial table. Table 2 is our scientific table—our table that 
is mostly empty space. Which table is more analogous to organisms isn’t clear, 
which may be part of the miscommunication between the metaphysicians and 
philosophers of science. On the one hand, there is obvious observability to (at 
the very least) ‘folk’ organisms such that we can refer to, and track, them in a 
way that seems to differ from the way that we track unobservable entities such 
as electrons. On the other hand, we have seen in the previous chapter that 
there is an important (and unavoidable) conceptual problem with how 
scientists refer to and define “organism” such that they can be referred to 
correctly.  
This problem can be seen as an example of  ‘the structural realists 
dilemma,’ a broader concern about structuralism that Chang (2012) posits. 
According to Chang, on the first horn, we identify the structure as something 
that is observable; however, this renders structuralism as just a form of 
empiricism. On the other horn, we take the preservation of structure as 
something wilfully done, in which case we are not justified in taking the 
structure to be an element of external reality (p. 245). I’ve suggested above why 
the preservation of structure in biology need not be seen as something that is 
wilfully done (i.e., the preservation is maintained by the modal resilience of the 
biological models). In what follows, I will argue that the structure in biology is 
not only empirical but that it is also conceptual. As such, the elimination of 
biological entities (in this case, organisms) needs to be handled with care.  
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 Here we can make use of Ludwig’s (2014) model of gradual ontological 
elimination. According to Ludwig, there are two types of ontological 
elimination of entities that occur in the sciences: elimination through redescription 
and elimination through failed reference (also referred to as the phlogiston model). In 
elimination through redescription, the concept postulated by theory T is too broad. 
As such, it is eliminated in favour of a more fine-grained, and therefore useful, 
taxonomy. This occurs even though there is no flawed empirical assumptions 
about the entity (p. 72). Elimination through failed reference occurs when an entity is 
eliminated because everything that a particular theory T assumed about it 
turned out to be wrong (p. 72).  
Ludwig argues that it’s misleading to see these types of elimination as 
dichotomous and that we should take each type as representing an idealized 
form that marks the ends of a spectrum of ontological elimination (2014, p. 
72). A positive aspect of looking at elimination in this way is that it doesn’t 
have to appeal to substantive accounts of reference (p. 73):  
 
On the one hand (and towards the phlogiston-end of the spectrum), 
elimination controversies are due to different empirical assumptions 
[…] on the other hand, (and towards the redescription-end of the 
spectrum), elimination controversies are motivated by different 
conceptual choices (Ludwig 2014, pp. 73-74).  
 
As such, using Ludwig’s model, we can make sense of criticisms that occur in 
elimination controversies that target both empirical assumptions as well as 
conceptual choices without having to worry about whether or not the terms 
being considered for elimination succeed or fail to refer (pp. 73-74). By 
eliminating organisms as entities in biology and instead focusing on biological 
structures, we can better understand the concepts, as well as the role they play 
in biological discourse. In this sense, the n-entities referred to aren’t merely 
observable phenomena but are determined by which concept (i.e., heuristic) we 
are using at the time. 
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 French (2014) has already discussed how OSR can be applied to 
biological individuals by the example of ‘metagenomics,’ a stance taken by 
Dupré and O'Malley (2007). This stance in biological research takes focus away 
from individual genomes to large amounts of DNA. This shift in focus from 
genomes to metagenomes led to a recognition that biological individuality is 
more complicated than the standard one-genome-per-customer account has 
suggested. As Dupré describes:  
 
[…] metagenomes are communal resources that the entity to which the 
resource is available is coordinated, developing, multifunctional, 
multicellular organisms composed of large numbers of cells of different 
varieties and capabilities, able to work in ways in which the collectivity 
regulates the function of individuals. Individual organisms, from this 
viewpoint, are an abstraction from a much more fundamental entity (Dupré and 
O'Malley 2007, p. 841, my emphasis).   
 
Given that metagenomics gives us a view of individual organisms as 
abstractions, there is an obvious question as to how we are meant to 
conceptualise an ontology of biological entities. One way of doing this is to 
adopt Dupré’s promiscuous realism, a form of pluralism that takes there to be 
“countless, legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying objects in the 
world. And these may often cross-classify one another in indefinitely complex 
ways” (Dupré 1993, p. 18). Of course, adopting “promiscuous realism” would 
also force one to adopt a very robust ontology (one filled with countless 
biological objects, at least), which may be something a metaphysician would 
want to avoid.   
The structuralist need not fret over metagenomics and the unintuitive 
conception of individuality that it forces us to take seriously. As French points 
out, the structuralist wouldn’t have to adopt promiscuous realism (and thus all of 
the countless biological objects that come along with it), stating:  
 
From this perspective, there are no biological objects (as metaphysically robust 
entities). All there is are biological structures, interrelated in various ways 
and causally informed. Putative objects, such as genes, individual 
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organisms, and so forth, can then be seen as emergent entities, or as 
dependent upon the appropriate structures, where the notions of 
emergence and dependence here will be both informed by the relevant 
biology and framed in terms of an appropriate metaphysics […] Thus 
there is no need for Promiscuous Realism since we can adapt a 
(dynamical) form of structuralism which will allow us to be realist about 
the relevant biological structures, without being ontologically pluralist 
about the entities (French 2014, p. 345). 
 
 I won’t go into much more detail regarding structuralist accounts of 
metagenomics. I only refer to this example not only because it provides us with 
a brief view of an already established example of OSR being applied to 
biological individuality, but to highlight the ability that adopting OSR in 
biology affords us: the ability to conceptualise biological individuals (n-entities) 
in a variety of different, objectively grounded ways without adding the 
ontological baggage that usually comes along for the ride. We do this by being 
realists about the biological structures rather than the entities (k-entities).  
 The structuralist can also make sense of various conceptions of larger-
scale biological organisms (e.g., Homo sapiens) in a similar way to large-scale 
objects (e.g., Eddington’s tables). To do this, however, the structuralist has to 
be specific about what organism concept they are using so that they know 
which biological structures are relevant. To narrow down the different 
conceptions of organismality, let us first look at a form of pluralism used to 
redescribe species into more specific terms. 
Eliminative pluralism was initially suggested by Ereshefsky (1992) as a 
new form of species pluralism. He notes that despite the fundamental role the 
species category has in biology, a proper definition has not been agreed upon, 
and no less than eight prominent definitions being used in the literature (p. 
671). Two responses to the diversity of species definitions have been taken: 
species monism and species pluralism. Species monists argue that the debate 
over the correct definition is unfinished and must continue until the proper 
definition is found. Species pluralists argue that the species category is 
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heterogeneous—that there is no common attribute shared by all species taxa 
(p. 672).  
Ereshefsky defends species pluralism, noting that many of the 
proposed definitions for species fall within three general approaches: 
interbreeding, which sees species as “the most extensive group of organisms that 
interbreed and produce fertile offspring” (p. 672); ecological, which see species as 
lineages that occupy the same adaptive zone or niche (p. 673); and phylogenetic, 
which see species as basal monophyletic taxa (p. 674), meaning that a species 
must be a taxonomic group that contains all and only the descendants of a 
common ancestor (p. 673). All three of these approaches assume species are 
lineages, however, they provide taxonomies that are incompatible (p. 674). 
That is, they can (and do) classify the same organisms into different lineage (p. 
675).  
Whereas a species monist would argue that one type of lineage is more 
important for understanding the course of evolution (thus being the one 
lineage we can properly call ‘species’), Ereshefsky argues that this is a mistake 
in that it leaves out important and insightful information afforded by the other 
lineages, stating: 
 
A proper systematic study of life requires each of these taxonomies. 
Consider the sorts of theoretically important information each 
taxonomy offers. A taxonomy of monophyletic taxa provides a 
framework for examining genealogy. A taxonomy of interbreeding 
units offers a framework for examining the effect of sex on evolution. 
And a taxonomy of ecological units provides a structure for observing 
the effect of environmental selection forces. A systematic study that 
considers just one of these taxonomies provides an overly coarse-
grained picture of evolution (1992, p. 678). 
 
He goes on to use the importance of the different taxonomies to formulate 




Instead of referring to basal lineages as "species", biologists should 
categorize those lineages by the criteria used to segment them: 
interbreeding units, monophyletic units, and ecological units. The term 
"species" is superfluous beyond the reference to a segmentation 
criterion; and when the term is used alone it leads to confusion. The 
term "species" has outlived its usefulness and should be replaced by 
terms that more accurately describe the different types of lineages that 
biologists refer to as ‘species’ (p. 680).  
 
Ereshefsky suggests we use the terms “biospecies”, “ecospecies”, and 
“phylospecies” to refer to lineages picked out by the interbreeding, ecological, 
and phylogenetic approaches. Replacing the broader term “species” with these 
terms—terms that are more accurate—aids the goal of communication in 
systematics (pp. 680-81).  
So what Ereshefsky is doing here is arguing that species must be 
eliminated because the concept “species” isn’t helpful, except for (perhaps) 
being an umbrella term for three different and incompatible taxa. It’s 
important to note here that, to Ereshefsky, this form of pluralism isn’t just 
epistemic; it’s ontological. That is, evolutionary forces have produced these 
three different types of basal lineages, and these basal lineages cross-classify the 
organic world (p. 679).  
My suggestion for the problem of the organism concept is to do just 
this. Instead of offering different definitions to explain a single kind of thing, I 
suggest we eliminate the organism concept in favour of separate and more 
accurate categories (i.e., concepts/heuristics) of biological individuality (thus 
eliminating the “organism” concept falls closer to the elimination by redescription 
side of Ludwig’s scale). 
A move like this has already been made by Wilson (1999), which I 
described in more detail in the previous chapter. Recall that Wilson 
distinguishes six concepts of biological individuality (p. 60):  
 
1. A particular 
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2. A historical entity 
3. A functional individual 
4. A genetic individual 
5. A developmental individual 
6. A unit of evolution 
 
Each of these concepts, Wilson argues, is important to biology and philosophy 
of biology. 
 Wilson adopts Dennett’s (1991b) conception of “real patterns” to form 
of view of natural kinds that are patterns in nature (Wilson 1999, p. 42). A 
“pattern” is to be understood as anything that can be a candidate for 
recognised as a pattern (Dennett 1991b, p. 32). What’s interesting here is how 
Wilson goes about constructing his view of natural kinds-as-real-patterns, he 
writes,  
 
[t]he existence of a pattern in a phenomenon does not preclude the 
existence of another pattern in the same phenomenon, even if each of 
these patterns is the basis of a natural kind. The same parts can 
compose more than one object simultaneously (1999, p. 47) 
 
Wilson argues that a pattern-based view of natural kinds makes it permissible 
to have a pluralistic ontology of overlapping natural kinds within the same 
phenomena. By formulating natural kinds in this way, he believes he is able to 
identify individuals in terms of substantial kinds (p. 47).  
However, Wilson’s ontology leads him to some conclusions that I find 
unpalatable, especially given the alternative I’ll discuss in a moment. First, 
given that Wilson’s ontology concludes that the same group of material can 
constitute different objects at the same time, he ends up with a rich ontology 
(p. 47). Second, because this group of material constitutes different substantial 
kinds, the material itself cannot constitute identity because the overlapping 
kinds of individuals will have different persistence conditions (pp. 46-47). 
Furthermore, Wilson later admits that the kind functional individual is 
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problematic in that it is often held to varying degrees, making it difficult to 
demarcate organism from non-organism (Wilson 2000, p. S302). 
The problems that Wilson faces with his pluralistic ontology can be 
avoided by adopting OSR and then eliminating biological individuals 
(ontologically as well as conceptually) via elimination by redescription to hone in on 
the relevant, finer-grained, biological concepts. Similar to French’s response to 
the metagenomics example, adopting OSR to Wilson’s pluralism would allow 
us to avoid the robust ontology whilst being a realist about the biological 
structures underlying the various conceptions of individuality. Similarly, the 
identity problem caused by Wilson’s ontology is eliminated, given that the 
overlapping structures are not seated in any object or material. “Identity” in 
this case would be understood in terms of whichever heuristic, or n-entity, that 
is being referred to.  
Lastly, in regards to the vagueness problem posed by Wilson’s functional 
individual, recall from the previous chapter that a functional individual is, to 
Wilson, something that begins to exist when either:  
  
1. Among single-celled entities, a free-living cell is produced. 
2. A number of cells are caught up in a developmental process that 
causally integrates them.  
3. Higher-level entities (organisms) are themselves combined in a way 
that causally integrates them, as in, for example, grafts or parasitism 
(Wilson 1999, p. 99) 
 
However, given these conditions, it’s unsurprising that the limits of functional 
individuals are vague. As we mentioned above, work in metagenomics suggests 
that biological individuals are actually abstractions of a complex and integrated 
whole, some of the entities of which form in different genetic lineages. As 




[c]ontrary to the idea that is fundamental to the one genome one 
organism idea, the biological entities that form reproducing and 
evolving lineages are not the same as the entities that function as 
wholes in wider biological contexts. Functional biological wholes, the entities 
that we primarily think of as organisms, are in fact cooperating assemblies of a wide 
variety of lineage-forming entities (2010, p. 28, my emphasis). 
 
The vagueness problem only seems to occur because Wilson identifies 
the individual with a substantial kind that overlaps with other individuals 
identified with other substantial kinds. All of this is constituted by the same 
group of material. As such, whenever the persistence of one functional aspect 
of the individual ceases, there is going to be vagueness as to whether that 
functional aspect is a part of a larger functional individual or not. By adopting 
OSR, Wilson would be able to avoid this vagueness by eliminating objects and 
focusing on the specific biological structure underlying the specific biological 
function. As such, vagueness in biology can either be seen as:  
 
(1) Vagueness in the relevant level of structure, not vagueness in 
composition and/or functional integration; and/or, 
(2) Vagueness in where to draw our biological heuristics and language 
 
If (1), then the structuralist retains a vagueness problem, but the problem 
differs from the composition problem faced by the existential problem. As such, 
the structuralist can still maintain that there exist no biological objects (thus 
circumventing the existential problem), even though a different problem still 
remains. If (1), the vagueness in biology is metaphysical. If (2), then the existential 
problem is avoided, however a non-metaphysical remains in terms of how we 
deal with vagueness in our biological language and conceptualisation. Thus, 
according to (2), vagueness in biology is not metaphysical but is linguistic and 
conceptual. That (2) is true seems likely to me.  
 
6.4. Objection and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I’ve argued that shifting OSR to a biological context would 
allow us to negatively respond to the existential problem of biological 
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individuality posed by Olson (2021). We do this by being realists about the 
structures in biology that are understood in terms of the relations between the 
properties found in our biological laws/models. Given that the structuralist 
does not take the resulting biological heuristics (which I’ve referred to as n-
entities) to not constitute metaphysically robust entities (which I’ve referred to 
as k-entities), there are not biological objects. As such, the structuralist response 
to Olson is that there is no condition such that there exists a biological object.  
 I’ve encountered two objections that seem to hone in on the same 
discomfort with my conclusion: the first is that OSR as a metaphysical theory 
is too radical, and the second objection is that we cannot even begin to make 
sense of the elimination of biological objects. I don’t understand the reasoning 
for these concerns. Ladyman and Ross (2007) have claimed that, “[…] it is far 
from clear that OSR’s rivals are ‘worked out’ in any sense that OSR isn’t. There 
in [sic] no general agreement among philosophers that any of the metaphysical 
theories of, say, universals is adequate” (p. 155). Even if Ladyman and Ross are 
unjustified this claim, it’s still the case that there is precedent for eliminativist 
ontologies to be a part of our metaphysical discourse. As I’ve mentioned in 
chapter 1, van Inwagen (1990) eliminates all objects except those that are 
living, and (as will be discussed later, in chapter 7) some animalists have 
adopted the view to make sense of organismal death (referred to as ‘corpse 
eliminativism’). Unger (1979b) has also argued against the existence of ordinary 
objects. More recently, Benovsky (2019) has not only argued in favour of the 
elimination of ordinary objects (as well as persons) but also develops a method 
for eliminativism. In terms of biological ontology, Dupré and O'Malley (2007) 
suggest moving away from entity-oriented ontologies to process-oriented 
ontologies.  
All of this isn’t to say that there aren’t legitimate concerns with OSR in 
general (or when the position is applied to each scientific or non-scientific 
discipline). It just suggests that OSR, as a metaphysical framework, is not as 
radical as it is sometimes claimed. In fact, further work in OSR, as well as other 









In this chapter, I will shift attention away from how OSR can help us 
understand the role organisms play in biology to how OSR can help us 
understand the role organisms play in personal identity. As I mentioned earlier, 
the two aims of this thesis were to offer a naturalised critique of animalism as 
well as lay the groundwork for a new form of animalism that is fostered by a 
non-substantial ontology. Throughout the project, I’ve focused on my first aim 
by directing several criticisms towards what I have been calling traditional 
animalism. Most of these have stemmed from a traditional metaphysics and an 
underappreciation of the complexities and unintuitive conclusions that can be 
found in biology and philosophy. In the previous chapter, I began fleshing out 
the details of my second aim—to lay the groundwork for an animalism that is 
not understood in terms of substance but rather in structure. In this and the 
following chapter, I will take the structures that I argued could be used to 
make sense of biological individuality and show that they can be used to solve 
and/or absolve some of the criticisms that animalism has faced.  
Structural animalism is the view that we are identical with animals—with 
biological individuals—but that such individuals are nothing above and beyond 
modally resilient structural nodes that are used as heuristic devices to better 
understand our identity. To this end, I will circle back to some of the 
arguments for and objections to animalism that I have mentioned throughout 
this thesis and see how a structural animalist might respond to them in a way 
that a traditional animalist cannot. In the next section, I will show several 
unrecognised consequences that occur when the ‘same-life criterion’ of 
organismal identity. These consequences—including an animalist version of 
the Foetus Problem—go against pre-established positions that many animalists 
already hold, but by using OSR as a framework, we can avoid them. After this, 
in section 5.2, I will shine some light on is the AAA, which has received little 
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attention after some well-placed criticism. I will then show that OSR allows us 
to accept much of the criticism forwarded to the AAA whilst also accepting 
the arguments main conclusions. In section 5.3, I will look at the ‘Thinking 
Animals’ and ‘Thinking Parts’ problems with animalism and show that they 
miss an important aspect of the structures of organisms. Lastly, in section 5.4, I 
will take a look at dicephalic cases and show how, when focusing on structure 
rather than substance, these cases pose no problem to animalism. 
 
7.1. The same life criterion and animalism’s Foetus Problem 
In chapter 1, I set out several questions that can be asked about identity and 
what question animalism answers. Animalism answers the question, “what kind 
of thing are we?” Another question that I discussed was the persistence question 
(i.e., “what does it takes for the kind of thing we are to persist through time?”). 
It’s important to note the difference between these two questions because 
answering one does not necessarily entail a particular answer of the other.  
 Animalists respond to the question “what kind of thing are we?” by 
stating that we are biological organisms. This answer does not tell us what it 
takes for animals to exist over time—it does not answer the persistence question. 
This doesn’t mean that there aren’t proposed answers, however, and the 
favoured response by animalists has already been mentioned in chapter 1. The 
animalist’s response to the persistence question happens to be one of the few 
things on which animalists agree with Locke concerning our identity.  
 Recall from chapter 1 that Locke believed the persistence of organisms 
depend on their partaking of the same life (1690 [1975], II.xxvii.6). That is, a 
particular organism x at T1 and an organism y at T2, x=y insofar as x and y 
partake in the same continued life. Partaking in the same life must be the 
persistence condition of organisms, Locke believed, because organisms are 
constantly going through a change of matter, yet they persist through time 
regardless of this (1690 [1975], II.xxvii.6) (compare this to Locke’s belief that 
non-living objects, or “masses of matter”, do not persist through time if the 
matter composing the object changes (1690 [1975], II.xxvii.3)).  
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Most animalists agree with Locke when it concerns the persistence 
conditions of organisms (and thus, the persistence conditions of us, if you are 
an animalist):  
 
On the Biological Approach, what it takes for us to survive remains the 
same throughout our careers: like other animals, we persist as long as 
our life-sustaining functions remain intact. One survives, at any point in 
one’s career, just in case one’s circulation, respiration, metabolism, and 
the like continue to function, or as long as those activities have not 
irreversibly come to a halt, or as long as one’s capacity to direct and 
regulate those functions is not destroyed (Olson 1997a, p. 89) 
 
The majority of animalists, following Locke, argue that organisms persist 
through time insofar as they share the same life. More specifically, as Olson 
suggests, organisms persist through time insofar as their circulation, 
respiration, metabolism, etc., continue to function. We can call this criterion of 
organismal persistence the same life criterion. Proponents of the same life 
criterion have been referred to as organic animalists (Blatti 2014, sect. 1.2). 
Those that object to the same life criterion, favouring the view that life is not 
necessary for organismal persistence, have been referred to as somatic animalists 
(Blatti 2014, sect. 1.2). We will discuss the intricacies of these two positions in 
the next chapter. What is relevant for the current discussion is that the majority 
of animalists are organic animalists—they are proponents of the same life 
criterion.  
  One may now ask what it means for an organism to partake in the 
“same life”. What exactly does the organic animalist mean by “life”? Based on 
the above quote by Olson, it appears “life” has something to do with certain 
functional properties, or dispositions, of an organism (such as respiration, 
circulation, and metabolism). These are only examples of what might compose 
a “life”, however. To better understand why functions such as respiration, 
circulation, and metabolism compose a “life”, we have to understand what it is 
188 
 
about these kinds of functions that are important. For instance, Olson 
describes life as:   
 
 [. . .] a sort of storm of particles in constant motion. (Storms too are 
events: they are extended in time, begin and end, have earlier and later 
parts.) A life draws in new particles and energy from its surroundings, 
imposes its characteristic form of activity on those particles, and later 
expels them. But unlike meteorological storms, lives are self-directing, or 
self-organising. Their activities are constrained by elaborate internal 
controls (Olson 1997a, p. 136) 
 
This self-directing/self-organising property of lives has two results, according 
to Olson. The first is that life can retain a certain form and structure for long 
periods of time, regardless of the rate of matter flowing through it (pp. 136-
137). The second result is that lives are well-individuated events, “there is 
usually a definite answer to the question of whether a given particle is or is not 
caught up in a particular life” (p. 137).  
The second result that lives are well-individuated events is an 
interesting one (and one that I will argue against in the next section). But this 
result is important for the organic animalist in that it affords them the ability to 
do something with lives that would be considerably more difficult to do 
without: count them. Olson writes:  
 
Lives are easy to count: in most cases there is a clear difference 
between a situation that contains one life and a situation that contains 
two. That is because of the nature of the activities that a life enforces 
upon the particles caught up in it [. . .] When a life draws a molecule 
into itself, it breaks that molecule into smaller pieces and reassembles 
them according to its needs. After extracting such chemical energy 
from them as it can, it expels their remains in a less ordered form. 
Thus, a particle cannot participate in two lives at once, any more than 
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one can serve in two armies at once; and two lives cannot overlap. 
(1997a, pp. 137).  
 
Given that a particle is drawn in, broken down, used, and expelled in a 
particular way, and according to the needs of the life that drew it in, Olson 
argues that such a particle cannot participate in two separate lives at the same 
time—two lives cannot overlap (at least insofar as two lives are not compatible 
in the right way). There is a caveat here, however, in that Olson does claim that 
two lives can overlap if one of them is subordinate to the other (1997a, p. 137). 
This last point will be explicated in more detail later on, but for the moment, 
what is important is what Olson understands a “life” to be.  
 “Life” according to the organic animalist can be described thusly: a 
“life” is a self-directing, well-individuated event that functions such that it 
allows itself to remain in a particular shape and structure for long periods of 
time despite the constant flux of material flowing through it. Examples of this 
kind of event organic animalists refer to (e.g., those that are self-directing and 
well-individuated) include respiration, circulation, and metabolism.  
 For the time being, whenever I refer to “life”, I am referring to the 
above definition (the one that appears to be the one used by organic 
animalists). I will offer a criticism of this definition later on by comparing it to 
the metabolic definition of individuality presented in the previous chapter. 
Prior to that argument, I want to show that there are internal conflicts created 
between the organic animalists’ definition of life and at two assumptions that 
animalists have made: their position regarding our once being foetuses and the 
view that we are not functional kinds. At the end of this section, I will show 
how these issues only arise if we accept a substance ontology and how a 
structural ontology can avoid them.  
 Let’s start with the animalist assumption that we—that is, all human 
animals—were once foetuses. In chapter 1, I explained that an argument in 
favour of animalism was the Foetus Problem Argument. As the argument goes, 
if we accept that we are essentially persons (and not animals), then no human 
person was ever a foetus. This must be the case, the animalist argues, because 
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no foetus is a person, and if we are essentially persons, then we couldn’t be 
something that is a person. This causes a Foetus Problem for mentalists, in 
that anyone holding the position must either accept the counter-intuitive 
conclusion that no human person was ever a foetus or else find a way to 
reconcile person-essentialism with our being foetuses. Animalism doesn’t have 
a Foetus Problem, and thus it seems to be a better position regarding what we 
are. 
Why doesn’t animalism have a Foetus Problem? Olson (1997a) has 
considered the possibility but ultimately argues against it. One could hold, he 
suggests, the following premises (see 1997a, p. 92):  
 
P2.1: I am a living organism throughout my career 
P2.2: a multicellular zygote does not seem to be an organism 
P2.3: a multicellular organism does not exist until about two weeks 
after fertilisation when the cells that develop the foetus become 
specialised  
 
Those that might argue that animalism has a Foetus Problem suggest that these 
premises lead to the conclusion that no human animal was ever a zygote 
(Olson 1997a, p. 92). This follows from premises 1 and 2. Two possibilities 
emerge from this conclusion: either the zygote ceases to exist and is replaced 
by the animal—a numerically different being—or the zygote continues to exist, 
and shares its space and matter with the numerically different animal (p. 92).  
The problem with the argument, Olson argues, is that “we need not 
suppose that there is any one persisting object, be it an organism or anything 
else, that is first a fertilized ovum composed of a single cell, and later consists 
of two cells, then four, and so forth” (Olson 1997a, p. 93). By this, he means 
that we can easily accept that the zygote ceases to exist and is replaced by the 
animal that we are. This is analogous to an amoeba that separates into two 
separate cells. As Olson notes, the amoeba doesn’t continue to exist as two 
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spatially divided entities, but rather the original amoeba ceases to exist and is 
replaced by two different cells (p. 93).  
Still, Olson entertains, a person may argue that given P2.1 (i.e., “I am a 
living organism throughout my career”), we ought to expect the multicellular 
zygote to persist from the zygote to an embryo, then a foetus, etc. based on the 
fact that these things are linked by a continuous process of growth and 
development, “[a] living thing, organism or not, doesn’t cease to exist simply 
by growing and developing in its characteristic way” (1997a, p. 93).  
 The problem with this argument, according to Olson, is that it assumes 
that there is a single process of growth and development that the multicellular 
zygote, embryo, foetus, etc., go through. This doesn’t seem to be the case, 
however. Each daughter cell of the fertilised ovum develop in complete 
independence from one another, “that is why embryologists deny that the 
ovum becomes a two-celled organism when it divides” (Olson 1997a, p. 93).  
Despite Olson’s arguments to the contrary, I submit that there is a 
Foetus Problem for the organic animalist. There is one relationship that Olson 
does not engage with concerning the developing foetus: the relationship 
between the foetus and its mother. One may reasonably ask when life begins 
for the foetus. Or, more appropriately, when does a foetus begin its own life, 
independent of its mother. It’s unclear to me whether or not the foetus and 
mother share a single life at any given point in the relationship or not. To show 
this, let’s examine some possible mother/foetus relationships.  
One relationship that the mother and foetus may have to one another 
would be that they maintain two individual lives throughout the entire 
developmental process of the foetus. On this view, the foetus begins its life 
whilst being inside the mother, and it continues to maintain its own life after 
birth. This is, perhaps, a consequence of Olson’s view that two lives can 
overlap insofar as one of the lives is subordinate to the other. He writes:  
 
Each of your cells has a life of its own, with an internal plan and a well-
defined boundary. The life of an individual cell can be a part of the life 
of a multicellular organism because the demands that those two lives 
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impose are compatible. You can serve in two armies at once if one of 
them is a division of the other (1997a, pp. 137).  
 
In the same way that a single cell’s life can overlap with a human animal’s life 
on the basis that the single cell’s life is subordinate to the human animals’, so 
to can the foetus’ life overlap with the life of the mother on the basis that the 
foetus’ life is subordinate to the mothers.  
A problem with this option is that it seems to tacitly take a foetus to be 
a part of its mother (an option we will examine in a moment, but one to which 
animalists tend to object.) A single cell’s life can overlap with an animal’s life 
because the single cell is a part of the animal. This is one way to interpret an 
entity overlapping another.  
A different interpretation of “overlap” and “subordination” could be 
that one entity merely relies on, or is dependent on, another. If this is the 
interpretation that we are meant to use, then it seems like a foetus, although 
perhaps not a part of its mother, is at least dependent on her for certain 
resources by which it can continue to grow and develop. If this is the 
relationship between the mother and foetus, then we have to figure out how to 
individuate the process of growth and development. How to do so is unclear. 
Olson suggests that a multicellular zygote is partaking in a different process of 
growth and development than an embryo and foetus. Could a foetus, by this 
reasoning, be partaking in a different process of growth and development than 
a child? If so, then the reason to believe no human person was ever a 
multicellular zygote must apply to embryos and foetuses—meaning that no 
human person was ever either of these things. That is, the argument Olson 
gives for our never being a multicellular zygote is that the process of growth 
and development of a zygote is different than that of an embryo and foetus 
(which, it is assumed, is the same as a child). But, if the process of growth and 
development is, in fact, different between the embryo/foetus and the child, 




Another possible mother/foetus relation is to embrace the idea that the 
mother/foetus partake in a single life. After the birth of the foetus, this view 
maintains, there is a substantial change from foetus to baby, at which point the 
baby gains and maintains its own life—a life distinct from the one that it had 
when it was a part of its mother. A similar view to this has been forwarded by 
Kingma (2018), who applies a substance ontological framework to the 
relationship between a foetus and mother during pregnancy.45 In doing this, 
she argues that foetuses (which she refers to as ‘fosters’) are parts of their 
mother (which she refers to as ‘gravida’). She writes: 
 
“[. . .] birth is a substantial change: at birth fosters cease to be and a 
new substance—baby-organisms—come into existence. And Human 
beings do not begin 16 days after conception but, usually, nearly eight-
and-a-half months later: at birth (Kingma 2018, p. 155-176).  
 
Kingma argues that there are several attractive qualities of this conclusion (i.e., 
that foetuses are a part of the mother and that baby organisms come into 
existence at birth.) First, it makes counting organisms incredibly neat in that it’s 
clear when we have one organism versus two or more: prior to birth, there is a 
single organism with a foetus-part, and after birth, there are (usually) two 
organisms—the mother and the child (Kingma 2018, p. 176).  
Birth being a clear-cut event that marks the coming into existence is an 
attractive quality in its own right. The conclusion that human organisms come 
into existence at birth is also attractive in that it’s consistent with intuitions 
about mammalian organisms being easily demarcated, physically cohesive 
individuals for the duration of their existence (Kingma 2018, p. 176).  
Lastly, Kingma believes that marking birth as a substantial change is an 
attractive quality in that it emphasises and preserves something that other 
views overlook: the important changes that occur at birth. She notes, “[. . .] 
birth is a much more substantial event than a mere change of environment, 
 
45 See also, Kingma (2019) for an argument based on biological considerations. 
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and fosters are not simply ‘babies in tummy’s’; there are many differences 
(internal, structural, functional, relational and topological) between fosters and 
babies” (Kingma 2018, p. 176).  
On the other hand, the view that human organisms come into existence at 
birth seems intuitively odd. Not only does such a view imply that no human 
organism was ever a foetus, but that no foetus ever survives to become an 
organism (Kingma 2018, p. 177). Both of these conclusions follow from the 
substantial change that takes place at birth. Prior to birth, there is a foetus 
(taken here to be a part of a mother), and at the moment of birth, a substantial 
change takes place, and a numerically distinct entity comes into existence—a 
baby organism.  
This result is acknowledged by Kingma, who goes on to suggest that 
our metaphysics be revised to avoid it and thus capture the phenomena that we 
seem to want to track: the thing that appears to persist prior to and after birth 
(2018, p. 179). This leads us to our third option for the mother/foetus 
relationship: that foetuses are a part of the mother but that no substantial 
change takes place during birth. This option has the advantage of a foetus 
being numerically identical to an organism after birth. However, this option 
comes at a cost as our metaphysics of organisms would have to be revised to 
account for organisms having other organisms as parts (i.e., mother-organisms 
having foetus-organisms as parts). Consequently, Kingma notes that some of 
the virtues that came with the traditional view of organisms (that is, that 
organisms could not have other organisms of the same kind as parts) would 
have to be similarly revised (2018, p. 181). 
Secondly, Kingma notes that taking foetuses to be both parts and 
organisms opens the doors to organs (as well as other body parts) potentially 
counting as organisms as well. This is due to some organs having the same, or 
very similar, properties that foetuses do and, as such, it’s unclear why foetuses 
could count as organisms but such organs would not. Kidneys, she points out, 
also undergo change, cease to exists if they do not maintain numerical identity, 
have spatial parts, lack an external boundary, is internally connected, is an 




Lastly, if foetuses are both organisms as well as parts of organisms, 
then the spatial and temporal boundaries of foetuses are unclear as a result of 
there being no complete external boundaries. This results in the added 
complication of when a foetus comes into being (Kingma 2018, pp. 183-184)  
 Taking organisms to be parts of different organisms of the same kind is 
only a problem if we take organisms to be substances. In fact, a structural 
metaphysics can avoid all of the consequences Kingma notes occur when we 
take, for example, foetuses to be parts of their mother. We can avoid these 
problems by re-interpreting the claims about objects (e.g., ‘foetuses’) to claims 
about structures. 
Recall from the previous chapter that structures, unlike substances, can 
co-exist without interfering with one another. In lieu of ‘substantial sortals,’ we 
refer to whichever ‘structural sortal’ (i.e., a sortal which is determined by 
whichever structural heuristic is in play) is relevant to the topic at hand. It’s 
these structural sortals that we use to determine the persistence conditions of 
the heuristic ‘object’ that is relevant at that point. The pragmatic importance of 
understanding parts in this flexible way has been stated nicely by Saunders, 
who writes: 
 
The world is a structure, and it is thought of as such in exact physical, 
interpreted mathematical terms, but how it is to be broken down into 
parts, to be spoken of predicatively, can be a more rough and ready 
affair, sufficient only in the sense of FAPP [For All Practical Purposes], 
to use Bell’s acronym; sufficient linguistically, but only for all practical 
purposes (Saunders 2003, p. 132).  
 
All of this is to say that structuralists can lend themselves to the notion of 
‘parts’ without committing themselves to the composition that metaphysicians 
refer to. Recall the difference I made between what I referred to as K-
composition (i.e., ‘thick’ composition) and N-composition (i.e., ‘thin’ 
composition) in the previous chapter. N-composition refers to a practical way 
of discussing composition in structural terms—a composition that takes place 
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amongst ‘parts’ that are only meant to be understood in practical terms. This 
kind of composition—N-composition—differs from the K-composition that 
metaphysicians typically refer to. Such K-composition is not merely heuristic—
it’s ontological. As such, the sortals that pick out such entities are “in the 
world” in a way that N-composed ‘entities’ are not. 
 Given this distinction between K-composition and N-composition, 
structuralists could take mothers having a foetus as a part to suggest that, at 
some point in time, there is a biological structure (call this structure ‘mother’) 
that, at some point, has a distinct structural node that is worth referring to as a 
distinct thing (call this structural node ‘foetus’). At some point, ‘foetus’ will 
undergo a process where it becomes independent of ‘mother’ and continue 
existing on its own, whilst ‘mother’ will no longer have ‘foetus’ as a part. Given 
that these heuristic devices are referred to when practical considerations arise, 
at no point is it unclear when ‘foetus’ is a part of ‘mother’ and when ‘foetus’ 
begins. ‘Foetus’ is a part of ‘mother’ precisely whenever it’s relevant to refer to 
‘foetus’ as being a part of ‘mother’, and it becomes detached precisely 
whenever it’s relevant to refer to ‘foetus’ being detached (this typically occurs 
at birth).  
 Furthermore, the concern that the distinction between the ‘foetus’ and 
other parts of ‘mother’ (e.g., kidneys) becomes less problematic. The question 
for the structuralist isn’t “how do we prevent other parts of ‘mother’ from 
being organisms once we understand foetuses as organisms?” rather the 
question is “at what point, and under what conditions, is it practical to refer to 
a part of ‘mother’ as an organism in its own right?” 
The same-life criterion of our persistence causes another problem for 
animalists in that it conflicts with the animalist position that we are not 
functional kinds. Olson (1997a) imagines a scenario in which an individual is so 
fascinated by moving objects that she formulates a criterion of identity around 
the ability to move—the locomotive criterion of identity (p. 32). According to the 
locomotive criterion of identity, the ability for an entity to move of its own 
accord is both necessary and sufficient for certain entities to persist through 
time. These entities are referred to as “locomotors” (p. 32).  
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 The locomotive criterion of identity is inadequate as a criterion of 
identity, Olson argues, because the criterion only tells us what such objects do, 
not what they are. That is, “locomotors” are a functional kind, not a substantial 
kind. The difference being that substantial kinds are the only kind of thing that 
tells us what something is, and functional kinds can only tell us about what 
something can do (1997a, p. 34) 
 Olson denies that a Psychological Criterion of identity can tell us 
anything about what it is that is. He argues that like the imagined “locomotor 
criterion”, a psychological criterion of identity merely tells us what something 
can do (i.e., “this thing can think, rationalise, etc.”):  
 
To say that something is a person is to tell us something about what it 
can do, but not to say what it is. To say that something is a person is to 
say that it can think in a certain way—that it is rational, that it is 
ordinary conscious and aware of itself as tracing a path through time 
and space, that it is morally accountable for its actions, or the like. But 
it doesn’t tell us what it is that can think in that way. We might still ask, 
Is the thing that can think a biological organism? An angel? A machine 
made of metal and silicon? What sort of thing is it that has those 
special psychological properties? (Olson 1997a, p. 32)  
 
Like psychological criteria and Olson’s locomotor criterion, I want to 
suggest that the same-life criterion forces us to look at “organism” as a 
functional kind—not a substantial kind. Olson suggests that only substantial 
kinds can answer the question of what it is that does a particular thing. This, he 
argues, is one reason why psychological criteria of identity are inadequate as 
criteria of identity—they fail to tell us what it is that is thinking. But 
“organism” also fails to answer this question when combined with the same 
life-criterion—it fails to tell us what it is that is living. We can question this in 
exactly the same way that Olson questions what it is that is thinking: is the 
thing that is living an angel? A thing made of metal and silicon? What kind of 
thing is it that has those special “living” properties?  
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 If the animalist accepts that organism picks out a functional kind, then 
they have the problem of explaining why “living thing” is a better candidate 
answer for what we are than “psychological thing”. The structural animalist, on 
the other hand, doesn’t have this issue on account of them rejecting any 
ontologically robust “things.” Instead, the structural animalist can refer to 
functions as higher-order relations that certain, lower-level, heuristic objects 
generate. Metabolic processes, for example, can be interpreted as relations (for 
example, relations between chemical reactions) that occur within certain 
biological structures.  
 
7.2. The Animal Ancestors Argument 
In chapter 1, I described the Animal Ancestors Argument (AAA), which shows 
mentalist positions regarding identity must reject evolutionary theory regarding 
human evolution. The argument suggests that given the mentalist picture that 
we are not biological organisms, then the principles by which biological 
organisms evolve must not be applicable to what we are (i.e., if we are not 
human animals, then neither were our parents, their parents, etc. until 
evolutionary theory is no longer applicable for us).  
 When I described that AAA, I mentioned that I take it to point out 
something incredibly important about what we are despite it not really 
motivating much the debate. Here I want to explain why I take the argument 
to be important. To do that, I need to address the criticisms that it has faced.  
 Gillett (2013) has argued against the AAA on the basis that it hinges on 
the key assumption that it is necessary for us to be organisms if we are to be 
the products of evolution. This assumption, he argues, is false given that 
contemporary biologists use evolution to explain the occurrence of non-
organismal entities. The position that we are identical to brains (call this the 
‘Brain View’), for example, is just as consistent with evolutionary theory. Brains 
are particular organs, the existence of which can be explained by evolutionary 
theory. Given that brains are the product of evolutionary theory, and given that 
the Brain View takes us to be identical to brains, proponents of the Brain View 
can deny animalism without rejecting evolutionary theory.  
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 Similarly, contra Blatti, Gillett argues that constitutional views of 
identity can be consistent with an acceptance of evolutionary theory. Here he 
makes an interesting comparison to superorganisms. Superorganisms are 
individuals that are composed of organisms, and superorganisms are also 
products of evolution. Therefore, he argues, some individuals that are 
composed of organisms are products of evolution. Gillett then suggests that 
this compares to constitutionalist views that we are psychological things 
constituted by organisms: He explains: 
 
[. . .] the Psychology-Plus-Constitution theorist can argue that under 
their accounts you are analogous to such a superorganism in being an 
individual composed by an organism, or organisms, and hence you are 
potentially a product of evolution (Gillett 2013, p. 276). 
 
Later on, Gillett emphasises the point that a general feature of evolutionary 
theory is that it can explain how one kind of thing can result in a different kind 
of thing (2013, p. 277). He then continues to conclude that Blatti is wrong to 
state that constitutionalist cannot in principle explain our existence as 
psychological things constituted by organisms, stating:  
 
Contrary to Blatti’s contention, the case of superorganisms illustrates 
how non-organisms might very well evolve from organisms. And even 
if one is concerned that superorganisms are still strictly organisms, 
rather than non-organisms, then the general point about evolution just 
outlined suggests that nothing bars one in principle from giving an 
evolutionary explanation of how a kind of individual that is composed 
by an organism evolved from organisms but is itself a non-organism 
(Gillett 2013, p. 277). 
 
Gillett is right to point out that evolution can occur on entities that are 
not organisms, as well as that evolution can produce organisms from non-
organisms. However, an important aspect that Gillett doesn’t acknowledge in 
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his argument is the background conditions of our development (organismal or 
psychological). The most interesting aspect of our identity that the AAA 
highlights is that there (at least appears) to be an important biological basis for 
our development. This biological basis may, indeed, produce something 
psychological (as Gillett points out), but it may also be something biological (as 
Blatti argues). I think the latter option is more likely because it takes the 
development of psychological capacities seriously.   
To illustrate this, compare the ‘organism/thinking thing’ relationship to 
the ‘organism/environment’ relationship discussed above (in chapter 3). 
Subrina Smith’s notion of the necessity of an organism being constitutionally 
embedded in its environment is particularly helpful here. According to Smith, 
although we can conceptualise organisms as being separated from their 
environment, we cannot, in fact, understand organisms without understanding 
them as organisms-in-the-world. Organisms are necessarily embedded in their 
environment because the environment provides the context of development of 
the organism.46  
 
7.3. Thinking animals and thinking parts 
As I’ve shown above, by shifting focus away from substances and the 
problems that accompany the part/whole distinction, and instead pay attention 
to structural relations between differing heuristic ‘objects,’ the structural 
animalist can respond to several objections posed to the traditional animalist. 
First, I provided a way of making sense of the heuristic devices that can be 
practically tracked to make sense of accounting for, as well as counting, nodal 
parts in relation to greater biological structures. I did this to show how we can 
avoid a Foetus Problem for the animalist, as well as make sense of functional 
aspects of the organism heuristic. Second, I argued that the Animal Ancestors 
Argument works best when we see it as highlighting the importance of biological 
structures to the development of human persons. Although Gillett’s point that 
evolutionary theory can produce a non-organism from an organism (and, 
 
46 The idea of organisms being necessarily embedded in their environment could be fleshed out 
in further detail in terms of recent literature on embodied cognition (see, e.g., Bermúdez et al. 
1995; Chemero 2009; Bermúdez 2018; Shapiro 2019). Although beyond the scope of this 




indeed, non-organisms to organisms) was well made, he doesn’t consider that 
the process being considered takes place within a biological framework. With 
all of this under our metaphorical belts, it will be useful to turn our attention 
over to the (TAA). Not only is this a focal argument in favour of animalism, 
but it provides the structural animalist with the context to show the importance 
of the pragmatic element of deciding which structures to pick out as heuristic 
devices.  
As I mentioned in chapter 1, the TAA relies on the common belief that 
human animals have the ability to think. The argument was stated as such:  
 
P1: There is a human animal sitting in this chair 
P2: the human animal sitting in this chair is thinking 
P3: I am the thing sitting in this chair thinking 
Conclusion: I am the human animal sitting in this chair thinking 
 
The ‘rival candidates problem’ was posed in response to the TAA. According 
to the ‘rival candidates problem,’ an acceptance of the TAAs schema not only 
entails an acceptance of animalism but also a number of its rivals (e.g., ‘mere 
body,’ ‘psychological person,’ etc.) Similarly to the ‘rival candidates problem,’ 
the TAA has also faced the ‘thinking parts problem.’ This problem also follows 
the TAAs schema but concludes that individual parts of an organism can think, 
and thus be what we are identical to (e.g., if my head is located in a chair and 
can think, then I am the head in the chair.) 
 The structural animalist can respond to the ‘rival candidates problem’ 
and the ‘thinking parts problem’ by denying the ontological existence of any of 
the rival candidates and/or parts.  This puts them in a weird position, of 
course, because they seemingly accept and deny P1 (there is a human animal 
sitting in this chair). The way to understand this, however, is to understand that 
the structural animalist rejects P1 insofar as ‘organism’ is understood in K-
compositional terms but accepts the premise insofar as ‘organism’ is 
understood in structural (or N-compositional) terms. Which structural organism 
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is most appropriate to put in P1 is an interesting question; however, given that 
this is the ‘thinking animal argument’ let’s assume for the moment that a 
conscious organism is an appropriate suggestion (call this conscious organism a 
COH for ‘conscious organism heuristic’). Doing this gives us the resulting 
structural emphasis of the thinking animal argument: 
 
P1*: There is a particular biological structure sitting in this chair that is 
referred to as ‘human organism’47 
P2*: This biological structure can be referred to as thinking (the COH) 
P3*. There is a biological structure sitting in the chair that refers to 
itself as ‘I’48  
Conclusion*: The structural relation referring to itself as ‘I’ is the 
human organism sitting in the chair 
 
I take these premises to be pretty straightforward in terms of structural 
emphasis of ‘organism,’ but critics might point out that the existence of various 
structural organisms, in this case, reignites a similar problem to the Rival 
Candidates Problem (i.e., which structural organism are we identified with) and 
Thinking Parts Problem (i.e., how do we know we aren’t a thinking part of the 
structural organism, rather than the whole structural organism?)  But, as I’ve 
shown throughout this, as well as the previous two chapters, we have good 
reason to believe no such problems exist for the structuralist. Given that 
structuralists refer to heuristic ‘objects’ based on their practical use, it’s unclear 
in which cases (apart from, perhaps, a horror novel) referring to, for example, a 
“head sitting in a chair right now” is in any way helpful.   
The reason we refer to the ‘thing’ sitting in this chair as an ‘animal’ and 
not a ‘thinking thing’ is because the former is more specific, i.e., the animal is 
 
47 Of course, the structuralist would also understand the terms ‘chair’ and ‘sitting’ as referring 
to some other heuristic device. 
48 ‘I’ here should not be understood in substantial terms, but as being sub-structure ‘node’ of 
the COH or, perhaps, an even higher-order structure generated by the COH. This is an 




the ‘thing’ which is thinking, and thus more amenable to practical 
considerations. If the ‘thing’ sitting in the chair happened to be some 
intelligent golem, then anyone would be right in saying “the thing sitting in that 
chair is a golem” or even perhaps “the thing sitting in that chair is a thinking 
thing, and by ‘thing’ I mean ‘golem’.” But if the person were to say, “the thing 
sitting in that chair is a thinking thing,” then another would reasonably ask, 
“what thing is thinking?” (compare this to Olson’s objection to ‘thinking’ as a 
substantial kind due to it being a functional kind.) Likewise, if a person were to 
say, “That thing over there is a hunk of matter”, then another could reasonably 
ask, “which hunk of matter are you referring to exactly?” Referring to the thing 
as a golem (or a human animal, or a robot, etc.) is (normally) the exact amount 
of specificity one needs to communicate such things, and that is why the 
structures underpinning those heuristic devices are appropriate to use. 
The second reason these premises don’t create a Rival-Candidates 
Problem or a Thinking Parts Problem has to do with structural priority, as 
discussed in the previous section. That is, the reason the thing sitting in the 
chair is an ‘animal’ rather than a ‘thinking thing’ is because the structural 
relations that produce, or the structures from which the ‘thinking thing’ 
structures emerge from, is the kind of thing that has undergone certain 
evolutionary processes to make such ‘thinking thing’ structures possible (i.e., a 
biological organism). As I argued above, one cannot make sense of the 
‘thinking’ structure without seeing that structure necessarily embedded in a 
prior structure that can generate the thinking—and in the case of human 
persons, that necessary thing is an organism! ‘Thinking’—as well as any other 
heuristic device that refers to a functional kind—will, on this view, always be a 
higher-level heuristic device that is generated by lower-level relations.   
 
7.4. Dicephalic cases 
The last problem for animalism that I will discuss are dicephalic cases. I will 
argue that such cases don’t pose a problem for structural animalism, even if they 
do for traditional, substance-based, animalism.49 I will argue that once we take 
 
49 Olson (2014) has, likewise, argued that dicephalic twinning doesn’t pose a problem to 
animalism. According to Olson, even if we assume that dicephalic cases are cases in which 
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‘organism’ and ‘person’ to refer to heuristic devices, then any metaphysical 
conflicts over identity drop out of the discussion in lieu of references to 
differing subsets of structure. In this regard, much of my argument here 
follows from the nature of the COH and similar higher-order structures 
developed throughout this chapter thus far. 
Dicephalic cases are an example of conjoined twinning in which a 
single torso on which two heads are connected (each head containing its own 
brain). Such cases pose an interesting problem to animalism in that it’s argued 
that both people cannot be identical to the organism (if this were the case, then 
they would be the same person). Given that both people cannot be identical to 
the organism, at least one of them must be identical to something else. Each 
person has the same relation to the organism, however, so it cannot be the case 
that one of the people is identical to the organism whilst the other is not. Thus, 
as McMahan (for example) concludes, “[t]he best thing to say [. . .] is that 
neither of them is identical to the organism” (2006, p. 47). Call this the 
“dicephalic argument” against animalism, and it can be structured thusly: 
 
P1: In cases of dicephalic twinning, there exist two human persons and 
a single organism 
P2: Two persons cannot be identical to the same organism 
Conclusion 1: Some human persons are not organisms  
P3: If some human persons are not organisms, then no human person 
is an organism  
Conclusion 2: No human persons are organisms 
 
However problematic or useful these arguments are for the animalist 
arming themselves with a substance-based metaphysics, I contend that the 
 
there is two person to a single organism (which he shows there is reason to doubt), the 
assumptions that are needed to get from this conclusion to the conclusion that animalism is 




structural animalist can avoid them by denying P1 in terms of composition, 
giving us the ability to deny P2. How is this so?  
 Structural animalists (at least ontic-structural animalists) deny that there 
are individuals above and beyond heuristic devices used to discuss phenomena. 
On an ontological level, structural relations are all that exist, and any “objects” 
that exist are meant to be understood as heuristic terms only. Given this, an 
“organism” in a structural sense is a heuristic, and (as I’ve shown in the 
previous chapter) there are many ways of caching out what kinds of organisms 
exist. To solve the metaphysical puzzle that dicephalic cases give to the 
animalist, we first have to figure out what kind of organism is necessary. Given 
that the problem in these cases is the ratio of person to organism, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the heuristic needed is whatever structural organism 
gives rise to conscious experience (i.e., the COH).  
 The structural animalist can then re-phrase P1 as 
 
P1: In cases of dicephalic twinning there exists one COH that gives rise 
to the structure of two consciousnesses 
 
Typically, in cases of COH, we see the organism heuristic give rise to a single 
conscious heuristic (we typically call this thing the ‘self,’ or, if one wants to be 
more personal, ‘I’). In dicephalic twinning cases, however, there appears to be 
a single COH that gives rise to two distinct conscious heuristic devices. Each 
heuristic device is relevant at any given time will depend, as noted above, on 
which device is the most practical at the time.  
To illustrate this, Figure 2 depicts a heart shape that represents a 
dicephalic organism (call this ‘O’ for short) and two distinct thought bubbles 
that represent two distinct COHs (call them ‘A’ and ‘B’). There may be certain 
circumstances in which the best heuristic device to use would be ‘object’ 
(again, object here is understood in heuristic terms only) OAB. Such a situation 
may be broader discussions of dicephalic cases in which a complete picture of 
such cases is needed for reference. Likewise, perhaps the ‘object’ that is most 
appropriate to refer to is OA (or OB); such cases may occur when A is asleep, 
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but B is awake (or vice-versa). Such a case may seem problematic on a 
substance-based metaphysics because it suggests that a single organism can be 
both awake and asleep at the same time. However, because a structuralist 
commits themselves only to the ontology of certain relational properties and 
not to an object-based ontology, this problem doesn’t arise. The OA and OB 
‘parts’ of OAB functioning in different ways at the same time becomes no 
more mysterious than any other ‘parts’ of OAB functioning differently at the 
same time.  
The question may be asked whether or not this is possible—that is, 
under a structuralist framework, is it possible for a single COH to give rise to 
two structural relations that are best understood as being distinct. Although the 
opponent of the structuralist may say no, Daniel Dennett provides a possible 
way of making sense of such a phenomenon that does not necessarily depend 
on a substance view of the self. 
 Although I can’t claim to solve the issue here, one potential way to 
make sense of two conscious structures being produced by one COH is to take 
Daniel Dennett’s explanation of how humans construct a self. He writes:  
 
[t]he strangest and most wonderful constructions in the whole animal 
world are the amazing, intricate constructions made by the primate 
Homo sapiens. Each normal individual of this species makes a self. Out of 
its brain it spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the other 
creatures, it doesn’t have to know what it’s doing; it just does it 
(Dennett 1991a, p. 416). 




An important aspect of this construction of selves is that it isn’t something 
constructed consciously (1991, p. 418); rather, the consciousness and the 
narrative we refer to as the “self” are products of biological processes (p. 416) 
that present themselves as if they are coming from a unified agent—a 
phenomenon Dennett refers to as a center of narrative gravity (p. 418). He 
describes his theory thus:  
 
A self, according to my theory, is not any old mathematical point, but 
an abstraction defined by the myriads of attributions and 
interpretations (including self-attributions and self-interpretations) that 
have composed the biography of the living body whose Center of 
Narrative Gravity it is. As such, it plays a singularly important role in 
the ongoing cognitive economy of that living body, because, of all the 
things in the environment an active body must make mental models of, 
none is more crucial than the model the agent has of itself (Dennett 
1991a, pp. 426-427). 
 
If we the self as a centre of narrative gravity, then we can deny a 
substantial account of the ‘self’ that is metaphysically significant in a way that, 
for example, a neo-Lockean might take the self to be. The centre of narrative 
gravity isn’t a thing in this substantial sense but can be seen as an abstraction 
generated by the COH. If this were the case, then any organism with the 
required context of development (or may include, for instance, a functioning 
brain) could generate a COH capable of generating such a narrative.  
Given that dicephalic organisms have two brains (and, therefore, two 
distinct contexts of development), it’s unsurprising that two distinct COH 
could develop. Of course, taking the self to be a centre of narrative gravity is 
only one way in which structural animalists could account for two ‘selves’ to an 
organism. Finding alternative views that are compatible with structural 






The aim of this chapter was to show how a structuralist animalism—a version 
of animalism rooted in a structural realist ontology—could respond to certain 
objections that animalism has either traditionally faced or could face. In the 
process of doing this, I began to develop a possible hierarchy of structural 









In chapters 1, 5, and 7, I argued that some major motivations for an animalist 
account of identity stem from a recognition that biology can help in answering 
philosophical problems about what we are. I’ve also argued (in chapters 3 and 
4) that a satisfying account of animalism ought to require it to be able to 
accommodate biology (or science in general) as well as the philosophy thereof. 
In this chapter, I will argue that a position held by many traditional animalists 
fails to certain practices, classifications, and observations made in science: 
forensic human identification, gross human anatomy, classifications of 
necrophilia in humans, and necrophilia sexual strategy.  
 Blatti (2014) makes a distinction between ‘organic’ animalism and 
‘somatic’ animalism. ‘Organic’ and ‘somatic’ animalism offer alternative views 
on how to understand our numerical identity after death. Organic animalism 
maintains that being alive is a necessary condition for an animal (in this case, a 
human animal) to persist. Somatic animalism denies that living is a necessary 
condition of animal persistence, instead arguing that one persists through death 
as a corpse (Sect. 1.2).  
In this chapter, I will argue that animalists should embrace somatic 
structural animalism because it allows for a more straightforward understanding 
of particular areas of current science. Whereas somatic animalists argue that we 
often persist as corpses—as non-living bodies—for some amount of time after 
death, I’ll argue that the structure of a corpse (and therefore the structure of a 
non-living body) is the relevant structure for understanding our persistence. 
Somatic-structural animalism is a view that keeps in mind the kind of structural 
biology and structural animalism I’ve defended in the previous two chapters—
there are, strictly speaking, no biological individuals, no metaphysically robust 
objects, and no ‘us’ above and beyond structural regularities. Of course, this 
means that there aren’t any bodies by which we persist, but in the same way 
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that, in the previous two chapters, I argued for our structural persistence in 
terms of particular heuristic nodes, here I will argue that those heuristics 
continue to play an important explanatory role after we die.  
This chapter is divided as follows: in section 1, I will lay out some 
background information regarding ‘organic’ and ‘somatic’ animalism. I will 
show how each of these positions responds to a more general metaphysical 
thesis: the termination thesis, the metaphysical position that once a person dies, 
they cease to exist. I will also give an overview of arguments that have been 
made for and against each position.  
In section 2, I will show how human cadavers have been used by two 
scientific fields: medical research and forensic anthropology. I will also show 
how the language used by these scientists, as well as how they learn from 
corpses, may give us a reason not only to assume certain metaphysical 
assumptions made by scientists about the nature of corpses but also why these 
assumptions should be seen as correct in some regard.  
In section 3, I will briefly dive into the weird world of paraphilias—
seemingly aberrant behaviours—by taking a close look at necrophilic 
behaviour in both humans and non-humans. As I’ll show, if the TT is true, 
then understanding necrophilia becomes incredibly difficult from both a 
behavioural and biological standpoint. This is especially the case when one 
considers the ‘necrophilia strategy’—a sexual strategy found in some species 
that possibly offers a functionally fit behaviour for reproductive success.   
I’ll discuss what I call the ‘explanatory gap’ in section 4. Although the 
existence of the explanatory gap has been hinted at in previous literature (e.g., 
Carter (1984)), it has not been called as such and has not received the kind of 
attention that I believe it deserves. I will discuss a response that has been made 
to avoid the problem caused by the gap, as well as why it and similar responses 
fail to avoid the problem. Section 5 will conclude the chapter.  
 
8.1. The termination thesis 
I’m going to begin this section by considering Mackie’s (1999) ‘death 
argument’. According to the death argument, psychological continuity is not 




1) a dead person remains in existence after death,  
2) the dead person is not psychological continuous to the person that 
was formerly the living person, and  
3) the dead person is identical with the person that was formerly living 
(Mackie 1999, p. 219).50 
 
What’s interesting about the ‘death argument’ is that it may appear as if any 
animalist would agree with each premise. This isn’t the case, however.  
As I mentioned above, Blatti (2014) makes a distinction between what 
he calls ‘organic’ animalism and ‘somatic’ animalism. According to the organic 
animalist, when an organism dies, it ceases to exist (sect. 1.2). Unlike the 
organic animalist, the somatic animalist believes that (under normal conditions) 
an organism will continue to exist after death as a corpse (sect. 1.2). These 
differing views are opposing responses to what has been called “the 
termination thesis” (TT) (Feldman 1992; Mackie 1999; Feldman 2000; 
Hershenov 2005; Árnadóttir 2011; Snowdon 2014a). According to the TT, 
people cease to exist when they die. Organic animalists accept TT.  Somatic 
animalists reject TT. 
 Most animalists believe that the existence of an animal ends when its 
life ends (Blatti and Snowdon 2016, p. 7). Given that TT is so widely accepted, 
it’s important to determine exactly what it is before I go on to argue against it. 
TT does not claim that when a person dies, they cease to exist as a person 
(Feldman 1992, p. 91; 2000, p. 100). Rather, TT suggests that a person ceases 
to exist, simpliciter, when they die (2000, p. 100). Neither does TT suggest that 
when we die, we will become a corpse, or any other kind of thing, as that 
would imply the falsity of TT:  
 
 
50 I assume that by “dead person,” Mackie is referring to the body that was formerly associated 
with the person, and not the “person” we refer to in terms of psychological continuity. This 
seems to me like the most charitable interpretation of Mackie’s argument. 
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TT is not the view that when people die, they cease existing as the same 
kind of thing they formerly were. TT says nothing about “existence as a kind 
of thing.” Rather, TT implies that when a person dies, he or she ceases 
existing as any kind of thing, since he or she ceases existing altogether. 
And in the second place, if a person goes on existing as a corpse after 
death, then he or she most certainly does go on existing. If you exist as 
a corpse, then you exist. In that case, TT is false, since TT implies that 
when people die they don’t go on existing as anything (Feldman 2000, 
p. 101, original emphasis).  
 
TT is the view that we cease to exist, simpliciter, when we die. When an 
animalist accepts TT we can refer to them as organic animalists.  
As I’ve mentioned, organic animalists deny that we continue to exist 
after death, so although they would agree that psychological continuity isn’t 
necessary for personal identity, they would (similarly to the non-animalist) 
disagree with the first and/or third premise. Regardless, Mackie’s death 
argument casts light on the primary difference between the two positions (i.e., 
the organic and somatic animalism). Thus, Mackie suggests:  
 
Consideration of the Death Argument forces us to recognise that 
Animalists face a genuine choice between different accounts of the 
persistence conditions of human beings. The question what those 
conditions are has not been adequately debated in the literature, and 
there has been a tendency to assume that continued life is required 
(1999, p. 221). 
 
The importance of this difference—the different positions regarding the 
persistence conditions of human beings—as well as acknowledgement of the 
lack of discussion on this issue in the literature, are mentioned by Blatti (2014, 
sect. 1.2) and (Olson 2004, p. 269). The differing views have also been used to 
show that this debate is not merely a verbal or linguistic problem (Blatti 2014, 
sect. 1.2). In the rest of this section, I will flesh out why some animalists have 
213 
 
endorsed the organic variation of animalism, as well as why some have advanced 
the somatic variation.  
Several arguments have been suggested for embracing the TT and thus 
taking organic animalism to be true. However, not all of these arguments apply 
well to animalists. ‘The argument from personal dualism’, described by 
Feldman (1992), doesn’t afford the animalist much hope, for instance. 
According to this argument, we cease to exist when we die because we are a 
union of body and soul. When we die, our soul separates from our body, thus 
breaking the union (pp. 97-99). However, Feldman notes that most people that 
accept TT do not believe in the sort of dualism described (1992, p. 98).  
 One argument that may be embraced by the organic animalist is that an 
animal must cease to exist after death because that is a consequence of 
accepting Locke’s criteria of the persistence of organisms—call this the 
‘Lockean defence of the TT.’ Recall from the introduction of this thesis that 
animalists have typically accepted Locke’s account of the persistence of 
organism—i.e., that an organism persists insofar as it partakes in the same life. 
Thus, when an animal dies, it ceases to exist because the corpse no longer 
partakes in the life necessary for animal persistence.  
The desire to maintain a Lockean account of the persistence of 
organisms seems to be the main reason animalists have accepted TT. Olson, 
for instance, explains one reason to believe that the animal ceases to exist after 
death:  
 
If organisms are essentially organisms, or if nothing can be an organism 
at one time and a non-organism at another, then what it takes for an 
organism to persist ought to have something to do with its life. The 
proposal that comes most readily to mind is that an organism persists if 
its life continues, and perishes when its life ceases and cannot be 
restarted: that is, when it dies. This cannot be what it takes for a corpse 
to persist. So the persistence conditions of living organisms seem 




For Olson, an animal must cease to exist after death in virtue of it no longer 
partaking in its life because life is a necessary property for organismal 
persistence. Corpses, on the other hand, have different persistence conditions 
(they can continue to exist without partaking in a life). Therefore, animals and 
corpses cannot be numerically identical, so the animal cannot continue to exist 
(as a corpse) after death.  
 Mackie (1999) argues that we can accept the important insight offered 
by Locke regarding the persistence of organisms whilst also rejecting the TT. 
Although Mackie takes Locke to have endorsed the TT (1999, p. 236), he takes 
there to be an ‘obvious alternative’ to Locke’s account of organismal 
persistence that both respects his insight yet denies the TT. We can do this, he 
believes, by taking the persistence of a biological organism to depend on 
whether or not the organism has enough of the organisation of parts that are 
suitable for that organism to live. This view would not, therefore, claim that 
organisms are necessarily alive, only that that they have enough organisation of 
parts such that they could live (Mackie 1999, p. 236). He writes:  
 
If we adopt this view, we can agree that there is a difference between 
the identity conditions of masses of matter and those of organisms, and 
that this difference is connected with the fact that it is characteristic 
and/or distinctive of biological organisms that they take on, and lose 
matter as part of their natural life cycles - indeed, that this is how they 
naturally live - without believing that biological organisms necessarily 
cease to exist when they die (Mackie 1999, p. 236) 
 
What’s more, Mackie believes that this alternative interpretation of organismal 
persistence may follow from some of the things Locke himself says [although 
he suggests that we should not take Locke to have meant, or even be aware of, 
this alternative interpretation (1999, p. 237).] For instance, after talking about 
how a plant’s identity is understood in terms of its continued life, Locke 
continues to describe that it continues to exist insofar as it parts “[. . .] exist 
united in that continued Organisation, which is fit to convey that Common Life 
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to all the Parts so united” (Locke 1690 [1975], II.xxvii.4, Mackie's [1999] 
emphasis, p. 237). Following this alternative interpretation, Mackie states:  
 
Now the parts of an organism plainly can be organised in such a way 
that they are fit to convey life to the organism, even if they are not 
actually doing so. Freshly dead trees, butterflies, and human beings may 
retain an almost perfectly intact organisation of their parts (Mackie 
1999).  
 
As stated above, the organisation of parts that are fit to convey life is the basis 
for Mackie’s alternative to the TT (1999, p. 237). On this view, an organism 
persists insofar as the organisation of those parts that are fit to convey life are 
sufficiently intact. Animalists have argued against this account of organismal 
persistence (e.g., Olson (2004, p. 270-272)), but it at least offers a way to reject 
the TT for those that wish to do so and, at the same time, take seriously the 
important insights that Locke provided on this matter.  
 As I mentioned earlier, the ‘organic’/‘somatic’ debate amongst 
animalists isn’t merely verbal/linguistic. However, it has been recognised, both 
by organic animalists [e.g., Olson (2004, p. 269), Rosenberg (1998, p. 41)] and 
somatic animalists (Feldman 1992, pp. 93-95; 2000, pp. 101-103; Árnadóttir 
2011, p. 581; Snowdon 2014a, p. 115), that we often talk as if there really are 
dead animals. Thus, regardless of whether we are correct in doing so, we say 
things like “we buried my grandmother today” or “when my father died, we 
had him cremated”. Likewise, Feldman (2000) suggests that the “here lies” 
followed by the name of the deceased on the headstones in cemeteries speaks 
to the idea that we continue to exist after death (pp. 101-102). In fact, “[. . .] if 
people went out of existence when they died, there would never be a case in 
which some formerly living person lies dead in his grave. Every ‘Here lies’ 
would be a lie” (Feldman 2000, p. 102).  
 Despite many agreeing that our common language assumes the 
existence of dead animals, it’s believed by some that this fact does little to 
make somatic animalism persuasive. It has been suggested that our folk 
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ontologies (and associated linguistic practices) can also favour the view that 
there aren’t dead people. For instance, those that believe in a soul are likely to 
believe that their dead relatives are located in Heaven rather than existing as a 
corpse in a grave (Hershenov 2005, pp. 38-39). This suggests that there may be 
more than one common-sense view, or perhaps, no common-sense view at all 
regarding when we cease to exist (p. 39).  
 Furthermore, even if there is a common-sense view and set of linguistic 
practices shared amongst most (or even all) people, such talk and views are not 
always clear when it concerns the persistence of objects (Árnadóttir 2011, p. 
581), and thus we would still have reason to be wary of putting too much 
weight on such things (Hershenov 2005, p. 39):  
 
We should not let our metaphysics be driven by pre-theoretical 
intuitions even if linguistic practices reveal them to be widely shared by 
laypeople. When exploring the metaphysics of individual objects we 
should place less emphasis on folk ontology and linguistics intuitions 
and more on other matters [. . .] (Hershenov 2005, p. 39). 
 
What’s particularly important for the purposes of this chapter is that one of the 
things that Hershenov believes we ought to place more emphasis on is whether 
or not a particular metaphysical position is compatible with our best current 
science (Hershenov 2005, p. 39). This compatibility with science is something 
Hershenov and I agree on, and I’ll rely on what I’ve said previously in this 
project (especially chapter 3) to defend the view in a general sense.  
The next section of this chapter will focus on the nature of this 
compatibility in a narrower sense: I will focus on whether or not our best 
current science assumes, requires, or is indifferent to the view that humans 
continue to exist after death. I will strongly suggest that some scientific 
disciplines do, in fact, assume and require this shared identity. Before I can 
show this importance, I want to point out two potential problems that those 
defending the TT have to face. Both of these issues have a fair bit of response 
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in the literature already, but I mention them again because they will resurface 
later on (in section 3).  
The first problem is that an acceptance of the TT, and thus organic 
animalism, face what I will call the ‘transfer problem’. This problem is one of 
explaining how an item that was previously on the living person comes to be 
on the now corpse—how did it transfer from one thing to the other?  
I base the transfer problem on a scenario described by Feldman (2000) 
in which a person dresses in a tight-fitting, hard to button suit, only to die later 
with the suit still on. After their death, we now have a corpse on which is the 
same tight-fitting, hard to button suit. Feldman asks, “[h]ow did the person get 
out of the suit without unbuttoning the buttons and unzipping the zippers? 
How did the corpse get in there?  If TT is true, these things must have 
happened” (2000, p. 103). Feldman argues (and I agree) that it is more 
reasonable to assume that there was no transfer of the suit from a living 
organism to a corpse (p. 103). Rather, we both believe that the living person 
died with the suit on, and now the corpse (the same object, although now 
dead) is wearing it. 
The second problem that TT faces has been referred to as ‘the 
annihilationist’s dilemma’ (Olson 2013, p. 88). The annihilationist’s dilemma 
stems from the fact that, if an animal really does cease to exist after death—if 
the animal and the corpse are not numerically identical—then an explanation is 
needed as to where the corpse came from after the animal died and ceased to 
exist (p. 88). It’s a dilemma in that there seems to only be two possible 
solutions, neither of which is ideal: corpse concurrentism and corpse creationism. 
According to corpse concurrentism, the corpse existed before death. This 
position has the advantage of answering the problem of where the corpse came 
from—it was there all along! However, Olson suggests that this solution has 
the odd disadvantage of implying a biological dualism: that the corpse-to-be 
and the animal would be composed of the same atoms at the same time in a 
non-identity relation (Olson 2013, p. 88).51 
 
51 Baker’s material constitution (discussed previously) may be one way of making sense of this 
‘biological dualism’ in that the organism and the corpse-to-be could be said to stand in some 
constitutional relation. I’m not sure if Baker would have subscribed to such a view, but I’m 




Another solution to the annihilationist’s dilemma is what Olson calls 
corpse creationism. On this view, the death of the animal brings the corpse—a 
new object—into existence (Olson 2013, p. 88). He states, “[s]o nothing 
persists through an animal’s peaceful death other than its small parts, such as 
individual atoms. Killing an animal would be a way of bringing a new object 
into being” (2013, p. 88). Olson seems to suggest that the atoms that 
composed the animal go on to compose the corpse, thus creating the corpse out 
of its material. One may reasonably ask how this creation works—how and 
why do atoms respond to the death of an organism in this way? Olson doesn’t 
provide any suggestion to these questions, and it’s perhaps because of the 
weirdness of this position that believes it best that it, along corpse concurrentism, 
be avoided (p. 89).52 
Someone rejecting TT (e.g., somatic animalist) does not have to worry 
at all about the annihilationist’s dilemma. Indeed, the fact that the organism 
doesn’t seem to go anywhere and that a corpse doesn’t seem to appear 
suddenly has been seen as a reason to reject TT:  
 
Surely in every case in which a 150-pound person dies and leaves a 150-
pound corpse, there are plenty of obvious reasons to suppose that a 
certain 150-pound object persists through the change from being alive 
to being dead. I mentioned several of these earlier. I can mention one 
more: suppose a terminally ill 150-pound person is resting on a 
sensitive scale when he dies. Suppose he dies peacefully, so that the 
needle of the scale does not move. It pointed to “150” before he died, 
and it continued to point to “150” when and after he died. It did not 
even quiver at the moment of death. It would have been hard to 
remove the person and replace him with an equally heavy corpse. It 
would have been nearly impossible to do this without causing the 
needle on the scale to move. Since the needle did not move, there is at 
least some prima facie reason to suppose that some 150-pound object 
persisted through the change (Feldman 2000, p. 105) 
 
 
52 Olson previously defended corpse creationism (Olson 2004, p. 272). 
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It appears that such prima facie reason is not sufficient reason to many for 
believing that the object survived the change from animal to a corpse. Instead, 
they choose to face the annihilationist’s dilemma.  
Hershenov (2005) also offers a solution to the annihilationist’s dilemma 
(although he doesn’t refer to it as such). They propose that we substitute the 
words “corpse” or “dead body” with “remains” (p. 40). According to 
Hershenov, it wouldn’t be strange to assume that the remains of an organism 
would have similar properties of the organism—weight and appearance, for 
example. Still, he states that outer appearances can be deceiving (p. 40). As I 
will show in section 3, referring to corpses and dead bodies as “remains” does 
nothing to solve the problems that are created by accepting TT.  
Lastly, one could adopt corpse eliminativism, the view that corpses don’t 
exist; there are, on this view, just particles arranged ‘corpse-wise’ (Olson 2013, 
p. 94). Those that endorse corpse eliminativism don’t have to deal with the 
annihilationist’s dilemma because they deny any corpse comes into being after 
death—a ‘corpse’ is just a useful fiction. An issue with corpse eliminativism, 
however, is that it’s not clear how to defend it without also defending the 
elimination of all things (p. 94). How can we justify counting tables as 
objects/chairs/etc. as objects but deny corpses count?  
 
8.2. The use of corpses in science 
So far, I’ve fleshed out the differences between organic animalism and somatic 
animalism, as well as briefly outlined some arguments for and against each 
position. I’ve also shown how organic animalism and somatic animalism are 
opposing responses to TT. In this section, I want to offer what I take to be a 
convincing argument in favour of somatic animalism, the view that we 
continue to exist after death.  
 This argument stems from an observation concerning how scientists 
talk about and study corpses and how they (at least appear to) learn from 
corpses. In some respects, this recognition isn’t new. Carter (1984) offers a few 
scenarios that depict situations similar to the ones I’m about to describe. He 
notes, for example, that if TT is true, then it is strange how an autopsy is 
performed on a corpse in order to discover how a different entity perished (p. 
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413). Carter also gives us an example of a physician examining a corpse of a 
man that he had performed surgeries on and, recognising the resulting scars, 
states how he spent a good deal of his time and energy taking care of the 
person (p. 413).  
Although Carter’s imagined scenarios are instructive, my hope is that 
some real case studies of scientific research and investigation of cadavers will 
show that these scenarios are not merely imaginary. In doing so, I will show 
just how strange accepting TT can be and (in section 4) how this leads to a 
large problem for the organic animalist. For the rest of this paper, I’m going to 
use the term “corpse” to refer exclusively to what we would normally call 
human corpses, but I see no reason why my argument (or similar arguments) 
cannot also refer to non-human corpses. 
 In medical education, the use of corpses to teach gross human anatomy 
has occurred for centuries (Cornwall and Stringer 2009, p. 234), and the 
dissection of these cadavers in medical courses has been seen as a “uniquely 
defining feature” (McLachlan and Patten 2006, p. 243) of such courses. 
Beyond university degrees and courses, non-university groups such as dentists 
and midwives have also used cadavers in various ways (Cornwall and Stringer 
2009, pp. 235-236).  More importantly, research on cadavers has led to 
biomedical advancements (Bach 2016, p. 356) in areas such as the lymphatic 
anatomy of the breast (Suami et al. 2007).  
Anatomy isn’t the only scientific discipline where a presupposition that 
we continue to exist after death is useful. Forensic anthropology is defined by 
Nawrocki (2006) as “[. . .] the application of anthropological research and 
techniques to the resolution of medicolegal issues, drawing primarily from 
physical anthropology and archeology” (p. 1). They go on to differentiate 
forensic anthropologists from general anthropologists by stating the former’s 
focus on human identification (p. 1). Identifying the deceased is important in 
that it helps in criminal investigations, determine victims of accidents and mass 
disasters, as well as victims of war crimes and genocide (Black 2007, no 
pagination). Thus, Black (2007) notes the important roles that forensic 




The recognition of a self identity may be a basic tenet of humanity and 
therefore, by extension, the scientific ability to confirm that identity is a 
natural progressive step. [. . .] The determination of biological identity 
of the living or the deceased is undertaken by forensic practitioners to 
fulfill our obligations to international humanitarian law, to uphold 
human rights, and to assist those who survive (Black 2007, no 
pagination).  
 
We can see from the use of terms such as “human identification” and 
“biological identity” in reference to the deceased that forensic anthropologists 
are working under the presupposition that what they are dealing with are dead 
biological organisms, specifically humans.  
 Although the language that forensic anthropologists use when talking 
about corpses is interesting, what helps push my argument further is references 
to the history of the formerly living individual that forensic scientists use to 
explain assistances and hindrances in identifying the deceased. Hobbies, 
previous accidents or assaults, bodily modifications, medical interventions, etc., 
that a living individual had or experienced, for example, can aid in identifying 
them once they die (Rutty 2007, pp. 122-123). Examples of this can include 
deformities of the nose and ears of former boxers (p. 122) or missing organs 
from individuals who had them surgically removed when alive (p. 123). 
Identifying the individual can be hindered in cases where the person was badly 
burnt, shot, or died from explosives, etc. (pp. 124-125).  
 The occupation and drug/alcohol use of the living organism can also 
help to identify their corpse after death (Milroy 2007, pp. 108-111). An 
example of this can be seen in coal miners who can have identifying marks 
based on soft tissue changes made by breathing in coal dust (p. 108). The nasal 
septum can be changed in those that snort cocaine, and external stigmata can 
be seen on individuals who take drugs intravenously (p. 109).  
 If a satisfying account of animalism is one that can accommodate 
science in some fashion, then the fact that scientists use, and have used, 
corpses to learn about humans ought to be a reason to suggest that those 
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corpses were once living. To question this is to create an explanatory gap in 
which we have to explain how scientists are able to utilise corpses in such a 
way as to learn about humans. 
The explanatory gap will be discussed further in section 4, but note that 
structural animalism does not have to contend with it. Nor does structural 
animalism have to figure out how to deal with the TT and the annihilationist’s 
dilemma. In fact, the structural animalist is able to endorse a form of ‘corpse 
eliminativism’ that is strengthened by structural regularities, i.e., the structural 
animalist accepts that there are no corpses but isn’t content with saying that 
there are particles arranged ‘corpse-wise’ and that corpses are just ‘useful 
fictions.’ Corpses, on this account, are n-entities—heuristic objects that are 
modally resilient (at least to some extent). Understood in this way, the 
structural animalist can claim that the corpse-structure is a continuation of 
some relevant biological structure—a somatic biological structure. This structure 
is what medical students refer to when studying gross human anatomy and 
what forensic scientists look for when finding and identifying corpses. Corpse-
structures can also help biologists and psychologists when it concerns a 
specific aberrant behaviour: necrophilia.  
 
8.3. The case of necrophilia 
Aggrawal (2016, p. 1) defines ‘necrophilia’ as receiving sexual gratification via 
sex with the dead.5354 For this section, I will assume a broader understanding of 
the term that is based closer from its derived Greek—nekros (corpse, dead 
body), and philia (love, friendship)—but also considers the sexual component 
by which we understand the word today. As such, I will use ‘necrophilia’ to 
mean any sex act in which corpses play some kind of role.  
The reason for this broader interpretation of necrophilia is that by 
Aggrawal’s (2016) own classification system for necrophilia, some necrophiles 
 
53 Necrophilia has also been referred to as necrophilism, necrolagnia, necrocoitus, necrochlesis, and 
thanatophilia. When the attraction is specifically to the corpses of children it’s known as 
necropedophilia (Aggrawal 2016, p. 1). When the attraction is specifically to the corpses of non-
human animals it’s known as necrozoophilia or necrobestiality (Aggrawal 2011, p. 74; 2016, p. 1). 
54 Aggrawal (2016) is the most up-to-date and expansive work by this author on this subject. 
See Aggrawal (2008) and Aggrawal (2009, ch. 13) for his similar but earlier considerations.  
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(i.e., classes I-III) don’t actually have sex with the remains of dead people. 
Class I necrophiles (or ‘role players’) merely role-play as if they or someone 
else were dead (see 2016, pp. 47-48) and Class III necrophiles (or ‘necrophilic 
fantasizers’) only go as far as fantasizing about having sex with the dead (see 
2016, pp. 51-55). In the case of class II necrophiles—or ‘romantic 
necrophiles’—if sexual contact with a corpse does occur, that contact is limited 
to a very specific corpse, such as the corpse of a specific loved one (see 2016, 
pp. 48-51), and as such it’s not corpses that are the object of desire, but the 
former person that the corpse represents. Romantic necrophiles are mostly 
composed of bereaved people who sometimes cannot accept the passing of a 
loved one (2016, p. 48), and the psychopathology of this class may be transient 
in nature and thus recover in time (2016, p. 51). 
Additionally, I don’t believe sexual gratification is a necessary 
component of necrophilia. As I will show later on, necrophilia has been 
observed in several non-human animals. I assume that at least some of these 
animals don’t do it for sexual gratification (at least, not in the way that humans 
understand the term) but as a way of attempting reproduction. Given that only 
seven of the ten categories of necrophiles involve physically interacting with 
the dead bodies as the object of desire, as well as my definition being able to 
accommodate necrophilia in non-human animals, my broader definition of 
necrophilia is more encompassing of the phenomenon as a whole. 
In non-human animals, necrophilia is also known as ‘Davian’ 
behaviour. Izzo et al. (2012, p. 293) and Costa et al. (2010, p. 79) have 
attributed the first use of this term to Dickerman (1960), stating that it’s a 
reference to a limerick about a necrophiliac named Dave (one which I will not 
be reciting here.) Davian behaviour has been observed in mammals 
(Dickerman 1960), birds (Lehner 1988; Moeliker and Rotterdam 2001), 
amphibians (Meshaka 1996; Brito et al. 2012; Izzo et al. 2012; Groffen et al. 
2019; Pintanel et al. 2021), and reptiles (Brinker and Bucklin 2006; Costa et al. 
2010; Siqueira et al. 2015; Ashaharraza et al. 2020).  
There are four reasons I refer to necrophilia specifically in this chapter: 
the first is to highlight that our common conceptions of necrophilia as a 
phenomenon become less clear once we accept the TT. We often consider 
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necrophilia as something strange or gross, if not completely wrong or 
immoral.55 Given that I’ve previously argued that common conceptions have 
little to no place when doing metaphysics, I won’t go into too much detail 
here. Still, for those who disagree with me on this point, it may be worth 
considering how one can reconcile the widespread belief that having sex with a 
corpse is wrong/disgusting/etc. with the belief that there is individual (or, 
indeed, even a corpse if we are corpse nihilists) there for such 
wrong/disgusting/etc. acts to be acted upon.  
 The second reason I refer to necrophilia is that, beyond the common 
conceptions of it mentioned above, the phenomenon becomes more difficult 
to explain and understand scientifically. Anurans (i.e., members of the order 
Anura, i.e., frogs) provide perhaps the best examples to illustrate this point. 
Meshaka (1996) takes Davian behaviour in anurans to be indicative of a 
‘Darwinian dilemma’ in which the drive to procreate puts them in situations 
where there is no chance that they will be able to reproduce. Even further, 
some of these individual anurans put themselves into danger in order to 
attempt this copulation by doing so on roads where they can be killed. 
Meshaka believes the high frequency of necrophilic behaviour in anurans is a 
consequence of human behaviour, i.e., we’ve built automobiles and roads 
which result in the death of female anurans. These deaths result in stationary 
females that appear receptive to male anuran advances (Meshaka 1996, p. 75).  
How is a proponent of the TT able to explain this phenomenon? If the 
TT is true (and we assume that if it is for human animals, then it must be for 
non-human animals), then the dilemma that Meshaka (1996) states as occurring 
in anuran Davian behaviour is much more complicated than previously stated. 
If the TT is true, it’s not the case that male anurans are fooled into putting 
themselves into danger to attempt copulation with a dead female, but that they 
are fooled into copulating with a non-frog.   
These scenarios become even more complicated when one considers 
the observations and experimentations of Izzo et al. (2012) and (possibly) 
 
55 See, e.g., Ochoa and Jones (1997, pp. 252-254) for a brief discussion on why societies value 
the remains of the dead. Aggrawal (2016) describes necrophilia as “[. . .] one of the weirdest, 
most bizarre and revolting practices of abnormal and perverse sensuality” (p. 1). 
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Groffen et al. (2019). Izzo et al. (2012) provide a case of what they call a 
‘necrophilia strategy’ exhibited in the species Rhinella proboscidea.  R. proboscidea 
fertilization occurs externally, and males have been observed extracting oocytes 
from dead females by compressing the dead female’s abdomen. The eggs were 
collected and found to have been successfully fertilized (p. 2963).  
R. proboscidea participate in ‘explosive’ breeding (Izzo et al. 2012, p. 
2962), meaning that breeding occurs in a short span of time (p. 2961). Because 
of this limited time, male-male competition occurs as a way of limiting female 
choice in a mate. This competition can result in female fatalities (p. 2962). Izzo 
et al. believe the ‘necrophilia strategy’ seen in R. probescidea may be beneficial in 
that it provides males with the use of oocytes from dead females (2012, p. 
2965), making it more likely that they can reproduce. After a female dies, the 
chances are unlikely that a male will find and successfully breed with another 
alive female. This is especially the case given that the operational sex ratio is 
strongly biased to males and that males expend a lot of energy in battles over 
females (p. 2965). Given this, it would be advantageous for R. proboscidea for 
males to have adapted a sexual strategy in which they extract and fertilize 
oocytes from dead females because it would allow for the reproductive success 
of both the male and female (p. 2965). Beyond R. proboscidea, Izzo et al. 
hypothesize that the ‘necrophilia strategy’ may be adaptive to other species, 
stating:  
 
As expulsion of oocytes from dead females probably can have fitness 
advantages for both partners, the behaviour may be more prevalent in 
anurans, or even other groups that rely on external fertilization, than 
present records indicate. However, studies of reproductive behaviour 
of species that are explosive breeders should be conducted to confirm 
this hypothesis (Izzo et al. 2012, p. 2965).  
 
Since their publication, Groffen et al. (2019) has suggested that the ‘necrophilia 
strategy’ may be utilised successfully by the species Rana uenoi, a ‘prolonged 
breeder’ (p. 43) (meaning that, unlike ‘explosive breeders,’ R. uenoi aren’t 
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limited to a short-term temporal breeding pattern.) This observation gives 
added credence to the ‘necrophilia strategy’ as a successful breeding strategy.   
If the TT is true, then how are we to explain Davian behaviour as a 
worthwhile sexual strategy? How are we to explain the offspring resultant of 
such a strategy? If we accept some version of corpse eliminativism, then it 
seems like we would have to accept some version of creatio ex nihilo in certain 
circumstances: such as in circumstances when the necrophilia sexual strategy is 
successfully utilised. Even if we deny corpse eliminativism, and accept that 
some kind of non-anuran material object exists after the female anuran dies, we 
would presumably need to accept some major revisions in our understanding 
of sexual strategies. For example, one might suggest that it’s worthwhile for 
some members of R. probescidea or R. uenoi to attempt copulation with an object 
that is not a member of its respective species (nor even an animal). When such 
a strategy is successful in these cases, we might say that the resultant offspring 
only has one parent (i.e., the male) given that there is, at least according to the 
TT, no female present.   
Of course, these complications don’t exist for those that deny the TT. 
There is no question, on this account, what the dead object is. The necrophilic 
sexual strategy works precisely because, in such circumstances that it’s 
successfully implemented, a male frog reproduces with a female frog! Given 
that a rejection of the TT provides us with a more straightforward 
interpretation of the necrophile strategy, I believe that we ought to reject it.  
 The third and fourth reasons I utilise necrophilia in this discussion can 
be seen as considerations that follow the first and second reasons above. If TT 
is true, it’s not only our common conceptions of necrophilia that become 
dubious but our common moral and legal concerns regarding necrophiles and 
acts of necrophilia. I will go into further detail on this point in the following 
(and final) chapter.  
 
8.4. An explanatory gap 
In the previous section, I showed how medical researchers and forensic 
scientists use dead humans to learn about humans in general as well as 
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particular individuals. I also showed that cases of necrophilia become 
complicated, especially in cases in which necrophilia leads to procreation. 
Because of this, I argued that it is beneficial to take ourselves to exist after 
death (as corpses). Of course, one may oppose this argument on the grounds 
that it assumes a philosophical understanding from such scientists that is 
simply not there. Perhaps what medical researchers and forensic scientists think 
they are studying and what they are actually studying are two completely 
different things. What they are actually studying is not something identical to a 
human animal, but something numerically different from a human animal. 
Perhaps necrophiles aren’t interested in human corpses, but atoms arranged 
‘corpse-wise.’ Maybe we ought to reconsider how reproduction in some species 
works to include cases of creatio ex nihilo.  
 If this move is made, then I think things become weird and 
complicated very quickly. I believe this because what I take to be an 
explanatory gap forms as a result of accepting that a corpse is not identical to a 
previous living animal. Unless the organic animalists reject that knowledge is 
attained from corpses by medical researchers and forensic scientists, they have 
to explain how it is that such scientists learn about humans (both generally and 
regarding specific individuals) by a) examining objects that are not themselves 
those animals or individuals, or b) examining objects that are not connected to 
the animals or individuals in any clear way. 
I’m sure the gap can be filled in somehow: scientists consistently learn 
about stuff from other, non-related things. However, in these cases, there is 
usually some connection between the entities we are learning about and the 
entities we are learning from. When it concerns corpses, however, the 
connection isn’t clear if we adopt ‘corpse creationism’ (i.e., the corpse is brand 
new, so some connection with the once-living organism would need to be 
made), ‘ 
To illustrate this point, imagine a scenario in which a corpse is found in 
a forest. Upon examination, a group of forensic anthropologists and other 
experts in the area determine that the corpse is a male, somewhere in their late 
thirties or early forties. The corpse has been in the forest for only a few days 
based on the level of decomposition, and the presence of a bullet hole in the 
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back of the head (as well as an embedded bullet) suggests that the cause of 
death was from a gunshot. Later, DNA, dental, and photographic evidence 
show the body to be that of an individual named Norman.  
If the organic animalist is correct, then this scenario becomes 
problematic very quickly. As shown in the previous section, a key job of the 
forensic anthropologist is to identify humans. Given that the corpse found in 
the forest isn’t human, one may wonder how the forensic anthropologist 
identified it (or why a forensic anthropologist was brought in to investigate the 
scene to begin with). Assuming that the organic animalist can account for this 
identification (as I will show later, they could suggest that the corpse is the 
remains of the individual, whilst not being identical to them), they then must 
explain how a non-biological thing can be determined to have a particular sex, 
as to my knowledge sex is a property that only living beings have. Determining 
the time since death and the age of the corpse is also complicated. How is it 
that forensic anthropologists can determine when a human animal died based 
on an object that never existed when the animal was alive? 
Another problem comes from explaining the cause of death. Firstly, 
how does one determine the cause of death of something that no longer exists 
based solely on a new and distinct object that didn’t exist when the living entity 
died? Secondly, recall the transfer problem mentioned earlier. If the bullet really is 
numerically identical to the one that caused the death of an individual, then 
how did the bullet get removed from the animal? How did it find itself in the 
head of the corpse? Similar to Feldman’s person in a tight suit, if the organic 
animalist is right, then this switch from animal to corpse must have occurred at 
some point. 
Regarding the nature of this and similar cases, the fact that it appears as 
if the bullet didn’t make a transfer suggests the falsity of TT. Take a similar 
example given by  Feldman (2000) in which an individual is shot by a bullet but 
survives. Later, an autopsy reveals the bullet (p. 102). Feldman states:  
 
I can readily imagine that there might be a person who is hit by a bullet 
on one occasion and then later dies as a result of a stroke. I can readily 
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imagine that an autopsy might be performed on this dead person and 
that the medical examiner might then remove the long-embedded 
bullet. The object that formerly was a living person still exists—now as 
a corpse—and still contains the bullet. If such a thing could happen, 
then TT is false (Feldman 2000, p. 102) 
 
If, as it appears, a bullet in such a circumstance doesn’t transfer from an 
individual to a corpse, then TT (and thus, organic animalism) is false. If the 
bullet does transfer from a living organism to a corpse, then this transfer has to 
be explained. 
Lastly, it should strike one as both odd and unbelievably coincidental 
that the corpse and Norman happen to look the same, as well as share the 
exact same DNA and dental structure. But coincidence seems to be the only 
explanation if organic animalism is true—the corpse just happens to have 
matching DNA, dental structure, and appearance of a former living animal. 
This coincidence makes it appear (falsely) as it was that same individual! 
Similarly, the organic animalist has to offer an explanation for how 
medical students learn about human anatomy using the anatomy of a corpse or 
how medical research using cadavers can lead to advancements in medicine. 
Without this explanation, it seems miraculous that these things occur.  
 One may respond to this problem by suggesting that we can make 
sense of it if we refer to the corpse as the remains of the living human animal. 
Hershenov (2005) suggests as such, noting that it’s not strange to hear of 
coroners studying remains (p. 39). He goes on to list a variety of things that 
scientists have learned from that are not, themselves, organisms:  
 
[. . .] there is an abundance of counterexamples to the claim that 
knowledge of a species can only come from studying individual 
members of the species. Just consider all the truth that can be gleaned 
from footprints, artefacts, nests, feather, stools, and blood samples of 
the species in question. They tell us a great deal about an organism that 
they are not identical to. So, likewise, gaining knowledge from studying 
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what is called a ‘corpse’ does not necessitate that the corpse had to be a 
living organism. It is not even necessary that the corpse be considered a 
genuine substance rather than just the remains of one (Hershenov 
2005, pp. 39-40). 
 
Thus, according to Hershenov, organic animalism can accommodate research 
done on cadavers. There is no explanatory gap because what researchers are 
studying are the remains of a living animal. I don’t see this as a productive move 
to make, however, because at best, it creates the question of what kind of 
“remains” the corpse is (e.g., are human remains like blood samples? Bird 
nests?). At worst, it only pushes the problem back further: how do we begin to 
make the connection between the corpse and the former living animal?  
 One could suggest that we can make the explanatory connection 
between corpses and the former living animal in exactly the same way that we 
learn from bird nests and blood samples—that is, corpses are of the same kind 
of remains as bird nests and blood samples. I don’t know if this is exactly what 
Hershenov (2005) had in mind when he listed his examples of animal remains, 
but such a suggestion is possible. We could potentially do this by broadening 
the “historic-dependence account” described by Olson (2013, p. 90-92), in 
which the boundaries of an organism include things that are in, some sense, a 
result of earlier activities of the life that created them (p. 90).  
Olson mentioned the historical-dependence account as a possible way 
to include “dead” parts of an organism (for example, a sheep’s horns) as parts 
of that organism, but we could extend such a definition to include artefacts 
that, although not parts of the organism, have at least some causal connection 
with the organism. A bird’s nest, for instance, may not be a part of the bird, 
but we can recognise the nest as offering information about that species of 
bird in virtue of a member of that species building it, i.e., having some causal 
connection to it, when it was alive. This account doesn’t seem to work in 
explaining the connection between corpse and living animal, however, because 
a corpse isn’t something that is left over by the organism, according to the 
organic animalist—it’s an entirely different entity.  
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 Because organic animalists have the burden of finding a solution to the 
explanatory gap, and because any way of doing this seems to fail, I suggest we 
abandon the position that creates it. We do persist after death (as non-living 
things). In structural terms, this amounts to a continuation or some somatic 
biological structure that extends beyond death. These non-living structures can 
then be n-composed (recall that this means ‘composed’ in a thin sense) to 
denote a particular useful structural node or n-entity that we call a ‘corpse’. 
Corpses are then studied by scientists to not only learn about the specific 
individual that the now corpse was when it was alive but also about certain 




In this chapter, I have shown that accepting a version of somatic animalism 
(and thus denying the termination thesis) is preferable to accepting the alternative 
view: organic animalism. I’ve referred to this version of somatic animalism as 
somatic-structural animalism because it focuses on the somatic structures found in 
biology. Structural somatic animalism is preferable to organic animalism 
because the latter offers a less straightforward interpretation of what occurs in 
our best current science (especially gross human anatomy, forensic human 
identification, and cases of necrophilia).  Organic animalism also has to deal 
with an explanatory gap brought upon by ‘corpse eliminativism’ or the 










There are three main steps that I’ve made in this project: first was to argue that 
animalism, the view that we (i.e., human persons) are animals (i.e., members of 
the species Homo sapiens), works better as a theory of identity when we motivate 
it with actual biology. The second step was to argue that biology—at least 
when concerning biological individuals—works best when we abandon talk of 
‘substances’ and ‘objects’ and instead embrace an eliminative Ontic Structural 
Realism (OSR). Finally, in the third step, I brought OSR all the way back to 
where I started by offering an account of animalism that accepts that we are 
necessarily animals but denies that animals are ‘objects’ in any ontological 
sense. I’ve called this view Structural Animalism. To conclude this project, I’m 
going to broadly look back at some of the key points I’ve made and discuss 
where we, structures of human animals, go from here. 
 
1. Summary: Step one (animalism to biology) 
Step one of this project began with an introduction to a theory of personal 
identity known as animalism. Animalism, it was described, broadly held that 
we, human persons, are identical to animals. Specifically, each human person is 
identical to a biological individual, a member of the species H. sapiens. 
Animalism is a response to the personal-ontological question of personal identity, 
the question that asks, “what are we?” In this regard, animalism doesn’t (at 
least directly) address other questions of personal identity, namely the evidence 
question (i.e., “which evidence do we use when we consider when establishing 
whether or not two or more persons or objects are numerically identical?”), the 
personhood question (i.e., “what does it take to be a person rather than a non-
person?”), and the persistence question (i.e., “what are the necessary and sufficient 
233 
 
conditions for some entity at one point in time to be numerically identical to 
another entity at another, different, time?”)  
 The relationship between the various questions of personal identity was 
discussed (albeit briefly). An answer to the personal-ontological question, for 
example, could imply an answer to the persistence question (and vice-versa). This 
relationship exists because what we are will tell us something about what it 
takes for something like us to persist. If we are human animals (as animalists 
suggest), then this answer to the personal-ontological question will imply that we 
persist in whatever way human animals persist—it will imply an answer to the 
persistence question.  
 The evidence question traditionally relates to the persistence question because 
an answer to the former will help us answer the latter. If we want to know 
what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for something to persist 
through time (thus, answering the persistence question), then we ought to be 
interested in what kinds of evidence will lead us to those conditions (thus, 
answering the evidence question.) I suggested at this point in the thesis that we 
also ought to consider that an answer to the evidence question will also help us 
determine an answer to the other questions of personal identity by, e.g., 
providing us with evidence to determine what it takes something to be a 
person (thus, answering the personhood question) or suggesting what we might be 
(thus, answering the personal-ontological question.)  
In this section of the project, I also suggested that the personhood question 
could be broken down into two separate questions: what I called the broad 
personhood question and the narrow personhood question. The broad personhood question 
asks what it takes for any entity to be a person—what properties would some 
entity have to have in order to be a person? The narrow personhood question asks 
what it would take for some particular kind of entity to be a person—what 
does it take for some particular kind of entity to have the properties suggested 
by the broad personhood question. Again, consider electricity to motivate this 
distinction: we can have a ‘broad electricity question’ that offers us a general 
account of what it takes to generate electricity, but not all things that generate 
electricity are the same. A ‘narrow electricity question’ would provide an 
answer of what it takes for a windmill to generate electricity or what it takes a 
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solar panel to generate electricity. This distinction should be important to the 
animalist because animalism doesn’t take all persons to be human persons 
(even though all human persons are human animals). Presumably, the 
conditions that must be met for a human animal to be a person are different 
than those that must be met for an alien to be a person (or an elf, a god, a 
robot, etc.)  Yet, an answer to the broad personhood question would tell us what 
properties to look out for that group all of these different entities together.  
 Animalism was compared and contrasted with neo-Lockeanism. A 
group of views that accept some form of psychological criterion of personal 
identity. Neo-Lockeanism is named such because it refers back to John Locke, 
who argued that persons persisted through time differently than living things 
(i.e., biological organism)—persons persisted through time insofar as the 
rational being or consciousness persisted through time. Neo-Lockeans follow 
in Locke’s footsteps by arguing that what it takes for a person to persist has 
something to do with psychology (hence, the psychological criterion.) In the same 
way that animalists answering the personal-ontological question by claiming we are 
human animals (and thus are implied to persist in the same way human animals 
persist), neo-Lockeans respond to the persistence question by stating that we 
persist in virtue of some psychological fact (and thus are implied to be 
numerically identical with something psychological.) We can see the 
relationship between the personal-ontological and persistence questions playing an 
important role in how neo-Lockeans and animalists approach questions about 
our identity (i.e., animalists start by answering the personal-ontological question and 
derive answers to the other questions of personal identity from that, and neo-
Lockeans start with an answer to the persistence question and do the same with 
their answer to that question.)  
 With the different questions of personal identity in mind, I suggested 
that the question that ought to have priority is the evidence question—that, as 
metaphysicians interested in personal identity, we should consider what 
evidence we look at to lead us to one view of identity or another. Once we do 
this, we can see that the animalists are emphasising evidence that points to our 
biological aspects and neo-Lockean’s are, in a similar fashion, emphasising 
evidence that highlights our mental properties.  
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In chapter 1, I showed how animalists emphasise evidence that shines a 
light on our biological properties by providing a critical analysis of three 
arguments that animalists have provided to conclude that we must be 
biological organisms. The Thinking Animals Argument (TAA) emphasised a 
common belief that we have that some biological organisms (e.g., H. sapiens) 
have mental capacities such as the ability to think. The Foetus Problem hangs on 
the belief that many people have that we, as human persons, were at one point 
human foetuses. The “problem” comes into play when we consider that this 
common belief seems to be at odds with the belief that we are necessarily 
persons (something that no foetus is.) Finally, the Animal Ancestors Argument 
(AAA) gets its force from the common belief that all human persons are the 
product of evolution by natural selection. According to the AAA, if human 
persons aren’t organisms, then neither were the members of the previous 
generation (e.g., our parents), and the same can be said of the generation 
before that (and so on, and so forth ad infinitum). Thus, it was argued, the 
entirety of evolution by natural selection must be false (at least when it 
concerns human persons.)  
In chapter 2, I turned my sights over to arguments that have been 
made against animalism. Utilising a slightly modified taxonomy afforded by 
Paul Snowdon, I showed that arguments against animalism could be broadly 
categorised in two ways: those that rely on apparent dissociative cases (i.e., 
cases in which there is a perceived dissociation between the human person and 
the human animal) and those that do not rely on such cases. In terms of the 
latter kind of argument, if a perceived dissociation were shown to exist, then 
animalism must be false. Animalism proposes that human persons are identical 
to human animals, and if dissociative cases are shown to exist, then it would be 
possible for a human person to exist without also being a human animal (and 
vice-versa).  Concerning dissociative cases, Snowdon divides them according to 
those that rely on possible cases in which there is an animal and no person 
(A&~P) cases, and those that rely on possible cases in which there is a person 
and no animal (P&~A cases).  
Although this taxonomy is useful, there is another way that dissociative 
cases can be categorised that, if the division is found suitable, can be of great 
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tactical advantage to animalists. In chapter 3, I spelt out this division of 
dissociative cases in terms of those that were ‘real’ and those that were 
‘imagined.’ ‘Real’ cases, it was argued, were those conceived dissociative cases 
that could actually occur in the world as we know and understand it. ‘Imagined’ 
cases, in contrast, were conceived dissociative cases which could only occur in 
the imagination (and thus not in the real world.) If this is a worthwhile manner 
in which to divide up apparent dissociative cases, I argued, then animalists can 
reject any ‘imagined’ dissociative cases as not posing any metaphysical threat to 
animalism on the grounds that such cases were not possible.  
Snowdon rejected the idea that such categories pointed at a real 
division in dissociative cases, whereas I argued that they did. This is because 
Snowdon doesn’t believe we can delineate ‘imagined’ scenarios in philosophy 
from those in science. Such scenarios are used in science to help us make 
hypotheses about how the world works and, as such, it seems like we can do 
the same thing with imagined scenarios in philosophy. If imagined thought 
experiments weren’t able to be used in philosophy, he argued, then why can we 
use them in science?  
In determining whether or not the ‘real’ and ‘imagined’ distinction was 
a worthwhile one, Snowdon and I were both referring to Wilkes’ contention 
that thought experiments had no place in drawing conclusions in philosophy 
(this despite her view that they could be used reliably to draw conclusions in 
science.) As I showed, Snowdon’s criticisms of the ‘real’/‘imagined’ were based 
on an uncareful analysis of Wilkes’ view, leading him to conflate ‘thought 
experiments’ that aren’t useful (i.e., those that aren’t constrained by 
experimentation) with ‘thought experiments’ that are useful, ‘experiments that 
take place in thought,’ and ‘merely imagined’ thought experiments. Given that 
these kinds of experiments are different to Wilkes, and given that the 
‘real’/‘imagined’ distinction only relies on ‘thought experiments’ that aren’t 
useful being utilised in philosophy, I argued that Snowdon’s criticisms of the 




2. Summary: Step two (biological objects to biological structures) 
With an understanding of animalism—its varieties, motivations, etc.—
considered. I went on to the second step of my plan, namely, to suggest that a 
fully developed animalism necessitates that the position is, at minimum, 
accommodating to our current knowledge of biology. However, as I showed in 
chapters 5 and 6 (which realised this step,) exactly what this means isn’t clear 
and may be best understood by adopting a new metaphysics of biology.  
 If animalism, the view that I suggested we adopt, claims that we are 
animals—individual organisms of the species H. sapiens—then it had better 
give us some indication of what such a thing is. Yet, providing such 
information is the first problem that a naturalised animalism must face. As I 
showed, it’s not actually clear what a biological organism/individual even is. 
Several candidate definitions that are taken seriously by contemporary 
philosophers of biology were provided. The various attempts at providing a 
clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions for organismality are attempts at 
providing a solution to what I called the definitional problem of biological 
individuality. The definitional problem is what one faces when they try to figure 
out what it takes for something to be a biological individual, and as such, it 
requires a definitional solution—a solution that outlines a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions such that, when an entity fulfils them, that entity belongs 
to the category “biological individual.” 
 However important a definitional account of organismality may be, 
such an account still isn’t sufficient for telling us what it takes for something to 
be a biological individual. This problem is what Eric Olson has suggested to us 
by arguing that such definitional solutions will always presuppose that there is 
some entity that counts as being a candidate for such a definitional solution. 
What an account of biological individuality requires (either alone or in 
conjunction with a definitional account) is an ontological account of what 
counts for some entity to exist such that it can even begin to be defined as a 
biological individual. I referred to this need for an ontological account of 
biological individuality as the existential problem of biological individuality, with 
a candidate solution to the problem being an existential solution.  
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 Although I agreed with Olson that definitional solutions were 
problematic in that they presupposed particular ontologies, I pointed out that 
definitional solutions were guilty of their own presuppositions—definitional 
solutions presupposed a proper definition of biological individuality. That a 
definitional solution requires a solution to the existential problem, which, itself, 
requires a solution to the definitional problem, is what I referred to as the meta-
problem of biological individuality—how do find a solution to both the 
definitional and the existential problems in a non-question-begging way?  
  The answer to this question was found in a structuralist ontology. 
According to Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), reality is fundamentally one of 
structure. I suggested that this non-substantive metaphysics was able to cut 
through the meta-problem of biological individuality by offering a metaphysics 
that was both scientific in nature (i.e., structures are understood in terms of 
modally resilient property relations) and metaphysical in nature (i.e., it suggests 
that the world is one of structure, not of substance.) By focusing on the 
important causal or lawlike similarities found in biology, I argued that we could 
refer to patterns of nature in a coherent way that doesn’t necessitate them 
being properties of an object. In doing this, I argued that we could eliminate 
biological objects (such as organisms) whilst also accepting that there exist 
heuristic nodes that can be carved out to fit those roles (I referred to this 
‘carving out’ as n-composition, or ‘thin’ composition, and the resulting thin 
entities, ‘n-entities’.) 
 
3. Summary: Step three (biological structures back to animalism) 
With a structural account of biology in mind, I took the third and final step in 
this thesis: to go back to where I started (i.e., animalism) and apply 
structuralism there. In chapter 7, I considered some arguments for and against 
animalism (e.g., the AAA) and suggested how a structuralist metaphysics could 
bolster some of the arguments in favour of animalism whilst also improving 
the criticisms animalists could make to their opponents. 
 Next, I considered how structural animalism could be applied to a 
specific problem in the debate: how to best understand our identity (or lack 
thereof) after death. This was the situation discussed in chapter 8. In the 
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chapter, I provided an analysis of the Termination Thesis (TT) and considered 
what particular sciences or scientific phenomena would look like if it was true. 
As I showed, accepting the TT creates an epistemic gap for scientists learning 
about humans via corpses. Accepting the TT also had strange consequences 
for the reproduction of certain species of frogs. Although there were ways to 
make sense of these consequences, they were ultimately deemed problematic 
and less straightforward when compared to a somatic account of organismal 
persistence. However, I also acknowledged that the somatic account was 
metaphysically problematic in that it led to the annihilationist’s dilemma. To 
follow through with the structural animalism defended in this project, I 
suggested that we take a structural somatic account of organismal persistence to 
be the most straightforward account in science. According to this account, the 
relevant structural ‘node’ to follow in organisms is something somatic—the 
heuristic has something to do with the body of the organism. 
 
4. Looking forward 
I recognise that a structural animalism is a unique position amongst animalists, 
and one that is in need of a lot more consideration. For instance, it’s still 
relatively unclear which biological structures animalists should concern 
themselves with. I mentioned in chapter 6 a potential conscious organism 
heuristic (COH) which is arguably the biological structure we care about most 
often since this is the structure that both animalists and mentalists often refer 
to. However, there are cases in which the material or ‘somatic’ structure is the 
one we care about. This is especially the case when dealing with dead bodies 
and their parts. A ‘living’ (broadly construed) structure may be the one ought 
to consider when we are considering individuals who are in a permanent 
vegetative state. In any or all of these cases, the animalist needs to figure out 
precisely what the biological structures are, as well as how modally resilient 
they are.  
Another possible area for further discussion is the role a structural 
metaphysics can possibly play in feminist metaphysics, both broadly as well 
structural animalism. Elizabeth (2014) has argued that projects in 
metametaphysics rule out the possibility of feminist metaphysics due to such 
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metametaphysical projects embracing an overly restrictive importance to 
fundamentality. She writes:  
 
Many familiar debates in metaphysics—personal identity, free will, 
constitution, etc.—don’t fit neatly into a fundamentality-centric 
framework. And yet, with a bit of wrangling, defenders of 
fundamentality-centric metaphysics can argue that those debates are 
actually, in some sense, debates about fundamentality. That option 
simply isn’t available, though, for most feminist metaphysics. Feminist 
metaphysics is explicitly—and deliberately—not about the fundamental 
(Elizabeth 2014, p. 349). 
 
One of the benefits of a structuralist ontology is that it can refer to 
fundamentality in a nested fashion. There are the modally resilient structures in 
fundamental physics, and nested in them are the less modally resilient 
structures found in biology. This leaves open the possibility of a structural 
account of psychology, cognitive science, and even social sciences. Each of 
these structures could plausibly be seen as nested within a more fundamental 
structural relation. Because of this, feminist metaphysicians could reconcile the 
kind of metaphysics they are doing whilst also claiming to work within a 
metaphysics of fundamentality (i.e., the fundamental structure of sociology, 
history, etc. and the relational role that women play within them). Of course, 
this goes against Elizabeth’s point of metaphysics not necessarily having to do 
with fundamentality, but the option I propose above could be seen as a 
possible compromise.  
 Lastly, earlier I suggested that a structural account of necrophilia could 
help us make sense of our common moral, legal, and psychological, and 
forensic concerns regarding the phenomenon. I find it strange that the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) classifies necrophilia as under code 
302.9 (Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder) in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (DSM-V) (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013, p. 705). Perhaps this is due to the disorder being presumed 
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rare (Aggrawal 2016, p. 99). However, even if the statistics concerning the 
prevalence of necrophilia are correct, it does seem like there are some 
regularities in necrophilic behaviour in humans that seem to specify the 
behaviour in much more concrete and subtle ways.56 Aggrawal (2016) has 
formulated ten distinct classes of necrophiliac with examples of criminals that 
fit each. If something as presumably rare as necrophilic behaviour in humans 
can be categorised into ten distinct and relatively regular kinds, then 
presumably other ‘rare’ forensic and medico-legal phenomena can as well.57  
Not only are fine-grained classifications of mental disorders beneficial 
to psychology, but they could also play a clarificatory function in law where 
necrophilic behaviour and the ethics thereof can come into play (see, e.g., Klaf 
and Brown (1958); Rosman and Resnick (1989); Ochoa and Jones (1997); 
Ehrlich et al. (2000); Troyer (2008); Boureghda et al. (2011); Pettigrew (2019a, 
2019b) for examples of medico-legal cases of necrophilia, and Benecke (2008); 
McKearn (2008) for ethical considerations of necrophilia.) The important 
point here is that a structural account of this (and similar) phenomenon would 
provide us with a better way of understanding the psychological relations at 
play in such aberrant behaviour, but also a possible way to understanding such 
behaviour within larger social relations.  
  
 
56 Aggrawal (2016) notes that necrophilia may be more prevalent than statistic indicate given 
that the acts only become known once the necrophiliac is caught. This is in addition to the fact 
that the presumed victim (i.e., the corpse) is unable to complain (p. 99). 
57 An example of this can be found in Aggrawal (2011) who has categorised zoophilia into ten 
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